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The commercialisation of military services has increased in importance since the 
end of the Cold War.  Commercial Military Service Providers (CMSPs) have found 
increased respectability and worked in states on every continent.  Writing on 
CMSPs has similarly increased.  Several high profile incidents have come under 
intense scrutiny, and has led to some portions of the literature demonising their use.  
However, there are still conceptual and theoretical issues which have been under 
explored. 
 This thesis contributes to the literature which has sought to address 
this theoretical lacuna.  Historical Sociology and comparative analysis are employed 
to analyse the implications of CMSP use on the state.  A modified version of the 
Ideological, Economic, Military and Political (IEMP) model developed by Michael 
Mann, is used to theorise the impact of commercial security providers on existing 
sources of power within the state, and the relationship between them.  The thesis 
uses two case studies which are representative of the use of CMSPs during this 
time period.  The Sierra Leone Civil War and the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq 
since 2003. 
 It will be argued that CMSPs alter the balance between power 
structures within the state, positively and negatively affecting the power of the state.  
The short term use of CMSPs has proven to be useful and of increasing importance; 
especially when military weakness is an urgent problem.  However, although there 
has been no example of CMSPs intentionally threatening state stability, they can 
also subvert the power of the state.  CMSPs, particularly when used for an extended 
period, have undermined the relationship between the sources of power, 
undermining political stability.  Most significantly they weakened the state by 




AFRC  Armed Forces Revolutionary Council  
APC  All People’s Congress  
CDF  Civil Defence Force  
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
CMSPs  Commercial Military Service Providers  
CPA  Coalition Provisional Authority  
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation  
DoD   Department of Defence  
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group  
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States  
EO  Executive Outcomes 
GSG   Ghurkha Security Group  
IEMP  Ideological Economic Military and Political  
IGO   Inter-Governmental Organisations  
IMF  International Monetary Fund  
IPOA   International Peace Operations Association  
MEJA  Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act  
MNC  Multi-national Corporation 
MPRI  Military Professional Resources Incorporated  
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation  
OAU  Organisation of African Unity  
PMC  Private Military Company 
PMF  Private Military Firm 
PSC  Private Security Company 
R2P  Responsibility to Protect 
 viii 
 
RUF  Revolutionary United Front  
SADF  South African Defence Force   
SIGIR  Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction  
SLA   Sierra Leone Army  
SLPP   Sierra Leone People’s Party 
UAVs  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
UCMJ  Uniform Code of Military Justice  
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola  







  “Earlier, human tribes lived on this earth 
 without suffering and toilsome hardship 
 and without painful illnesses that bring death to men- 
 a wretched life ages men before their time- 
 but the woman with her hands removed the great lid of the jar 
 and scattered its contents, bringing grief and cares to men. 
 Only hope stayed under the rim of the jar 
 and did not fly away from her secure stronghold, 
 for in compliance with the wishes of cloud-gathering Zeus 
 Pandora put the lid on the jar before she could come out. 





In Hesiod’s poem Works and Days, Zeus orders the creation of Pandora in order 
to take revenge on men.  Pandora opens a jar2 which brings ‘grief and cares’, 
withholding only hope.  Many of those who comment on the outsourcing of force 
by the state have portrayed the process in the same way - by opening the jar 
and using commercial actors to carry out core functions, the state is committing 
an act that can only bring evil onto the world, a world which has never seen such 
strife before.   
                                                          
1
 Hesiod, Hesiod: Theogony, Works and Days, Shield, trans. by Apostolos N. Athanassakis 
(London: John Hopkins University Press, 1983), p.69. 
2
 As the jar is referred to as a box in common usage, the term box is used in the title. 
 2 
 
 This thesis will engage with the outsourcing of military functions by the 
state to Commercial Military Service Providers (CMSPs) by adopting an 
objective stance which is not under the illusion that the state exists in an 
idealized form or that CMSPs are essentially negative; in most cases where 
CMSPs have become involved, the state is under considerable internal 
pressure, external pressure, or both.  Although the use of a neutral approach to 
the subject is not unique among those writing on CMSPs, the use of a strong 
framework to theorise their role is an approach which has been underexplored.3 
 This thesis will theorise the implications for CMSPs on the relationship 
between state and society to argue that the short-term use of CMSPs offers an 
alternative to weakened, unreliable or even non-existent state institutions.  Their 
use can be problematic and requires careful consideration by the state as to 
exactly how CMSPs are employed, funded and controlled.  However, CMSPs 
are not a long-term panacea.  Their prolonged use can interfere with the 
relationship between the power structures around which the state is centred; 
threatening the stability of the state and impeding the development of social, 
military and political institutions. 
A Historical Sociological approach to security theory is utilised, which 
employs a modified version of Michael Mann’s Ideological, Economic, Military 
and Political (IEMP) model.  This also draws upon Barry Buzan's sectoral 
approach to security, which looks at political, military, economic, environmental 
and societal security.  Mann's, economic, military and political sources of power 
are supplemented by Buzan's definitions.  While Mann's ideological sources of 
power are replaced by Buzan's societal security.   
This thesis is concerned with the implications for the states in which 
                                                          
3
 See Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Deborah Avant, 'Private Security', in Security 
Studies: An Introduction, ed. by Paul D. Williams (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 438-452; David 
Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Paper, 316 vols (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized 
Military Industry (London: Cornell, 2003) for good objective overviews of the industry. 
 3 
 
CMSPs operate.  Where their services either supplement or replace existing 
sources of military power,4 in particular those states which fall within Cooper's 
typology of 'pre-modern states'.5   These are states which lack the most 
fundamental attribute associated with modern states, the monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force.  According to Cooper these states have lost either: (1) 
their legitimacy over the use of force, as the result of abuse; or (2) the monopoly 
over the control of the use of force, to other actors within the state.  He 
compares the use of force to holding a bird; too loose a grip and the bird 
escapes, too tight and it is crushed.  It is possible to go further and argue that 
the state can lose its monopoly by (1) and (2) occurring simultaneously. The 
states loses a monopoly over the use of force to other actors within the state, 
the remaining ability to exert force is then used in such a way that the state is 
further de-legitimised. 
The focus on pre-modern states has implications for the generalisability 
of the conclusions reached in this thesis.  Further research would be necessary 
to consider the impact on what Cooper terms 'modern' and 'post-modern' states. 
However such a focus is necessary because of the direct importance to the 
security of populations within pre-modern states, and often the existential threat 
to the state itself.  Modern states possess a monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force, and post-modern states have voluntarily ceded some authority to other 
actors.6  Pre-modern states are therefore most in need of the services provided 
by CMSPs, exacerbated by the lack of interest that states in the west have in 
intervening in failing states.7  As a consequence of the loss of the legitimate use 
                                                          
4
 IEMP stands for Ideology, Economy, Military and Political.  This is an approach which Mann 
makes extensive use of in his analysis of the sources of social power: Michael Mann, The Sources 
of Social Power, Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760, 1st edn 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp.1-21, pp.44-91. 
5
 Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century 
(London: Atlantic Books, 2004), pp.16-18. 
6
 Ibid. pp.21-31. 
7
 Ibid. p.17. 
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of force by pre-modern states, CMSPs take their largest role and have therefore 
have a significant impact on security.  It is therefore important to consider their 
role in restoring both the monopoly and legitimacy over the use of force.  The 
latter does raise some important questions, but as can be seen in the literature 
review below theorising has already been undertaken.    
  The theoretical model will be applied to two states; Sierra Leone and 
Iraq, and will be considered in the context of the historical use of commercial 
military actors.  The use of this model to examine the use of CMSPs in Iraq and 
Sierra Leone will open up new avenues of understanding.  The use of this model 
is a unique approach in an undeveloped area.  By undertaking a new approach 
to the constantly evolving nature of the industry also means that existing studies 
become dated, as new empirical data allows this thesis to build on the current 
literature, challenging some of the projections and assumptions which have 
been made. 
1.1.1 Context 
The growth of the private security sector since the end of the Cold War has been 
rapid and far-reaching.  The past two decades have witnessed the evolution of 
CMSPs into sophisticated enterprises, with contracts across the globe providing 
a variety of services to both state and non-state actors.8 Although CMSPs 
operated during the Cold War, the uncertain security situation which emerged 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union established them as important international 
actors.  The release of military equipment and personnel provided the means to 
intervene, while continuing and reigniting conflicts in regions such as Africa 
provided the demand for military services.9 The reluctance of Western states to 
intervene in minor conflicts following incidents such as the 1993 US led 
operation in Somalia, alongside the failure of the UN and regional organisations, 
                                                          
8
 Madeline Drohan, Making A Killing: How Corporations use Armed Force to do Business 
(Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2003); Singer, Corporate Warriors. 
9
 Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, pp.23-37. 
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increased the demand for CMSP services.10  2001 proved to be a second 
watershed as a more assertive US foreign policy placed demands upon its 
military that they could not meet.11  Thus CMSPs have become a way for 
western militaries to bolster their capabilities; or, in the case of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs), new, sophisticated weapons systems require specialised 
civilian support.12  CMSPs have even become closely involved with intelligence 
agencies.13  The logistical support services offered by Brown Root Services 
BRS, a subsidiary of Halliburton, means they have become an important part of 
the US military infrastructure during operations since 1992.14   
The use of private force is of great consequence as functions previously 
thought to be intrinsic to the functioning of the modern state have now shifted 
from the public to private domain.  Companies such as Blackwater, Halliburton 
and ArmorGroup have become synonymous with the invasion and rebuilding of 
Iraq and Afghanistan.15  This is a trend that seems set to continue, with the 
South African company Saracen rumoured to be offering its services to the 
failing government in Somalia16 and various CMSPs linked to efforts to combat 
piracy.17  The cuts in defence budgets by many developed states since 2008 
                                                          
10
 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 2nd edn 
(London: Cornell, 2008), pp.58-60. 
11
 Singer, Corporate Warriors (2003), p.58. 
12
 Carlos Ortiz, Private Armed Forces and Global Security: A Guide to the Issues (Oxford: 
Praeger, 2010), p.128. 
13
 BBC, ‘CIA Cancels Blackwater Drone-Missile-Loading Contract,’ 12 December 2009 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8409358.stm> [accessed 13 December 2013]. 
14
 Singer, Corporate Warriors  (2003), p.136. 
15
 Blackwater has undergone a change of ownership and two name changes.  ArmorGroup is now 
owned by G4S. 
16
 Mazzetti, Mark and Eric Schmitt, ‘Blackwater Founder Said to Back Mercenaries,’ New York 
Times, 20 January 2011 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/21/world/africa/21intel.html?_r=2&hp> [accessed 21 January 
2011].  
17
 Sengupta, Kim, ‘Blackwater Gunboats Will Protect Ships,’ The Independent, 10 May 2011 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/blackwater-gunboats-will-protect-ships-
1024582.html> [accessed 11 May 2011]. 
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have led to an increase in the use of commercial service providers.18  Thus 
outsourcing security raises important theoretical questions about the role of the 
state.19  Are we moving towards Bobbitt’s Market State in which devolution and 
privatisation includes security?20 
The trend in re-privatization provides new perspectives and importance 
for renewed analysis of the state and how it deals both with other states and 
with non-state actors, via the execution and regulation of force.  The challenges 
offered by CMSPs pose a different set of dilemmas compared to other non-state 
actors.  They utilise force, but within the legal framework established by the 
state they are working in or for.  State actors often sanction CMSPs as they seek 
to prop up their capabilities, where their ‘challenge’ to the state’s monopoly of 
the legitimate use of force is in fact intended to enhance the long term security 
of the state.  However, the capacity to purchase military capabilities off the shelf 
is an important dynamic impacting on how groups interact within the state.  
While the demand for private security displays no sign of waning; CMSPs will 
remain important actors in contemporary international security, requiring 
academic analysis and theoretical explanation. 
1.1.2 Problems with Current Research 
Activity by the US and UK in Afghanistan and Iraq has increased awareness of 
the private security industry as the market for private force rapidly expanded. 
Several high profile incidents have raised awareness of the role of private 
contractors in these theatres with a wide audience; as a result companies like 
                                                          
18
 Kirkup, James, 'British Army Forced to Rely on Foreigners and Contractors', The Telegraph, 7 
June 2012 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9315166/British-Army-forced-to-
rely-on-foreigners-and-contractors.html> [accessed 3 March 2013]. 
19
 Singer, Corporate Warriors.  
20
 Phillip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (London: 
Penguin, 2002), p.237. 
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Blackwater (renamed to Xe, then Academi) have gained widespread notoriety.21  
The importance of CMSPs has come to be recognized by a number of writers 
from journalists to academics to those with a general interest in current affairs.  
Literature has focused specifically on CMSPs or included them in more general 
studies of security issues and elements within conflicts.  Initial writing on the role 
played by CMSPs sought to draw attention to their existence and introduce 
some of issues which had arisen as well as highlighting potential problems for 
the future.  Much of this writing however was journalistic or descriptive.  While 
these sources have their own merit, drawing attention to the activities of the 
companies, and providing rich empirical data from which draw, they do not 
deepen our understanding of how the privatisation of force impacts on our 
current understanding of security.   
Recent literature has widened the scope of analysis to include further 
developments and address some of the theoretical and conceptual ramifications 
of the privatisation of force.  However, as can be seen in the literature review 
below, there are several significant lacunae which remain.  Importantly, while 
there have been attempts to address the initial dearth of theoretical engagement 
with the subject, understanding of the implications on security and the state 
remains incomplete.  When addressing the impact of CMSPs on the state, little 
has been done to move beyond the basic assumption of the Weberian state 
‘claiming a monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a given territory’.  This is 
an issue identified by both Singer22 and Avant,23 who view the impact of CMSPs 
on the state as a problem in need of investigation.  Avant in particular is critical 
of the ‘rush for normative judgement’ at the expense of analysis of the effect of 
privatisation.24  
                                                          
21
 BBC, ‘Iraq 'Expels Blackwater Security Employees,' 10 February 2010 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8509475.stm edn> [accessed 13 February 2010.] 
22
 Singer, Corporate Warriors (2003), p.170. 
23





1.1.3 Research Objective 
This thesis will contribute to the body of work which has sought to move beyond 
the descriptive writing that formed the basis of much writing on CMSPs; 
contributing towards the move to tackle the theoretical lacunae that surround the 
subject.  The focus will be on those companies which play a significant role in 
state security, either directly employed by the state or their use as a proxy, by 
providing military services.  Their impact on the state in which they are operating 
will be analysed.  The theoretical gap will be addressed by breaking down the 
state using Michael Mann’s sources of social power. Mann's IEMP model will be 
used, in a modified form, to provide a theoretical framework that will allow a 
deeper understanding of how the sources of power operate within the state and 
the implications of introducing an external source of power. 
Although Mann is sceptical about the potential of his model as a 
comparative tool, in Volume I of his Sources of Social Power he argues that as 
his rejection of society as unitary discounts the effectiveness of comparative 
sociology25, it can be used to provide an effective analytical framework.  The 
IEMP model facilitates the deconstruction of the state, and the analysis of the 
relationship between the sources; allowing cases to be compared.  Indeed, this 
thesis would argue that Mann himself tacitly acknowledges this usefulness by 
engaging in comparative discussion over both geography and time in his 
discussions with John Hall.26  This thesis will also employ and therefore 
contribute to literature on the failure of the state in each of the case studies 
covered by integrating the impact of CMSPs into work on the failure of the state 
in the countries covered. 
The use of Mann's IEMP model will contribute to a deeper understanding 
of CMSPs by theorising the impact of the use of CMSPs on power structures 
                                                          
25
 Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1, p.30. 
26
 Michael Mann and John A. Hall, Power in the 21st Century: Converstaions with John A. Hall, 
1st edn (Cambridge: Polity, 2011). 
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within the state - the role of the companies in providing security and the state in 
controlling them.  By looking specifically at the power structures within the state 
it will be possible to see how CMSPs affect the dynamic between political elites, 
military elites and the society.  Significantly - how the state interacts within 
society and the implications for the long and short-term stability of the state.  
This is an important area of research as the relationship between these three 
groups is often the source of instability within developing states. 
The remaining sections of this chapter will consider: the existing 
literature on CMSPs, in order to place the contribution that this thesis will make 
to current understanding; the research questions which will be addressed; and 
outline the methodology which will be used. 
1.2 Current Literature 
Interest in CMSP activity at both an academic and more general level has 
contributed to a rapidly growing body of literature.  However, as mentioned 
above, the work that has been undertaken is far from comprehensive.  A 
significant portion of the initial literature was anecdotal and descriptive.  While 
important analytical work has been carried out on the structure of the 
companies, the roles they have played and could undertake in the future; there 
is however a dearth of analysis on the theoretical impact of CMSPs.27 Existing 
literature has rapidly become outdated as companies have changed and new 
cases have revealed more about their impact.28 This is complicated by the 
constantly changing nature of politics since the end of the Cold War and the 
evolution of the security industry.  Current scholarship can be divided into four 
                                                          
27
 Percy also notes the reluctance of writers on CMSPs to apply their work to a theoretical frame, 
particularly the failure to engage with wider IR theory. Sarah Percy, Mercenaries: The History of 
a Norm in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) over the last few 
years the situation has only just begun to change. 
28
 Singer has responded to such changes by updating his work.  His book Corporate Warriors was 
initially published in 2004, but an updated edition was released in 2008 to recognise the 
developments in Iraq. 
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main categories:  (1) first person accounts; (2) descriptive/narrative; (3) 
analytical and conceptual classification and finally; (4) wider theorising.  These 
categories can be subdivided according to the age of the research: (A) earlier 
writing dealing purely with CMSP activity during the 1990; and (B) more recent 
work on CMSPs since 2001 focusing on their role in the so-called ‘war on terror’.  
These categories are not entirely discrete: for example Spicer splits 'An 
Orthodox Soldier' between a first person account of his time in the army and 
Sandline, and an analysis of the private security industry.  Many of the 
conceptual works also make use of narrative. 29  
In the first category CMSP operators have made their own contribution to 
the literature.  This includes books such as Spicer’s autobiographical account of 
his time in the military and a history of Sandline; though he also includes a 
section on CMSPs and the possibility of regulation.  His account culminates with 
his explanation of the ‘Arms-to-Africa Affair’, following Sandline’s involvement in 
the Sierra Leone civil war.30  Eeben Barlow has also written his version of 
Executive Outline’s (EO) activity in the 1990s.31  The ‘boy’s own’ style of account 
has also become popular; a majority of these books are by current or ex-
employees, who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Ashcroft, Geddes and 
Lowe are good examples of this genre.32 They offer street level accounts of their 
experiences.  These are useful for understanding the conditions that contractors 
work under and their attitudes towards the job, each other, and other actors, 
including civilians and other military forces.  The experiences they relay will 
always be open to question, as with any source of this nature, particularly as the 
                                                          
29
 Lt. Col. Tim Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair (London: 
Mainstream Publishing, 1999). 
30
  Ibid. 
31
 Eeben Barlow, Executive Outcomes: Against all Odds (Alberton: Galago, 2008). 
32
 Capt. James Ashcroft, Making a Killing: The Explosive Story of a Hired Gun in Iraq (London: 
Virgin Books Ltd, 2005); John Geddes, Highway to Hell: An Ex-SAS Soldier’s Account of the 
Extraordinary Private Army Hired to Fight in Iraq (London: Century, 2006) and Simon Low, 
The Boys from Baghdad: From the Foreign Legion to the Killing Fields of Iraq (London: 
Mainstream Publishing, 2007). 
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intention is to appeal to a broad readership.  Despite this, contractors such as 
Ashcroft are prepared to offer a critical account of themselves and the way they 
operate.33  The focused nature of each account, in terms of geography, 
chronology and the companies involved mean they are of limited use when 
considered individually; but can contribute towards a wider understanding.  
While popular interest in Iraq and Afghanistan have been the catalyst for many 
of the books, edited volumes of contractor’s accounts include experiences from 
before 2001.34 
The second category of writing on CMSPs is descriptive or narrative, 
these often tend to be historical. A significant proportion of writing uses historical 
narrative as an introduction to the issue being addressed, usually to establish 
the historical relationship between CMSPs and other forms of private force; a 
few authors have provided purely historical narratives. Thomson’s book is one of 
the main historical studies to establish the long-term relationship between 
private force and the state.35  Although the bulk of the book is historical, CMSPs 
make a brief appearance in the final chapter.  Her work has proved an influential 
source, being cited by many other writers on CMSPs as they also seek to 
explain the rise of the companies.  She has faced criticism for failing to develop 
a strong enough theoretical framework to her analysis,36 which is why I have 
classified her work within this category. Lanning also considers the evolution of 
private force, focusing on how CMSPs evolved; this is a much less ambitious 
work, the focus on narrative resulting in a weaker overall thesis.37 CMSPs do 
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appear in number of works on general mercenary activity, though these 
accounts do not go into sufficient detail on CMSPs.  Rogers looks at the modern 
mercenary, including CMSP activity, this is in the context of more conventional 
mercenary activity which persisted in the 20th century.38 
Journalists have made a significant contribution towards the 
understanding of CMSPs, tending to fall again within the bracket of description.  
This includes generating a large amount of data on the activity of the 
companies, and revealing a number of incidents.  Arguably the journalistic style 
of writing has been one of the main ways that the part played by CMSPs has 
been recorded, analysed and disseminated to a wider audience.  Sources range 
from news articles to NGO reports and books.  Recent books have proved 
popular, proving to be easy to read and offering an accessible way into the 
subject.  Schumacher and Pelton-Young have both spent periods of time with 
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan,39 both can claim previous military 
experience, and are embedded with their subject, not surprising seeing as 
journalists generally need to use security contractors when they are operating in 
these areas, with reports on the use of convoys.  The relationship between the 
writer and subject needs to be questioned: Brabazon offers an insight into the 
planning behind the failed attempt to overthrow the government of Equatorial 
Guinea in 2004, but is openly aware of how his relationship with Nick du Toit 
compromises his position as a spectator.40 
Journalistic literature on CMSPs also tends to focus on the activities of 
particular CMSPs, or be restricted to specific areas or narrowly defined criteria.  
These accounts, while investigating the various elements of case studies in 
detail, do not attempt to place them in a wider theoretical framework.  Chatterjee 
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has released books on Iraq41 and Halliburton;42  Scahill on Blackwater;43 while 
on the wider subject of mercenaries, Roberts has tackled the attempted coup in 
Equatorial Guinea.44  The significant omission of this source of writing on 
CMSPS is the failure to consider the impact of CMSPs in the context of wider IR, 
or security theory.45  This is meant to be an observation and an indication of 
where further research possibilities lay, rather than a criticism of the value of this 
source of writing on CMSPs.  Neither does this mean that further descriptive 
writing on the subject is no longer required, further research will continue to be 
useful as long as CMSPs are active, by generating empirical data.  
The third category of literature, the analysis and classification of CMSPs 
and their relationship to other forms of private force formed the core of initial 
academic CMSP analysis.  From earlier scholars such as Shearer, attempts 
have been made to understand the new private military industry, through to 
more recent scholarship such as Singer,46 Kinsey47 and Avant.48 The 
classification chosen by the various writers generally reflects the position they 
have adopted on the issue.  Those who wish to take a critical view of CMSP 
operators tend to label them as mercenaries; the normative baggage associated 
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with the term makes a good starting point for their arguments.49 Others, who 
take a positive or neutral attitude, tend to use terms such as Private Military Firm 
(PMF), Private Military Company (PMC)50 Private Security Company (PSC), or 
the compound of CMSP.51  CMSP literature has sought to explore the roles that 
CMSPs may be able to fulfil in the future.  Popular themes include the 
relationship between CMSPs and the United Nations.  The idea has been 
mooted on various occasions that private contractors fulfil peacekeeping 
commitments.52 The option of peacekeeping is a popular one, as CMSPs are 
quite often compared in favourable terms as a solution to reluctant and/or 
ineffective state sponsored operations.53  
CMSP regulation is a long running theme amongst writers and an area of 
current debate.  Concern over the conduct of CMSP operatives and the ability to 
hold transgressors responsible for their actions has driven a great deal of the 
literature, in particular questions over which laws they are accountable to and 
how effectively these are enforced.54  This has become an increasingly popular 
subject for debate as CMSPs have become embroiled in several incidents in 
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Afghanistan55 and Iraq.56   
The analysis carried out within this section of the literature has provided 
some useful insights into the structure of the industry, such as Singer’s 
influential typology.57  As with narrative descriptions of the industry some of the 
literature takes a focused analysis, such as concentrating on how CMSPs have 
impacted on particular conflicts.58  From the point of this thesis, the main 
weakness of this category of literature is the failure to address the issue of wider 
theorising by engaging with more general international relations or security 
theory. 
1.3 Theory Guided CMSP Research 
The fourth category of literature, wider theoretical work, is of most interest for 
this thesis.  This is an area that for a long time remained underexplored, as most 
literature was descriptive and/or analytical.  However, researchers are 
increasingly seeing the importance of considering CMSPs within international 
relations and security theory.  This area has begun to address some of the 
issues surrounding the state and the use of force.  It is this area of research to 
which this thesis contributes - which will be considered in more detail below. 
Avant embarks upon one of the most conceptually interesting research 
on CMSPs among the current literature.  She was one of the first to address the 
impact of the increasing use of CMSPs on the use of force both as a subject, 
and from a strong theoretical position.  Avant uses ‘New Institutionalism’, a 
combination of sociological and economic theory.59 She analyses three different 
relationships; CMSPs and state clients, CMSPs and their ‘home’ states and 
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finally CMSPs and other private companies; looking at levels of control; 
functional, political.60  Avant is interested in the question of how the different 
dimensions of control fit together. 
This in an important area of research and overlaps with this thesis. Avant 
argues how the consideration of functional benefits and the sociological 
ramifications of CMSP use has become lost in the normative debate between 
whether CMSPs are good or bad.  This thesis goes beyond her work by using 
historical sociology to understand the implications of the use of CMSPs on the 
relationship between state and society.  Doing so will increase understanding of 
the implications of employing CMSPs on the control of force.  The rapidly 
changing nature of events in Iraq has opened up new lines of questions and 
allows ideas to more effectively challenged; Avant was writing only two years 
after the invasion of Iraq. 
Several writers have addressed the issue of morality and the use of 
CMSPs.  The issues they discuss have ramifications for the regulation and the 
possible use of CMSPs by organizations such as the UN.61 This is a significant 
area, and one that is becoming increasingly popular.  By understanding the 
reasons why terms such as mercenary have a pariah status, an insight can be 
gained into some of the problems with regulation or how employing CMSP 
operatives may undermine an operation.  Percy was one of the first authors to 
tackle the issue of norms and mercenaries.62  She argues that the ethical 
objections against the historical use of mercenaries are crucial in understanding 
the composition of military forces, and thus why CMSP use is seen to be so 
problematic.  The outcome is to limit both the way states have been able to use 
CMSPs, and the employment opportunities for the companies themselves.63  
The ramifications for the composition of state forces is of interest here, as it 
                                                          
60
 Ibid.  
61
 Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry.  
62
 Percy, Mercenaries 
63
 Ibid, pp.1-2. 
 17 
 
feeds into the debate over whether CMSPs can offer, even a temporary, 
alternative to regular state forces.  However, this thesis is less interested in the 
normative implications of CMSP use, than their empirical impact on the role of 
power within the state. 
The ethical implications of CMSP usage has proved to be a popular area 
of discussion.  Scholars such as Pattison have sought to explore the ethical and 
normative implications of outsourcing force, in relation to more general 
international relations theory, including the impact on Just War Theory and 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P).64 
Ortiz offers one of the most up to date approaches to the subject.  While 
still offering to generate debate as much as he answers questions, the 
arguments he makes move on from earlier writing.  Engaging with security 
theory he argues that what he terms as CMSPs should be seen as part of the 
reality of the security situation which has emerged.  CMSPs should not be seen 
as ideal, nor fundamentally problematic.65  A problem with Ortiz's approach is 
that his book is as much a survey of the use of CMSPs as a consideration of 
their implications on theory.  His major contribution to theory is on "security 
partnerships" using public management theory, but ultimately concludes that the 
civil-military-private relationship is one which requires further research.66 
Krahmann’s edited volume on new threats and actors in international 
security attempts to place CMSPs within a wider framework of how security has 
changed in the 21st century, combining analysis of non-state actors and the 
state.  The focus is on the widening of security to include a greater range of 
actors, the general framework of the volume is interesting.  CMSPs are covered 
in a chapter by Spearin; however the focus is restricted to their use by Non-
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Governmental Organisations (NGOs).67  There have also been attempts to 
consider the implication of the growth of private force since the end of the Cold 
War on Human Security.  Though in this case Shannon’s article goes beyond 
CMSPs to look at the various private forces which emerged in Columbia and 
Sierra Leone.68 
Krahmann also looks at the democratic implications of the use of force 
on the state.  She focuses on post-modern states - the US, UK and Germany 
and asks what the implications are for the democratic control over the use of 
force in these states.  She compares Liberal and Republican models of military-
civil relations and argues that both are equally problematic.  For Krahmann the 
solution lies in moving from military to civilianisation of conflict resolution.69 
Abrahamsen and Williams argue that they are moving the debate beyond 
the focus on firms which provide military services to include wider security 
services.  They focus on globalisation and security, and again cite the 
importance of social factors in understanding the implications of outsourcing 
security functions.  They argue that the embeddness social forces, with and 
between states, in different forms of governance.  The consequence is a 
reconfiguration of state power.  Their research focuses on the relationship 
between the globalisation of security and four African states.  They recognise 
that as a consequence there are limitations to their findings.70  Although one of 
these states is Sierra Leone, it leaves room for wider geographical analysis. 
Some attempt has been made in incorporate the commercialisation of 
force into theories of the state.  Bobbitt draws on the work of Martin van Creveld 
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to argue that privatisation of security functions is part of a shift to a market 
state.71 Thus the focus is on states which Cooper classifies as 'post-modern', 
rather than the pre-modern states which are of interest in this thesis. 
 The literature within each of these categories can also be broken down 
by date published.  Writing before 2001/2 tended to focus on the impact of 
CMSPs in Africa, the Balkans and Latin America, with most of the literature 
falling into the descriptive/narrative and occasionally conceptual categories.  The 
focus on events which have followed 9/11, as CMSPs have become an 
important part of the US ‘War on Terror’, has opened up a large amount of 
empirical data to challenge the assumptions made in the initial literature.  For 
example Carafano focuses on the impact of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
while turning his attention to their future use.72  The title, 'Private Sector, Public 
Wars' suggests the possibility of wider theorising, but the overall thesis does not 
engage with the topic theoretically.  In ‘One Nation Under Contact’ Stanger 
makes only a limited mention of theory in her critique of the way in which 
American foreign policy has come to rely on the private sector.73  Although the 
profit motive behind the companies is important, these works still suffer from the 
tendency to make normative judgments – such as ‘Betraying our Troops’74 and 
‘War on terror inc.: Corporate profiteering from the politics of fear’.75 
The literature recognises the importance of CMSPs activity on the state.  
Although the literature has begun to contribute to theory based research, gaps 
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remain.  Particularly on the implications of CMSP use for power structures within 
the state and how they affect the relationship between state and society.  
Further research will also allow more recent events to be incorporated.  Finally, 
some of the more recent research has specified more general forms of security 
and looked at particular regions. 
1.4 Research Questions 
This thesis will seek to address the lacunae in the literature identified above by 
providing a conceptual and theoretical analysis of CMSPs, analyzing the 
relationship between the state and the commercialisation of force at unit and 
system level, contributing to and expanding upon existing knowledge in two 
ways.  It will engage with wider international relations and security theory by 
utilizing historical sociology to construct a suitable theoretical framework and 
theory of the state.  This will then be used to explore the ramifications of the 
increasing use of CMSPs on the agency of the state at the domestic and 
international level, avoiding normative judgements on the use of private use of 
force.  The cases studies will need to balance in depth analysis that focuses on 
military firms operating in failed states, but at the same time allowing for some 
wider conclusions to be drawn. 
While a number of different actors over the last century have been 
heralded as eroding the state, CMSPs are the focus of this thesis as they pose 
the most conceptually interesting ‘challenge’ to state sovereignty. Governments 
of weak and failing states have sought the use of private force to reinforce their 
position and developed states are seeking to transfer the risks involved away 
from media-sensitive traditional forces as they become increasingly aware of the 
risks involved of intervention abroad.76 It has been well established that although 
both internal and external factors are influencing the state, to argue they signal 
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the end is to underestimate the resilience of the state and the nature of the 
institution.77  This thesis will therefore engage in a more sophisticated analysis 
of the possible challenge posed by CMSPs to the state: 
 What is the impact of CMSP use on the relationship between the sources 
of social power in the different networks? 
 Do CMSPs undermine the power and/or the legitimacy of the institutions 
that comprise the state? 
 Does the existence of a body, possessing the quasi-legal ability to 
exercise force, compromise the relationship of the state with other actors 
within and outside the state? 
 Therefore, how effective are CMSPs in building a sustainable security 
environment within the state? 
The answers to the first three questions will contribute to the final, and most 
important question. By answering these questions it will be possible to 
understand the significance of the use of CMSPs in the case studies.  They are 
also relevant to understanding their continuing role; such as the intervention in 
Somalia by CMSP operators78 and the protection of resource extraction 
infrastructure by G4S.79  This thesis will provide an informed answer by 
balancing empirical data with a strong theoretical base. 
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1.5  Methodology 
1.5.1  Historical Sociology 
This thesis does not seek to refute the importance of realism, particularly as 
historical sociology’s status as a method of research means its practitioners can 
still utilise other theories, including realism.80  Historical sociology does however 
offer a way to augment some of the assumptions made by realism which are 
viewed as weaknesses when dealing with non-state actors and institutions 
within a state.  Although realism is a diverse school, there are general criticisms 
which can be made.  Most importantly that realism, in particular structural 
realism, has three inbuilt inadequacies which result from the preference for 
parsimony: 1) oversimplification, which limits the understanding of power and 
marginalises role of non-state actors; 2) as a result of which actors are not 
granted sufficient agency; and 3) the failure to account for historical change.81  
Thus historical sociology allows for a more nuanced understanding of how these 
elements impact on each other.  While doing this some of the dangers identified 
by realists need to be acknowledged, such as being too reductionist.  These 
omissions are a fundamental characteristic of realist scholars; who focus on 
what they view to be the most important actors and their motivations, allowing 
events to be abstracted and placed in a wider context.  Mearsheimer 
emphasises the explanatory power offered by parsimony, warning of the 
dangers of reductionism and the subsequent loss of the explanatory power of 
theory.82  This is a debate which continues to incite supporters from both sides 
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with realists such as Drezner favouring the explanatory power offered over more 
recent theories, which he argues are still yet to be proved.83  
However, historical sociology is an approach which is becoming 
increasingly popular and influential within international relations.84 A diverse set 
of scholars including Charles Tilly,85 Theda Skocpol,86 Martin Shaw,87 Immanuel 
Wallenstein and John Hobson,88 have all contributed to this trend. The edited 
volume 'Historical Sociology of International Relations' is indicative of the 
interest in the approach, with international theorists including Buzan, Smith, 
Halliday and Linklater offering contributions on the impact of the various forms of 
historical sociology, each offering an alternative way to deal with the issues in 
the identified failings of other theories, though the main recipients are realism 
and liberalism.89  Despite this the use of historical sociology within international 
relations has been fragmented.  Within the CMSP literature there is on occasion 
reference to works by historical sociologists, but none of them make explicit 
reference to the theory or make a sustained attempt to understand it within their 
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framework.  As such they tend to be intellectually pillaged piecemeal.90 
This thesis will draw on the analytical models developed by Michael 
Mann.  His work is widely influential, leading to his inclusion in volumes on key 
thinkers in international relations,91 and other scholars to critique his work in 
edited volumes.92 While the recent subjects he has covered include genocide93 it 
is the analytical model he develops through the three volumes of his ‘Sources of 
Social Power’ which are of most interest,94 along with his contributions on 
globalisation95 and the foreign policy of the USA.96  He also offers an explanation 
of the sources of social power and their relevance to power in the 21st century in 
an edited conversation with John Hall.97 
While chapter two will go into more details as to the way in which Mann’s 
model will be employed, there are two elements of his writing which are a focus 
of the theoretical framework to be employed here.  The first is the IEMP model 
Mann has developed which analyses the relationship between the four different 
power structures within the state: ideological, economic, military and political.98  
They offer a coherent and effective way of breaking down the state to analyse 
how the various sources of power interact with the institutions of the state.  The 
second is the levels of analysis Mann employs in his work on globalisation,  
which plot the interaction of the state with other actors and threats across 
                                                          
90
 John Hobson, 'Debate: The 'Second Wave' of Weberian Historical Sociology,' pp.284-320. 
91
 Martin Griffiths, Steven Roach and Scott Soloman, Fifty Key Thinkers in International 
Relations, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2009). 
92
 An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann, ed. by John A. Hall and Ralph 
Schroeder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
93
 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
94
 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1: A History of Power from the 
Beginning to A.D. 1760; Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2: The Rise of 
Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
95
 Mann, Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State? pp. 472-496. 
96
 Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: Verso, 2005). 
97
 Mann and Hall, Power in the 21st Century: Converstaions with John A. Hall.  
98
 Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1, pp.1-32; Mann, The Sources of Social Power, 
Volume 2, pp.1-21. 
 25 
 
different networks.  These networks run through the local, national, inter-
national, transnational and global.99 
Mann’s approach is not without critics. He has been called a realist who 
has not gone far enough to bring the state back in, Hobden arguing that that the 
way Mann addresses the international is inadequate, and that he is merely a 
realist.100 These are charges that Mann strongly refutes.101 A fairer criticism 
would be the approach taken to the analysis of the various aspects of the 
sources of power. In particular the way that ideological factors are considered, 
this is a criticism that is made in several places and one that he accepts in 
certain places,102 particularly in relation to the Second Volume of the Sources of 
Social Power.103 As such wider security theory will be employed to refine the way 
in which Mann uses Ideology. In particular borrowing from Buzan’s approach to 
security he develops in Security: A New Framework for Analysis.104 
The most important part of Mann’s theory is his understanding of how 
different power sources interact within the state. This 'crystallisation' of the 
sources of the powers enables us to understand more about the functioning of 
the state; in particular how power is concentrated.105  While the idea of dividing 
up various aspects of the state for analytical purposes is not unique to Mann’s 
historical sociology (see for example such as Buzan’s levels of analysis),106 
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Mann's emphasis is on the relationship between the sources of power and how 
they interact.  He argues that the four sources of power are not like billiard balls, 
rather they entwine with the result that they impact on each other's structure, not 
just their direction.107  The analysis of power is further elaborated by his drawing 
on sociological theory and the organisation of power between Authoritative and 
Diffused, Intensive and Extensive.108  
The final appeal of Mann’s theory is his decision to balance theory and 
empirical data equally.  His preference is of avoiding theory for its own sake, but 
at the same time recognising the requirement to form some kind of logic around 
the empirical data.109  This approach is not without criticism.  He is charged with 
tacking between historical empiricism and sociological analysis, the danger of 
which is being overwhelmed by empirical data.110  However, this thesis views 
such criticism as a strength; such an approach not only addresses the identified 
gaps in the literature appropriately, but retains an empirical narrative. 
1.5.2  Comparative Research 
The employment of Mann’s model means this thesis will utilize a form of 
comparative politics in order to compare the impact of CMSPs on the power 
structures within the state.  Although this thesis is not specifically a comparative 
study there is no way of escaping Dogan and Pelassy’s assertion that all political 
analysis is in some way comparative.111  Therefore, an understanding of 
comparative methodology, particularly its strengths and the problems that can 
arise, is necessary.  This will assist in selecting the appropriate form of 
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comparison to take, and allow potential drawbacks to be mitigated.  There is 
however, no doubting the overall strength of this approach in the testing and 
generation of hypotheses.112 
Comparative studies take a variety of forms: drawing on small ‘n’ or large 
‘N’ numbers of case studies; using either qualitative or quantitative analysis; and 
looking for either differences of similarities between cases.   Each of these 
approaches has a specific function, carrying different drawbacks and 
advantages which lend themselves to the study of particular phenomenon.  
Large number quantitative analysis allows a large dataset to be used to test a 
complex independent variable,113 while small number case studies using 
qualitative analysis facilitate detailed interpretive analysis.114 
The use of comparative research has several important functions; as 
such it is unsurprising that it forms such a key part of political analysis.  The 
primary advantage of comparative analysis is one identified by Hopkins, 
addressing the difficulty of testing political science in a complex world.  He 
argues that as it is not possible to set up experiments on demand to test 
hypotheses, so political scientists must make the best use of the data accessible 
to them.115  This approach allows the testing of hypotheses and the potential for 
prediction and control.116  Such an approach is relevant to the study of CMSPs, 
where analysis is immediately dependent on cases where they have been used, 
thus being able to make use of a limited, albeit growing, number of studies 
where they are involved.   
There are two options as to the type of comparison to be carried out.  
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The first is most similar, where the cases picked are as similar as possible in 
order to compare a phenomenon.  The problem of this approach is that often 
factors remain which are different.  This undermines the analytical value of the 
approach as intervening factors cannot be accounted for.  Harrop argues that 
the value of the analysis ‘is in the journey rather than the destination’.117  The 
next approach is most different; this is where a relationship is tested by using a 
phenomenon, such as the state, which has different attributes.  This is the 
approach that will be adopted for the thesis.  The relationship between CMSPs 
and the research questions will be tested between states which differ widely 
from each other.  
While the use of comparative analysis can be an effective method of 
testing out a hypothesis, there are still several disadvantages associated with 
the use of comparative analysis through case studies.118  The main danger is 
dealing with either too many variables, or too few countries; as a result of which 
there may not be enough data to draw reliable conclusions as to the impact of a 
phenomenon, or its cause. This requires taking into account the number of 
states where CMSPs have become involved and balancing this with the 
availability of data to adequately analyse their impact. 
The number of cases selected can be problematic.  The more cases that 
are selected place demands on the researcher as they are faced with trying to 
understand several different political systems.  Harrop questions the positive 
relationship between the number of cases and the knowledge obtained, arguing 
that the researcher needs to develop the skill to use specialist knowledge to 
develop observations which are both new and general.119 Therefore there needs 
to be balance.  The researcher is therefore faced by the choice between 
selecting a number of cases which allows the desired variable or variables to be 
tested, avoiding the danger of selecting cases that end up being from a limited 
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area.  But, at the same time avoiding talking on too many cases, which could 
undermine the ability to tackle each in enough detail to reach suitable or valid 
conclusions. 
The selection of cases is potentially subject to bias, such as restricting 
those chosen to English speaking examples.120  As such, the selection of cases 
in the thesis, while constrained by the number where enough data can be 
obtained to allow significant analysis, has attempted to ensure that diverse 
range of backgrounds have been included.  The availability of secondary 
sources and English language media sources means that cases can be drawn 
from a larger pool allowed by the language knowledge of the author - cases 
come from Africa, and the Middle East.  This does mean relying upon another 
person’s interpretation of events, an issue that Mann also dealt with on a much 
larger scale, but which can be mitigated by appropriate cross referencing.121 
As the thesis is dealing with cases with a diverse range of variables, the 
only common factor being the use of CMSPs, a possible problem is the difficulty 
of making effective analysis between detailed cases.  Each case will therefore 
utilise the same framework of analysis, based on Mann’s four sources of social 
power: Economy, Military, Political and Ideological to overcome this potential 
problem.  This framework and how it will be implemented will be established in 
chapter two.  Comparative research is a method that has been employed by 
others who have used historical sociology, including Skocpol, who employed 
comparative analysis of the revolutions in France, China and the Soviet 
Union.122   
Calvert identifies three possible strategies for comparison.  The first is 
the whole unit approach, where all relevant structures within a state are 
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compared; this is done with two or more states.  He argues that the danger of 
this approach is the researcher becoming overcome by the amount of 
information generated.  The second approach is to compare centres of political 
power within given societies.  The third approach is to compare communities; 
this can be done across states.123  This thesis will adopt the use Mann’s IEMP 
model to break down the power structures within the state, operating between 
the first two strategies it will test the impact on centres of power on the relevant 
structures within the states included.  CMSPs tend to be employed to operate 
within states which do not have full control over their structures, where different 
groups are competing with each other.  The third approach has been rejected as 
the focus is on the use of power by states, not on community groups. 
This thesis will draw on qualitative analysis to test the impact of CMSPs 
on the security of the state.  The ability to explore each of the social sources in 
greater detail, allowing questions about why and how the relationships between 
the sources of power change, rather than just whether they do, is fundamental to 
fully utilising Mann’s analytical model.124  It does need to be recognised however 
that the data can often be atypical, difficult to interpret and time consuming.125  
Thus a strong analytical model is needed to provide an effective basis for 
comparison.  Therefore this thesis will draw on a small number ‘n’ of cases, 
using qualitative analysis to offer an interpretive analysis of CMSP activity. 
 
1.5.3  Case Study Selection 
The choice of case studies therefore needs to form a representative sample, 
while drawing on a small number of cases.  There are a number of limiting 
factors which help to narrow this down and explain why Sierra Leone and Iraq 
are the most useful case studies to understand the use of CMSPs across the 
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period of study. 
The first limiting factor is to identify those states where CMSPs have 
taken a role in providing military functions.  The focus on the provision of military 
services removes a large number of states where more general security 
services were provided.  Although the number of states who have employed 
some form of commercial military or security support, in only a few cases has 
this involved the employment of military services to provide substantive military 
support. This narrows down the initial selection to Sierra Leone, Angola, Croatia, 
Columbia, Papua New Guinea, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The second limiting factor is to focus on pre-modern states.  Sierra 
Leone and Angola fit into these categories following the collapse of their 
governments.  Iraq and Afghanistan both lost their monopoly over the use of 
force after regime change.  In Columbia, even though CMSPs provided military 
functions, and military force was contested within the state, this was not to the 
extent of the other case studies. 
Thirdly, there needs to be a spread of cases across the time period.  The 
cases selected need to compare the use of CMSPs in the 1990s to their use 
after 2001.  Sierra Leone, Angola and Papua New Guinea are part of the first 
group.  In the second group are Iraq and Afghanistan.   
The final fourth requirement is that the case studies are not limited to one 
region.  As was seen above in the literature review, some of the existing 
research, such as Abrahamsen and Williams' use of Africa, focuses on a specific 
region.  Therefore, from the remaining cases it is necessary to decide between 
Sierra Leone and Angola.  This is particularly important made use of the same 
companies.  
The case selection also needs to reflect two regions in which the 
services of CMSPs are likely to continue to be required.  Thus resulting in 
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conclusions which are relevant for the future use of CMSPs.  The continued 
instability and state weakness in the Middle East and Africa. 
There needs to be enough material available to adequately consider the 
use of CMSPs within the theoretical framework.  This excludes Papua New 
Guinea, as Sandline was kicked out of the country before the contract could be 
properly executed. 
The selection of Sierra Leone and Iraq therefore provides two states as 
case studies; which fit the definition of pre-modern where CMSPs provided 
substantial military services.  They allow for the widening of conclusions by 
providing a sample of cases from the first and second periods of CMSP activity, 
(pre and post-9/11).  These cases represent the activities of CMSPs in two 
different regions, and reflect the use of CMSPs by the state, and an intervening 
state.  They represent states in which a small number of resources were 
important, and where both, state, international and non-state actors played a 
role. 
1.5.4  Sources 
Research for this thesis has sought to use primary sources.  However, issues of 
access mean that secondary literature is an important resource when studying 
CMSPs.  The emphasis of this thesis on improving understanding of the CMSP's 
by applying theory to existing knowledge means that existing scholarship can be 
used to provide some of the empirical basis for analysis.  In particular the thesis 
draws on both CMSP literature, and the country-specific writing on the various 
case studies which are included.  It is important to recognise the expertise which 
has contributed to understanding conflicts in specific states and what this can 
bring to the theorising of a phenomenon across a range of cases.  This thesis 
will also contribute to their work by integrating the impact of CMSPs into work on 
the failure of the state in the countries covered. While there are gaps in the 
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literature, it is important to acknowledge that important pieces of work have been 
published, which can help to inform the analysis being carried out here.  The fast 
moving nature of the industry does mean that these works are becoming 
outdated and require careful use as some of their conclusions may have already 
been proved false, but the empirical data within these sources remains a rich 
source. 
This thesis will utilize current work, particularly the more descriptive and 
basic analytical work and apply it within a deeper theoretical framework in order 
to seek a greater understanding of the issues involved in the outsourcing of 
state functions.  There is some dispute as to the accuracy of some older work on 
CMSPs as using secondary resources risks repeating errors made by earlier 
authors.  Sandline has complained that the work of Musah and Fayemi for 
references to information in earlier articles that had been disputed and 
acknowledged as incorrect.126  Because of this problem, care has been made to 
cross reference information, particularly where allegations of abuse have been 
made.  Accuracy is important as many of the companies mentioned in the thesis, 
particularly in cases since 2001, are still operating.  Inaccurate analysis could 
wrongfully damage the image of the respective company; a characteristic, that 
as will be discussed in the next chapter, is a key aspect of the CMSP.  Of course 
the opposite is also true; an overly favourable reading of the role played by the 
companies could lead to drawbacks of their use being overlooked. 
There are several issues relating to access to data on CMSPs.  The 
main obstacle is that much key information lies with the various companies 
involved.  As this information is in the private sector there is no obligation on the 
companies to divulge any information.127  Rather, as many of the companies 
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covered in this thesis are still operating, there is more of an incentive to withhold 
much possibly useful information.  Such actions are understandable; few of their 
clients would likely want details of contracts made public, and would therefore 
harm the professional reputation of the companies.  An often identified feature of 
the companies is the lack of attention they draw.  This is attractive for state and 
non-state actors seeking to conduct their affairs discreetly, also allowing them 
the potential for plausible deniability if things do not go their way. 128  CMSPs, 
companies and individual contractors have assisted researchers; however they 
have been accused of shaping their replies in an attempt to undermine rival 
companies.129  
Although access to information is an issue that needs to be 
acknowledged when investigating the activities of CMSPs, it should not deter 
study.  While there are issues with access to some data, there are plenty of data 
available with which to work.  The growing body of literature over the last 
decade is testament to this.  Some companies have willingly cooperated with 
writers, especially as the difficult issue of regulation has come to be discussed 
more.  There is a significant amount of data available in the public domain, 
although much has already been used in existing studies, the nature of the 
thesis as a theoretical analysis, will allow the avoiding a repetition of existing 
arguments.  This is an important subject with serious ramifications requiring 
rigorous academic study; the range of case studies and the amount of open 
source data means there is no insurmountable block to analysis. 
1.5.5  Structure of the Thesis 
Having introduced the phenomenon to be theorised and the framework by which 
this will be done, the next two chapters will cover these issues in more depth.  
Chapter two will show how a modified version of Mann’s theory of the state is 
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the most suitable alternative to Realism, and how this will be used in the thesis.  
Chapter three will establish the definition of CMSP which will be used in this 
thesis; by analysing, defining, and labelling the industry since the end of the 
Cold War.  Chapter four will place the contemporary market for CMSPs in 
historical context, along with the trends which emerged.  Chapter five will look at 
Sierra Leone and chapter six Iraq, applying empirical data to the model 
developed in chapters two.  These cases are in chronological order, by start 
date; Sierra Leone, then Iraq.  Finally the conclusion will reconcile the findings of 







The Commercial Use of Force: 
Definition & Issues 
2.1 Introduction 
The definition and labelling of the market for the commercial provision of security 
services has come to occupy a vast portion of the literature.  This is in no small 
part due to the widely accepted difficulty of identifying what exactly the 
companies are, and how they can be distinguished from other actors.  As a 
consequence a number of different categorisations and a plethora of terms have 
been used.  Before the research questions can be answered by analysing the 
case studies, it is necessary to explain how Commercial Military Service 
Providers (CMSPs) fit into this framework.  This chapter will therefore provide an 
overview of the current structure of the CMSP sector, identify its main features 
and show how it will be conceptualised in this thesis.  This chapter will explain 
why the thesis differs from a majority of the literature by adopting a focussed 
approach to the services provided by concentrating on military services.  A 
broader approach to the ownership and provision of these services however, will 
allow for the interaction between state and commercial enterprises that the label 
of 'private' disguises.  From this conceptualisation it will then be explained why 
CMSP is the most appropriate term for this thesis, over more commonly used 
terms such as Private Military Company (PMC) or Private Security Company 
(PSC). 
2.2 What are CMSPs? 
 A number of definitions have been used within the academic literature to 
delineate the private security sector.  These are based on typologies which have 
been developed to compare the various types of companies to each other and 
other types of actor; using the type of activities undertaken and their impact as 
points of differentiation.  The problem with these typologies is that the many 
exceptions and overlaps contained within them limit their effectiveness.  To 
overcome this problem the approach taken here is similar to that employed by 
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Mandel.1  A simple definition will be used as the basis of analysis, with the more 
effective typologies used to elucidate these points.  However, the interpretation 
of the definition used and the treatment of the typologies will differ from Mandel. 
The simple definition which most accurately describes the phenomenon 
being studied here associates three core principles.  The first two are: (1) the 
provision of military services, with (2) a corporate structure.  Uesseler refers to 
what he calls 'Private Military Corporations' as "business providers of 
professional services that are linked to warfare".2  The association of the 
provision of military services with a business structure is a good starting point, 
however these features raise questions over which the literature disagrees.  
Such as; what is the range of activities that are being provided by CMSPs?  
What does the corporate nature of the companies mean?  This is inevitable 
considering that the entities which operate in the sector vary in size, history, 
corporate relationships, location and client base.3  Finally, the third core principle 
(3) states that these services would otherwise be undertaken by the state.  
Shearer describes CMSPs as "offer[ing] military skills that were once the 
preserve of governments”.4  How does the funding and provision of services by 
CMSPs fit in with other types of military activity?  Where the typologies have a 
role is in considering these questions in more depth.  The core features of the 
definition and the questions which arise will now be considered in more detail. 
2.2.1 Range of Services 
The first element of the definition to be considered is the range of services 
provided.  The armed contractors who provided close protection and guard 
duties in Iraq and Afghanistan have become synonymous with CMSP use, 
however these are just part of the range of services CMSPs have provided.  In 
Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes and Sandline International ran full combat 
missions. They utilised air support to protect the capital, Freetown, and secured 
key mining areas in the country.5  In Afghanistan and Iraq CMSPs such as 
Vinnel Corporation and Dyncorp have been involved in training the fledgling 
                                                          
1
 Robert Mandel, Armies without States: The Privatization of Security (Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002), p.93. 
2
 P W Singer interview in Shadow Company [Film], Dir. Nick Bicanic and Jason Bourque 
(Canada: A Purpose Built Film, 2006). 
3
 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 2nd edn 
(London: Cornell, 2008), p.88.    
4
 David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Paper, 316 vols (Oxford: 





domestic security forces.6  Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), having been 
purchased by Halliburton, provided a range of support services in Iraq; which 
included building barracks, feeding troops and driving supply trucks,7 even 
providing final training for troops in Kuwait before deployment into Iraq.8  
Typologies have attempted to categorise these services, and in doing so attempt 
to distinguish the companies from each other, and other forms of actors. 
 
Figure 2.19 Singer’s ‘Tip of Spear’ 
 
The most useful of the typologies are those which classify the services provided 
by the companies and group those services by function.  Singer employs the 
analogy of a spear to classify what he calls Private Military Firms (PMFs) by the 
proximity of the services they provide to the 'frontline' of the 'battlespace' (see 
figure fig. 2.1).  He identifies three different categories of 'firm': (1) military 
provider firms, which employ equipment and skilled personnel to directly exert 
force; (2) military consultation firms, which advise and train forces; and finally (3) 
military support firms, which provide logistical support and intelligence 
services.10  This typology would appear to provide a useful method of both 
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grouping companies by the range of services which they provide and identifying 
the extent to which commercial actors are involved in military activities. 
There are difficulties in trying to rigidly place companies within these 
categories.  The actual position of companies within Singer's conceptualisation 
of the battlespace is more nuanced, and subject to change; in trying to maximise 
their profits they will often seek to expand the range of services provided.  
Companies will often straddle more than one category, possibly varying between 
contracts.  Avant has argued that it is more accurate to classify the activities of 
companies within each contract.11  However, even within a contract 
circumstances can affect the role taken by contractors.  For example, in an 
environment such as Iraq with no front lines, truck drivers found themselves 
directly involved in contact with insurgent forces.12  Associating companies with 
a particular position in the market can be useful, especially in recognising 
specialisations; such as KBR and logistical support.  But, Avant's method of 
working by contract is preferable, as it recognises that the services the 
companies provide varies from case-to-case, and reflects how the companies 
change over time. 
 
Fig 2.213 Ortiz’s Typological Breakdown 
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The difficulty of distinguishing companies and contracts by the services provided 
has not stopped academic writers from attempting to refine these categories, in 
order to frame their analysis of the industry.  Uesseler identifies four areas of  (1) 
security, (2) training, (3) intelligence and (4) logistics.14  The overlap between 
their approaches can be seen in the comparative framework developed by Ortiz 
in figure 2.2, synthesising the categories used by Shearer, Singer and Avant 
into: (1) Combat, (2) Training, (3) Support, (4) Security, (5) Intelligence, and (6) 
Reconstruction.15  These six 'units of analysis' appear to offer a more detailed 
breakdown than Singer's model, but they also suffer from problems.  First, 
adding more categories exacerbates the problem of overlap.  Second, the 
identification of 'reconstruction', is an unnecessary category which duplicates the 
activity of the other sectors, merely changing the client.  Finally, these categories 
make the distinction between security and combat, military and policing, criticism 
of which requires detailed consideration. 
 
Figure 2.316 Kinsey’s ‘Public Private vs. Lethality Topology’ 
The debate as to whether it is possible to distinguish between military and 
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security services divides much of the literature.  This is based on whether the 
contractors are armed or unarmed; active or passive; participate in combat or 
offer training and advice; fight to change the status quo or to preserve it.17  
‘Military’ companies are perceived as having an offensive, strategic, impact on 
the battlefield; for example Executive Outcomes and Sandline in Sierra Leone 
who lead operations to secure mining areas from RUF forces.18  In contrast 
‘security’ companies offer a lower level of support, at a tactical, rather than 
strategic level.  Security companies specialise in close protection work, the 
guarding of installations and infrastructure.  Something Brooks refers to as the 
protection of ‘nouns’.19  The lethality of actors is one of the axis used by Kinsey's 
typology to distinguish different types of security actor (the second axis will be 
considered in more detail below).  In figure 2.3 the state military is placed at 
point A and police at point C; companies that have provided full combat services 
(Sandline International and Executive Outcomes) at D and E; smaller security 
companies at point L; whereas companies that provide support services are 
around H, I and J. 
 However, the use of these distinctions to categorise the companies at 
this level is problematic.  The identification of military companies as aggressive 
and security companies as passive means the terms have become a normative 
judgement, thus companies tend to argue they are passive actors in a theatre, 
serving defensive functions.20  This causes difficulty in adding a separate 
category of security.  Avant's distinction between military and policing is equally 
problematic.21  As was argued in chapter two, the distinction of internal and 
external spheres of activity is increasingly questioned, especially in weak or 
failing states where policing and military are indistinguishable.  The abstract 
categorisation of the companies on these grounds, while conceptually useful in 
theory, does little when they are so contested.  Trying to distinguish between 
companies, or contracts, on any of these grounds is flawed. 
Although these categories lack rigorous conceptual integrity there is one 
aspect that the breakdown of the industry by function can be used to 
understand: the trend of personnel working across the sector.  As with modern 
state military forces the bulk of those in the industry provide logistical support.  
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Uesseler supplements Singer's spear analogy with that of a pyramid.22  The 
number of companies currently in operation which are capable of fielding troops 
and hardware in the numbers of the 'military' companies which were prominent 
during the 1990s, such as EO, is very limited.23  As such the vast majority of 
companies are now referred to as security companies.24  Although the services 
they provide will often coincide with the older style of private military contractors.  
Here though again, the difficulty in identifying these companies also arises from 
the reluctance of firms to be identified with what has become a negative 
normative category.25  It would also be presumptuous to assume that larger 
combat orientated companies will not emerge in the future.  Kinsey 
acknowledges the re-appearance of such a role in the future.26 
The identified categories include a wide range of services, but there are 
a number of activities which fall outside the scope of this thesis.  The focus here 
is on the service industry; so companies and individuals who only provide 
hardware, whether manufactured by themselves or another party, will not be 
included.  This excludes major arms manufacturing firms, and weapons dealers.  
Here there are two important caveats to note.  First, CMSPs often import military 
hardware into which they are operating either for their use, or for a client.  When 
provided for a client this is part of a contract alongside other services that 
include training or the restructuring of a military force.  Secondly, CMSPs may 
also be, or be owned by, arms manufacturers.  But it is the supply of arms in 
conjunction with providing services which this thesis is interested in.  The 
second exception is to recognise that although there is continuity to security 
guards seen in western states, these are not normally included in the academic 
literature, nor are they to be included here. 
This thesis is concerned with the substantive use of military service 
providers in conflict zones.  While writers such as Dunigan and Avant seek to 
use the most complex breakdown possible when looking at the role of military 
service providers,27 the approach taken here is similar to Eckert. In her analysis 
of the implications of military companies on just war theory, she prefers the use 
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of broader categories. 28  The specific categories used by writers like Avant do 
not help answer broader theoretical questions.  It is better to accept that this is a 
range of services, each of which is being used in a military context.  There is 
utility in recognising the broad distinction between the three main categories of 
service.  In this thesis the distinction will be made between (1) Combat, (2) 
Advice and Training, (3) Logistical Support and (4) Intelligence. But these will 
not be treated as discrete categories, the activities undertaken even within a 
contract can easily overlap between categories. 
2.2.2 Corporate Structure 
Defining CMSPs by the services they provide can tell us a lot about what they 
do, however this alone is insufficient to distinguish CMSPs from other actors 
who provide military services.  It is the combination of military services with the 
second and third elements of the definition which make CMSPs unique.  The 
first of these is the corporate structure of CMSPs.  Although there is a great 
degree of variation between companies, such as the type of corporate structure, 
their size, and location, they also share a number of common traits.  It has been 
argued that the corporate identity of the companies in the current market even 
distinguishes them from those of the Cold War era.29  Although some 
commentators think that the requirements are too low, there is a convincing case 
that the corporate structure is a significant factor that defines their structure and 
even affects their behaviour.  The most significant implication of this corporate 
identity is to distinguish CMSPs from the more traditional mercenary. 
CMSPs are companies with legally registered corporate entities with all 
of the implications that this entails.  The growth of the industry means that they 
are viewed as legitimate; it is reputed that retirement fund managers have been 
encouraged to invest in the sector with the result that the portfolio of many 
American's retirement funds are likely to include CMSPs.30 Within this they can 
be freelancers, limited liability companies or publically traded; the most 
successful of which are likely to be purchased by other companies.31  MPRI 
belongs to L-3 Communications.32  DynCorp has been bought and sold several 
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times.33  Kellogg, Brown and Root belonged to Halliburton between 1962 and 
2007, but have since separated.34 In 2008 G4S purchased ArmorGroup 
International Plc.35 Despite these differences CMSPs all have a corporate 
identity which has important ramifications. 
The size of the companies can vary from one-person operations to 
organisations which employ hundreds of thousands of people.36  G4S claims 
620,00 employees worldwide across the full range of services it provides.37  
However, the conventional practice is towards flexibility by employing the 
minimum number of employees possible, on short-term contracts for the 
duration of a job.38  Contractors are drawn from databases and could be used by 
several different companies.39  Procurement costs, which are normally part of a 
contract, are passed directly on to the client.40 It is not just western ex-soldiers 
who are employed.  In order to save money on labour CMSPs have taken 
employees from the local population when on site in a country, up to a ratio of 
twenty locals to one international employee.41  CMSPs are thus able to lower 
their infrastructure costs.   
Another notable component of the companies is their physical location.  
Like other registered companies they have corporate offices.  But unlike other 
companies they often have a number of different headquarters which include: 
lobbying, legal and operative headquarters.42 The companies often have a 
mixed makeup, with offices and personnel originating from different countries.43  
The companies tend to establish local offices which are run by a small group of 
expatriate employees, who then work with the local employees to fulfil the 
contracts.44  However, the focus on international is not necessarily correct.  
Although the industry is characterised by western companies, particularly from 
the US, UK and South Africa, the flexibility of being able to move the location of 
the head office means that labelling companies as international, especially when 
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they may even be formed for contracts in one war zone, is overly restricting. 
The significance of this commercial structure is the pursuit of a long-term 
market presence.  As such the companies have followed the norms of 
international statecraft, limiting what they do, such as deterring the companies 
from shifting sides in search of profit.45  The commercial nature of the 
companies has given them a strong link to some states.  The US in particular 
has strong links between the state and the companies, with current and former 
members of the government that have interests in the companies.46 
2.2.3 Funding and Delivery 
The final part of the definition is that these services would otherwise be provided 
by the state.  Much writing on CMSPs refers to a change in the relationship 
between 'public' and 'private' spheres, and whether this breaks the state 
'monopoly' over the use of force.47  There is a tendency to focus on the stark 
difference between the employment of commercial entities to provide services 
as part of the process of neo-liberalism which has been prevalent since the 
1980s.48  As a result it has been argued that the companies represent a 
movement of the provision of these services to the private sphere; in Mandel's 
definition the ownership and control of CMSPs is non-governmental.  Abstracting 
the financing and delivery of force does two important things.  It allows the 
relationship between the funding and provision of force to be considered and 
whether these are from the public or private sphere.  It provides some measure 
of comparison with other actors which undertake military activities.  Although the 
distinction is problematic is does offer some utility in understanding the place of 
the actors.  The problem with doing this that it is not completely correct. There is 
a convincing argument that the stark division between public and private which 
is often used mischaracterises them.  Although there is still a strong link 
between CMSPs and the 'private' sphere, there is still a significant relationship 
between CMSPs and the 'public' sphere. 
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Figure 2.449 Avant’s ‘Funding vs. Provision Topology’ 
 
Avant and Kinsey have both developed typologies which differentiate CMSPs on 
the basis of whether certain characteristics of CMSPs are 'public' or 'private'.  
Referring back to figure 2.3, the second axis utilised by Kinsey distinguishes 
whether the object to be secured is 'public' or 'private'.  This is considered to be 
a sliding scale, rather than a binary categorisation.  CMSPs feature across the 
scale, from defence of the state, to protection of private property.  Avant has 
sought to categorise CMSPs' activity by considering the place of the private 
sector in how intervention is funded against how it is executed.  Avant 
recognises the problem of distinguishing between public and private, especially 
historically.  She defines 'public' as state and 'private' as activities which occur 
outside the state, such as market, family and religion, but she uses private as 
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shorthand for non-governmental organisations.50  The CMSPs being considered 
in this thesis sit in what she categorises as 'Private (for-profit delivery), it shows 
how funding comes from a number of sources. 
 There are difficulties in abstracting 'public' and 'private'.  Avant asserts 
that such abstraction is necessary in order to move beyond description.51  It is 
useful to recognise the conceptual differences between the categories, but not 
to view this as a stark dichotomy. There is a second problem with distancing 
CMSPs too far from the interests of states.  First, several countries have a 
stronger relationship with the firms that the 'public', 'private' divide would 
indicate.  The US and the UK in particular pay interest to the companies.52 It has 
been argued that the way the companies are used is closer than simply 
assuming a 'private' entity is providing a service for a public body.  Mohlin 
argues that there is more cooperation between CMSPs and states than is often 
credited.53  Secondly, when the companies are used they have been employed 
as members of the client state's armed forces.54 
Although it is useful analytically to consider public and private spheres, it 
is wrong to solely identify CMSPs as 'private' entities.  Recognition of the 
problems caused by the stark differentiation between the 'public' and 'private' 
spheres fits well with historical sociology, which avoids making similar 
differentiations between domestic and international, recognising that the two 
flow into each other.55  CMSPs work for a number of different clients across 
these two spheres, with different levels of integration.  The companies are 
providing services which were viewed to be the preserve of the state, but in a 
manner which has a much closer relationship than a binary identification of 
'public' and 'private'. 
2.2.4 Contractor or Mercenary? 
The three elements combined contribute to address one of core conceptual 
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issues; whether CMSPs can be distinguished from the traditional 
conceptualisation of mercenary.  The term mercenary is effective at 
communicating with a wider audience, either because it is familiar, or because it 
quickly establishes the tone of an article.  The prevailing approach within the 
academic literature is to differentiate commercial providers of military services 
from traditional mercenaries (historic and recent variations).  Their criticism of 
the conflation of the two often stems from the use of mercenary as a normative 
judgement, rather than serving any analytical purpose.56  Several key 
conceptual features distinguish CMSPs from the traditional understanding of 
mercenary, so it is inaccurate and unhelpful to think of them as the same type of 
entity. 
Singer has identified a number of core features which he argues 
distinguish PMFs from mercenaries: 
“Organisation: Prior Corporate Structure 
Motives: Business Profit-Driven, Rather than individual Profit-Driven 
Open Market: Legal, Public Entities 
Services: Wider Range, Varied Clientele 
Recruitment: Public, Specialized 
Linkages: Ties to Corporate Holdings and Financial Markets”57 
These features stem from the corporate structure of the industry.  This is an 
important conceptual development from the image of the traditional mercenary, 
influencing the behaviour of the companies.  There are of course some dangers 
of this being the only distinction, as the task of registering a group of 
mercenaries at Company House is a rather low barrier.58  However for a 
legitimate company the entry into the corporate world, and the resultant 
liabilities, has a number of important ramifications.  The corporate nature of 
private military companies means they have a fixed identity and resultant legal 
identity.   
While still driven by the logic of profit motive there are important 
implications for how the companies pursue this.  The ethics behind who the 
companies work for is arguably much more important, and been used to 
distinguish the companies from mercenaries.  The owners and operatives are 
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publically discerning of who they would choose to work for, claiming only to work 
for legitimate governments.59  Modern commercial military enterprises recognise 
the importance of positive public opinion.  Krahmann points to ArmorGroup, who 
emphasise the ethical standards they follow and work with organisations like the 
Red Cross.  Whereas negative perceptions can have a detrimental impact on 
their share value, such as CACI after the abuse of inmates at Abu Ghraib 
implicated their employees.60   
Thus the acceptance of one lucrative contract could damage the long-
term reputation of a company.  This is important as the companies differ in 
another element from mercenaries.  They are not established for one-off 
operations; instead retaining permanent structures, though taking on personnel 
as required.61  While as corporate entities they can try re-image and brand 
themselves, the actions and reputation of a previous incarnation can prove 
difficult to lose.  The twice renaming of Blackwater; to Xe and then Academi has 
not stopped the name ‘Blackwater’, and thus past actions, being mentioned 
when the new names have been called for.62 
Further distinguishing between CMSPs and traditional mercenaries is 
that the growth of CMSPs has not brought to an end the career of more 
traditional mercenaries, even if these have become more sophisticated.  The 
‘Wonga Coup’ in 2004, where a group tried to overthrow the government of 
Equatorial Guinea, was such an undertaking. They had corporate ties, with high 
profile backers being identified,63 and the intention was to take a role in the oil 
industry and a contract to rebuild the military.64  However, the initial operation 
was to play out more as a ‘Boy’s Own’ adventure, rather than the operations of a 
CMSP.65  Some observers might argue over the semantics of drawing such a 
line, the operation used personnel who would otherwise be employed by 
CMSPs.66 However, this is certainly an exception to the companies being 
examined here.  This was a company formed for one particular operation, and 
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has attracted criticism from those within the industry.67   
There are crossovers between the commercial military sector and more 
traditional mercenaries; who on occasion utilise the same pool of personnel as 
commercial providers.68  The changing nature of the industry leads to further 
confusion; arguably early PMCs actually functioned as mercenaries, even while 
establishing the basis of the current industry.  EO has been called the purest 
form of the modern mercenary.69  Mercenary or contractor, because of the use of 
the same personnel between the two it is even more important to distinguish.70 
These characteristics are reflected in the definition provided by Lt Col 
Tim Spicer, who distinguishes the companies from mercenaries on the grounds 
that: 
"PMCs are permanent structures, corporate entities, which are run as a 
business. They have a clear hierarchy, are run on military lines and 
operate to high disciplinary standards and within the Law of Armed 
Conflict, with a particular concern for human rights."71 
Spicer has been clear in the link between mercenaries and ‘PMCs’ (Private 
Military Companies) in that they share a common ancestry.  However, he views 
the latter as a distinct and positive actor that he hopes can restore the reputation 
of mercenarism as a profession, from the activities of mercenaries in the 
1960s.72  
Although CMSPs provide similar services to mercenaries, there is a 
conceptual difference.  Mercenary is used as shorthand by many, including 
those within the industry, but it is unhelpful to conflate the two conceptually.  
CMSPs are structured as legally recognised corporate entities, while their 
employee base may be flexible the companies themselves are permanent with 
identities which have implications for whom they claim to work for, how force is 
employed and the implications of its use.  As such they work claim to work for 
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2.2.5 Definition in the Thesis 
This thesis will therefore take a focused analysis on the market for military 
services.  It is concerned with companies that provide services which have 
military applications, and are linked to the support, training and/or execution of 
force by the state.  Although the supply of military hardware may form part of 
their contracts the emphasis is on the provision of services.  These services can 
be provide by entities of variable size, but they must be legally recognised 
commercial entities.  Because of the close relationship with the state and the 
blurring of the public and private realms in which the companies operate it is not 
accurate to call them private.  Although often characterised as international, this 
is not strictly true.  Companies can be locally registered, they often have local 
head quarters and employ members of the local population. 
 CMSPs are distinct from a range of other actors because of their 
corporate identity.  The use of contracts to work for a variety of companies 
means they are not militia.  Although related, by the services provided, they are 
distinct from the private security guards which have become commonplace in 
many western countries, but also in South Africa and Pakistan.  CMSPs are also 
different from mercenaries who work on an ad hoc basis, which became 
infamous in the latter part of the twentieth century, although the same personnel 
can work for each of these. 
2.3 Labelling the commercial use of force 
The selection of a label for commercial military providers requires careful 
consideration because of the normative connotations of many of the terms used.  
A strong definition requires an accurate term in order to be useful.  Doing so will 
distinguish the thesis from less academic writing and orientate this thesis within 
the literature.  There is a gap between the industry and those writing about it.  
Some members of the industry have been happy to participate in efforts to better 
understand the concepts involved,73 writers such as Isenberg argue that the 
adoption of an appropriate label would be encouraged by the companies.74  
However, others have been more cynical of how useful this is, instead leaving 
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journalists and academic writers to construct their own definitions.75     
The different approaches to the elements of the definition considered 
above complicates the search for an accurate definition, especially as many of 
the terms used are value laden.  It is therefore unsurprising that the search 
occupies a significant portion of the academic literature and a number of terms 
have come into vogue; from Mercenary,76 to Private Military Firm (PMF),77 
Private Military Company (PMC),78 Private Military and Security Company 
(PMSC),79 Military Service Provider (MSP),80 International Security Firm (ISF),81 
and now Commercial Military Service Provider (CMSP).82  This is alongside 
more sensationalist terms, such as ‘Dogs of War’,83 from the Forsyth novel of 
the same name.84  Writers within the academic literature often either establish 
their own term for the industry, or revise an existing term.  This can lead to 
different terms being used to explain the same fundamental concept, such 
repetition is inevitable.  The changing nature of the industry, and the 
development of the literature, has resulted in constant reappraisal of the 
terminology used. 
Of these terms, CMSP is the most effective umbrella term to describe the 
commercial provision of force as understood in this thesis.  CMSP is inclusive 
enough to cover the various forms that the commercialisation of military services 
has taken, recognising the features of the industry but not so general that it 
includes other actors.  While it is impossible to find a completely neutral term 
CMSP reduces unwarranted normative connotations.  It will still be necessary to 
                                                          
75
 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Private Military Companies.  
76
 Abdel-Fatau Musah and Kayode J. Fayemi, Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma 
(London: Pluto Press, 2000).    
77
 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (London: 
Cornell, 2003).    
78
  Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention.  
79
 David Isenberg, ‘UN use of PMSC? it's a Reality Not a Hypothetical,’ Huffington Post, 3 
January 2012 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/united-nations-military-
contractors_b_1180272.html> [accessed 3 January 2012]. 
80
 Doug Brooks ‘Hope for a hopeless continent: mercenaries,’ Traders: Journal for the South 
African Region, Issue 3, July-October 2000, cited in House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Private Military Companies, p.12. 
81
 Thomas K. Adams, 'The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict', Parameters, 
Summer (1999), p.103.    
82
 Isenberg, From PMC to CMSP.     
83
 Beredette Muthien and Ian Taylor, 'The Return of the Dogs of War?', in The Emergence of 
Private Authority in Global Governance, ed. by Rodney Hall and Thomas Biersteker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 187; Al Venter, War Dog: Fighting Other 
People’s Wars, the Modern Mercenary in Combat (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2006).    
84
 Frederick Forsyth, The Dogs of War (London: Arrow Books, 1996).    
 53 
 
refer to either security or military companies within the thesis, however.  CMSPs 
are one of many different forms of non-state actor utilising force, although there 
are aspects which CMSPs have in common with other forms of private force, 
they are an important and distinct actor. 
2.3.1 Defining the terms 
The term mercenary is the traditional label used, especially in their classic forms 
of an independent operator. Well known figures such as Bob Denard and Mike 
Hoare fall under this bracket.  Although there is some blurring of the line as 
Simon Mann has moved from working for Sandline in Sierra Leone, to taking a 
more traditional mercenary role during the ‘Wonga Coup’.  There are occasions 
that operators use the term themselves, though this is likely to be more in terms 
of self publicity.  Most guns for hire, even if they inwardly use the label avoid its 
usage in public as the use of mercenaries is illegal; tending to rely on 
euphemism,85 even though as shown above the definition is easy enough to 
escape.  This does not stop the some CMSP personnel from using it to describe 
themselves.86   
There are two main reasons for not using a mercenary: 1) important 
conceptual issues are raised (as covered above); and 2) the term is immediately 
pejorative, often used by writers wanting to connote a negative image of 
CMSPs.  Instead, this thesis recognizes CMSPs of the last twenty years to be a 
distinct phenomenon.  It would be incorrect to say that mercenaries in the 
classic sense no longer exist.  Indeed the attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea 
is a good example of this form.  Thus it is even more important to use a term 
that recognises this difference as continued analysis of mercenaries, even in an 
updated modern guise should be considered separate.  Corporate Mercenary is 
used in some of the literature.87  While this does recognise the new 
characteristics of the commercial aspect, the term mercenary still implies too 
many assumptions as to the way in which contractors operate; being tied to the 
pursuit of individual profit, rather than the role of a group. 
The term PMO is used much less often and is far too ambiguous.  
‘Organization’ could be interpreted to include, among others, paramilitary and 
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terrorist groups.  While organizations such as these do have an influence on 
international security and the use of force, they fall beyond the scope of the 
questions considered here.  Paramilitary and terrorist groups tend to have a 
much less ambiguous legal status, providing a direct threat to a particular 
state(s).  Whereas it is the quasi-legal status ‘enjoyed’ by PMSCs which makes 
them complicated and more interesting. 
PMC and PSC are two of the most commonly used terms. However, use 
of the term PMC or PMS implies exclusion; it is argued that PMCs differ from 
PSCs as their deployment has a strategic impact on the battle space; PSCs 
influence security at a tactical level.  Some commentators have chosen to 
exclude one or the others; some arguing that only a couple of PSCs have ever 
existed and others that PSCs do both so have significant impact.  This thesis will 
include both forms of private force.  PSCs may not have the level of influence of 
PMCs, but their prevalence in several of the case studies in the thesis means 
they cannot be excluded.  Their presence is affecting the ownership and 
deployment of force in the states they are operating.  The effect of this influence 
being a key question.  More problematic is the reliance upon the term private. 
The next option is a compound of PMC and PSC, to make PMSC, 
although this term is slightly unwieldy it does solve the problem above.  It allows 
the thesis to consider both PMCs and PSCs, without constantly referring to both.  
PMSC also excludes non ‘corporate’ military organizations from the discussion 
allowing a tighter focus on the question.  Reliance upon a catch-all term, while 
useful for convenience covers up an important theoretical distinction. However, 
given the range services available, the difficulty of distinguishing between them 
and the adaptability of the companies to react to situations in order to market 
services the most sensible approach is not to directly distinguish between 
security and military functions to define the companies.88  The option therefore 
lies with PMSC.  However this leaves the issue of distinguishing between public 
and private. 
The term military service provider is the next option, this is a term 
favoured by Doug Brooks.89  The term does not catch the corporate nature of 
the organisations; surely other non-corporate organisations are also military 
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service providers.  A more recent term to be used is CMSP,90 Commercial 
Military Service Provider, which does engage with concept, placing emphasis 
the corporate nature of the companies.  The reliance on the term military is 
arguably restricting, as the appeal of the term PMSC lies in the acceptance of a 
technical difference between military and security services, security sitting at the 
lower end of the close protection scale.  However, both of these are functions 
which are carried out by the military.  For example the close protection and 
guard work carried out by companies such as Blackwater, Triple Canopy was 
work that would otherwise have been carried out by US military forces.  The 
difficulty of adopting another label is in moving away from what has become an 
established term, PMC. 
Isenberg points towards the probable favourable reception of a term by 
the companies that takes emphasis away from the private aspect of the 
operations.91  The private sector basis of the industry has long been seen as the 
source of many negative connotations towards the use of contractors.  The 
preference is for the public sector to become involved, when dealing with 
security, even if the outcome of private sector involvement is beneficial.92 
2.3.2 CMSP 
This thesis will use the term CMSP.  It offers a label that encapsulates the 
corporate business side of the companies; while allowing the distinction between 
the companies and other forms of non-state force and defence industries.  It 
provides a term that is recognisable within the structure of the existing debate.   
CMSPs are registered companies who undertake a variety of services on 
long or short-term contracts to fulfil military, security or law enforcement 
functions usually performed by the state; from training and support services, to 
the execution of deadly force.  This can be either at a tactical or strategic level.  
The companies can be registered within the country they operate, or brought in 
from abroad.  They can work on behalf of states, or non-state organisations. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the commercial provision of force is difficult to 
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precisely define, but the parameters established above allow a good 
understanding of how the companies which will be covered here will be 
understood in this thesis.  CMSPs are a distinct phenomenon which share 
characteristics with other actors, but are distinct from them.  This thesis is 
concerned with companies that provide military services, including the support, 
training and/or execution of force by the state.  These services can be provided 
by entities of variable size, but they must be legally recognised commercial 
entities.  Because of the close relationship with the state it is not accurate to call 
them private.  Companies can be internationally or locally registered, and 
employ members of the local population. 
 CMSP is most appropriate term for the phenomenon as understood in 
this thesis.  Although the trend within the literature has been towards the use of 
PSC, this privileges the activities of a small number of companies which 
operated at the zenith of the boom in Iraq.  This thesis is concerned with a wider 
view of the period, as such Military better serves as an umbrella term for the 
overall type of activity which has been undertaken since the end of the Cold 
War.  Similarly the term PMC has been rejected because it places too much 
emphasis on military services.  However, considering the problems of 
establishing a strict public/private division within the use of the companies, 
particularly when they were effectively employed as agents of the state, the use 











"To insist that a single method constitutes the only proper approach is like 




3. 1 Introduction 
Stephen Walt's quote above illustrates how the diverse range of theories which 
international security utilises is a strength of the discipline.  No universal theory 
of international security exists and any attempt to develop one would be 
counterproductive; limiting the answers offered by security studies.3  However, 
the theoretical approach needs to be suitable for the phenomenon being 
studied.  Theorising the impact of CMSPs on the state, and thus addressing the 
research questions posed, requires an approach which can account for the role 
of non-state actors and problematise the state. 
Realism's parsimonious approach offers a coherent and effective method 
of theorising international security by removing the clutter from the analysis of 
international politics.  Waltz argues that a theoretical model is an abstraction of 
reality, rather than merely a scaled down model of the reality it seeks to explain.4  
However, in eschewing reductionism5 theoretical lacuna are created, particularly 
when analysing interaction between non-state actors below state level.6  The 
research questions posed in the introduction require a more complex theoretical 
approach.  It is not enough to consider states as billiard balls, instead "it is 
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necessary to look inside the black box of the state".7  Musah and Fayemi call for 
such a re-conceptualisation of security, beyond structural realism, in their study 
of ‘mercenary' activity in Africa.8  An approach is required which grants agency 
to state and non-state actors, rather than reduce the motives of the state to the 
structure of the international system. 
Historical sociology offers an alternative to both mainstream and critical 
approaches to security by facilitating the analysis of non-state actors and their 
interaction with the state at both the sub-state and systemic level in their historic 
context.  Criticisms have been made of historical sociology as an approach to 
international relations: that international relations and sociology scholars have 
passed each other without understanding developments in each other's 
discipline, resulting in a retreading of old debates.9  However, these criticisms 
can be reconciled and the potential insights which its analytical tools can offer to 
the theorising of contemporary security in its sociological and historical context 
justify further engagement.10 
As with other theoretical approaches, historical sociology is subject to an 
active internal discourse. The diversity of ideas which results is constructive, 
even if some debates have verged on semantic.11  Of the various forms of 
historical sociology Mann's IEMP model is the most relevant in addressing the 
research questions posed in this thesis.  His analysis of the sources of social 
power and their interaction allows the theorising of power and the state from 
different sources, at several levels. His model also provides a suitable 
framework for the comparative analysis of the case studies. Importantly, 
although more reductionist than structural realism, Mann still fulfils the criteria 
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set by Waltz: separating relevant information from empirical mess.12 Mann's 
model is not perfect, indeed Mann has continued to refine it in response to 
criticism, thus further refinements are necessary, in particular the use ideology.  
Therefore Buzan's sectoral approach to security will be engaged with to offer a 
more rounded model. 
The rest of the chapter will take the following structure.  Historical 
Sociology; from Weberian Historical Sociology, to Mann’s Historical Sociology, 
which develops of Webers’ Historical Sociology.  Followed by an overview of the 
How Historical Sociology can address the research questions.  An overview of 
Mann’s approach.  Then How Barry Buzan also addresses these areas in his 
sectoral approach to security.  Finally this chapter will outline how a combination 
of Mann and Buzan’s model will be operationalised and applied to the case 
studies.   
3.2 Historical Sociology 
The intention of Historical sociology is to provide a sociological historical 
approach to international relations, analysing historical international processes 
and phenomenon, problematising contemporary processes and institutions;13 
theorising the interaction of units, and structure.14  Other approaches, in 
particular structural realism, are criticised for 'chronofetishism' and 
'temprocentrism' - cutting the present off from the past, and extrapolating current 
process backwards to create an artificial history.15  There are several excellent 
overviews of historical sociology,16 and the role it can play in international 
relations,17 which outline the scope of this contribution.  However, of interest 
here is whether this results in a more effective answer to the research questions.  
As such there are two issues to consider.  (1) How does historical sociology's 
claim to improve upon structural realism address the problems in answering the 
research questions? and (2) whose work most effectively fulfils these criteria? 
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3.2.1 Historical Sociology and the Research Questions 
A number of historical sociologists have outlined the contribution historical 
sociology can make to international relations as a critique of structural realism; 
one of the most comprehensive of which is by Hobson who has identified six 
principles.18  Shaw and Spruyt agree with Hobson's critique, though not 
necessarily the way he proposes fulfilling it.19  These principles also 
demonstrate how historical sociology can be used to answer the research 
questions by addressing the three concerns with structural realism.  'Multi-
causality' and 'multi-spatiality' increase complexity, by incorporating more factors 
and increasing the number of levels of analysis.  Granting 'partial autonomy' and 
using a 'non realist concept of state autonomy' stops the behaviour of actors 
being derived from structural constraints.  Finally, historical sociology 
incorporates change by not just accounting for 'history and change', but 
'complex change'.  Its effectiveness in answering the research questions is 
therefore dependent upon how successful scholars have been in developing an 
approach within this framework. 
Within historical sociology there is a lively debate as to whose work most 
effectively fulfils these principles.  This is to be expected as the scholars 
involved originate in different academic fields, focus on different phenomenon, 
and utilise other approaches to international relations.  A number of subfields 
have emerged, including Weberian historical sociology, world systems analysis, 
constructivist and critical approaches.  The search here is for an approach which 
in addressing the three problems with structural realism builds upon it rather 
than rejects it, adds a degree of complexity without being too reductionist and 
retains a focus on the state as a the main actor.  These are not criteria to which 
all historical sociologists would subscribe, particularly among those who have 
called for a critical, constructivist or third wave of Weberian historical sociology.  
However, there is support for diversity within historical sociology with Skocpol 
arguing "it is a mistake to tie historical sociology down to any one 
epistemological, theoretical, or methodological orientation",20 and Buzan 
promoting "methodological pluralism over methodological monism" in his realist 
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take on historical sociological international relations theory.21 
The most suitable subfield in the search for such a base is Weberian 
historical sociology, which is compatible with many of the common assumptions 
of realism.  Critical approaches have proved popular with a number of theorists 
such as Halliday, Smith and Reus-Smit taking up the call made by Linklater for a 
historical sociological move beyond structural realism and Marxism.22  However, 
in opposing the materialist foundations of what they see as the large majority of 
historical writing; in particular neo-Weberian historical sociology and 
constructivism,23 critical historical sociology rejects the fundamental 
epistemological underpinnings of realism. 
Constructivism and historical sociology is a more promising partnership 
as there are a number of similarities between the two approaches.24  That 
constructivists don't consider themselves to be part of the post-modern turn, 
which has rejected positivism, avoids the pitfalls of critical theory.  The problem 
with constructivism as an approach to historical sociology within this thesis is 
that it tends to be a number of principles or tools.25  As was argued above some 
of these are useful in individually addressing the problems with structural 
realism, but they lack overall coherency.  The thesis would therefore be better 
served by using these principles to inform a more coherent analysis within 
Weberian historical sociology. 
Weberian historical sociology forms a substantial section of historical 
sociological research within which a number of waves have been identified. 
These waves have been used to evaluate how far each work advances the 
pursuit of a historical sociological approach to international relations, they also 
serve as a method of discrediting the work of other writers.  Criticism on these 
grounds does not necessitate irrelevance when answering the research 
questions as the measure of success here, the search is for a more complex 
approach which retains some realist characteristics, is somewhat different to 
Hobson who advocates a much greater move away from structural realism.26  
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These waves can still be useful as they explore historical sociology within the 
context of structural realism. 
3.2.2 Weberian Historical Sociology 
The first wave of Weberian historical sociology is identified with the re-
emergence of historical sociology in the context of the 'second state debate' 
which occurred in international relations during the 1980s.  Those writing within 
this wave include Skocpol and Tilley.27  They  attempted to address the failings 
of structural approaches to international relations; which emphasised the 
centrality of the state as a unit of analysis, but treated it as a 'black box' so in 
fact 'kicked the state out' by refusing to problematise it.  These writers sought to 
retain the state as an analytical category by considering the domestic and 
agential powers of the state.28  It has been argued that they in fact failed to fulfil 
this ambition as early historical sociology drew too heavily on structural realism 
and 'kicked the state back out'.29 
Although Skocpol's work provides a strong analysis of the state, it is 
criticised for a weak account of the international system which by focusing on 
warfare is too deterministic.30  By failing to offer a complex enough account of 
the international system she does not move far enough away from structural 
realism to offer an approach which can be used to answer the research 
questions.  However, Skocpol's work on historical sociology as an approach 
does show that in principle historical sociology can be used as a method of 
comparative analysis of case studies over time to abstract causal factors.31 
Tilly's explanation of the relationship between the state and warfare has 
been influential.  In 'Coercion, Capital and European States' he explores the 
relationship between capital and coercion.32  Although based on the 
development of the state in Europe his work has been used to understand the 
state after decolonisation.33  He has also considered the future of European 
                                                          
27
 John Hobson, 'Two Waves of Weberian Historical Sociology,' pp.70-73, Peter W. Singer, 
Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, 2nd edn (London: Cornell, 
2008). 
28
 John Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), pp.3-4. 
29
 Smith, 'Historical Sociology and International Relations Theory,' pp.70-73. 
30
 Stephen Hobden, International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down 
Boundaries (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.169-170. 
31
 Skocpol, 'Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies,' pp. 362-385. 
32
 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992). 
33
 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, 
and the International System (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1995), p.22. 
 63 
 
states following the end of the Cold War.34  Tilly provides a strong account of the 
development of the state, but his explanation of the international is criticised as 
inconsistent, being partially constructivist and partially structurally deterministic.  
Hobden admits that the inconsistency can be explained by Tilly accounting for 
historical contingency, but discounts his work as a result.35  This inconsistency is 
not of concern when an accurate reflection of historical contingency, more 
problematic is that the emphasis is still on warfare and economics, limiting the 
causal complexity of his account. 
The second wave of historical sociology resolves the problem with 
structural realism's parsimony by increasing the number of causal factors, 
introducing a complex form of parsimony which include a greater number of 
causal factors.  This is preferable to complex parsimony, which still utilises one 
causal factor but introduces intervening variable, and therefore does not 
fundamentally alter the logic.36  The second improvement is the introduction of a 
'fourth image' which accounts for developments at a sub-national stage.37  
Criticisms which have been levelled at Weberian historical sociology for not 
offering a substantive enough move away from structural realism.38  Although 
this is denied by Weberian historical sociologists.39  This leaves second wave 
historical sociological approaches to international security much better able to 
account for the use and implications of CMSPs on the state.  and the focus on 
the state should not be viewed as a problem - the research questions consider 
the impact of CMSPs on the state, so a state based approach is required, as 
long as it gives the appropriate relevance to other actors.  The overlap with 
realism is a strength rather than a weakness. 
There are a number of theorists working within this second wave 
including, Halliday, Rosenberg and Shaw.  The work of Shaw in particular is of 
contemporary relevance.  He has adopted a sociological approach to a number 
of issues, including globalisation and modern methods of warfare.  'The Western 
Way of War' considers how the risk avoidance in modern warfare by the 
'Western' militaries leads to greater civilian casualties.40  His work demonstrates 
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how historical sociology can be used look at smaller focused problems, not just 
large scale historical change at a systemic level.  However, within the second 
wave Mann offers the most effective potential framework. 
3.3 Michael Mann’s Historical Sociology 
Mann's IEMP and infrastructural power models offer a useful tool for the analysis 
of social power structures; how they interact with institutions and each other 
over time. He has proved to be increasingly influential, with the analytical power 
of the models he has developed being recognised by international relations and 
security theorists.41The books he has written using this model have been 
identified with attempts to seek a third wave of historical sociology.42  Although 
Mann's focus was on classes and nation-states in a Weberian critique of 
"Marxist monocausalism",43 he stress the importance of undertaking sociological 
analysis - even in the context of historical macro-sociology - which is relevant to 
contemporary issues.44  His focus on power offers an alternative to the 
parsimonious realist theories of security; to generate a theory of the state and 
how it interacts with other actors at various levels.  Thus a degree of 
reductionism is granted, but not ad nauseam - so losing all the benefits of 
parsimony.  Mann's writing has attracted criticism, both from within and outside 
of historical sociology, some of these criticisms are unwarranted or the result of 
a conflicting view of how historical sociology should be developed.  However, 
valid criticisms have been made.  Mann has been receptive to critics of his work, 
and responded when he has believed necessary.45 
The decision to use Mann's IEMP model is based upon three of the 
underlying methodological assumptions behind his approach.  The first is his 
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position on the relationship between history and sociology.  Some academics 
are critical of the of mixing history, a humanity, and sociology, a social science, 
on the basis that the methodological and epistemological foundations of each 
subject are so fundamentally different cooperation is not possible.46  
International security has always relied upon cross-disciplinary cooperation, an 
important development within the study of international security has been the 
improved use of history as a means of generating empirical data.47  This is an 
approach which Mann adopts when he argues that "social theory cannot 
develop without knowledge of history...[and]...the study of history is also 
impoverished without sociology."48  As has already been demonstrated in this 
chapter, it was be disingenuous to argue that realism is completely ahistorical.  
Classical and neo-classical approaches emphasise the importance of historicism 
and even structural realism, generally viewed as the most ahistorical of realist 
approaches, makes use of historical examples to justify its arguments.49  Where 
Mann differs from realism is in providing a more rounded explanation of 
historical change, addressing the criticisms made by Hobson.  Adopting such an 
approach will allowing the conceptualisation of commercial force within its 
historical context.   
Mann is also supportive of the use of secondary sources as the basis of 
both historical macro-sociology.  He argues that it is the specific theoretical tools 
which the sociologist can bring - or in this case security theorist - to the analysis 
which can bring new insights to previously used data.50  Mann's approach 
therefore enables to further work to be carried out by theorists looking at the role 
of commercial military companies using empirical data which has already been 
presented.  As long as the theoretical approach employed allows the research 
questions proposed to bring new insights.  Particularly where focused work on 
specific periods and regions can be brought together in a wider theoretical 
approach.51 
The second assumption is the balance between theory and empiricism.  
Mann adopts a realist emphasis on theory as a method of analysis in which he 
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stresses the importance of 'zigzagging' between theory and empiricism.  His 
theory is designed to deal with mess,52 making sense of it in a way that allows 
the most important factors to be identified and theorised.  Mann is critical of the 
domination of either approach.  In providing a theory which is more reductionist 
than realism, he acknowledges the fundamental importance of selectivity as the 
rationale behind the development of theoretical models, avoiding unnecessary 
complexity and the overuse of superfluous empirical data.  Conversely he warns 
against the overemphasis of theoretical models.  The following quote from the 
first volume of the Sources of Social power expresses this eloquently: "Too 
much scholarly attention to the facts makes one blind; too much listening to the 
rhythms of theory and world history make one deaf."53  He concludes by warning 
that the match between theory and facts can never be exact.  This reflects the 
underlying tensions which are outlined by Waltz at the beginning of this chapter - 
theory is an artificial abstraction.  The task of the theorist is to select the 
approach that best abstracts the data they wish to analyse.  Part of this process 
will always be a compromise, but some approaches will be more suitable than 
others.  Although Mann has been criticised for the execution of his analysis - 
Gorski describing him as "more of historical than a "grand theorist.""54 the 
balance of theory and empiricism in Mann's approach offers the most 
appropriate approach to address the research questions; by addressing the 
theoretical lacuna, while retaining practical levels of analysis as to the impact of 
the companies. 
3.3.1 Sources of Social Power  
Mann’s theorising of social power is based on the identification of four sources 
of social power: Ideology, Economy, Military and Political.  These sources are 
outlined by Mann in Volume I of The Sources of Social Power55 and 
subsequently built upon in further volumes of his work.  Volume 2 of the Sources 
of Social Power refines their use,56 and their context in the use of power in the 
twenty first century is further explored in a discussion with John Hall which acts 
as a prelude to volume 3.57  Mann demonstrates the utility of this method of 
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analysing the behaviour of a state when he examined the foundations of US 
foreign policy in Incoherent Empire;58 the interaction between the four sources of 
power is used to cast light on the confused, and sometimes contradictory, nature 
of US foreign policy. 
The four sources appear at first glance to be fairly straightforward and oft 
used categories, but there are three important elements to note in Mann's use of 
these sources of power. The first is the number of sources identified.  The 
identification of four sources builds on the work of Giddens and Weber.  The 
conventional approach to power was to divide it between the categories of 
economic, political and social.  Mann sought further explanation in the division of 
military and political, differentiating himself from this earlier work.59  While not 
agreed upon by all,60 the division between military and political is important, 
particularly in the context of work carried out since the end of the Cold War.  The 
separation of military and political aspects of conflict has proved to be important 
in understanding the character of intra-state warfare.  While the novelty of 
Kaldor's 'New Wars' has rightly been widely questioned,61 her highlighting of the 
way in which violence is often divorced from political aims vindicates the 
separation of military and political sources of power.62  The differentiation of 
military and political sources of power is important when considering the 
commercialisation of military services.  It will be demonstrated in the case 
studies how the companies have an interest in each of these sources of social 
power - by their very nature they tend to become involved in the various political, 
military and economic constituents of the state as they are military 
organisations, with strong economic interests, whose employers and objectives 
will have political implications.  In order for the impact of these sometimes 
contradictory interests to be fully understood the sources need to considered 
separately. 
The second element is the interaction between the sources of social 
power.  The fact that they are promiscuous; rather than bouncing off one another 
merely affecting each other's trajectory they intertwine, changing each other's 
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internal structure.  As well as being able to rank these factors in order of 
importance it also possible theorise how they interact with each other. The 
combination of the different sources of power also allows the understanding of 
the type of control within the state.  Mann has framework for the type of control 
which the institutions within the state are able to exert.  He is praised in the use 
of these categories in incoherent empire for the emphasis on agency over 
structural factors.63 
3.3.2 Buzan and Historical Sociology 
The two main problems with Mann's approach are the execution of the IEMP 
model and the definition of some of the sources of social power, particularly 
ideology.  Both of these could be remedied by improving the definition of the 
sources of social power.  There have been suggestions that Mann's approach 
could form an effective framework when combined with Buzan's sectoral 
approach.  Hobden argues that such an approach would be no small 
undertaking, but it would address both the issues with structural realism and the 
problems of Mann's approach in addressing them.64  Buzan has also used 
similar categories in his work on security, referring to them as sectors.  His work 
forms a useful basis for building upon Mann as he has a similar understanding 
of the role of these categories.  He recognises that although the analytical 
categories are not in themselves novel, their explicit use as an analytical 
framework is uncommon.65  He also emphasises their importance not just in 
deconstructing issues, but in the way they need to be reconstructed 
afterwards.66 
'Military', 'Economic' and 'Political' are used as with Mann, but there are 
two differences.  He refers to a 'Societal' sector rather than the 'Ideological' used 
by Mann.  In the context of this thesis 'Societal' is a more accurate description of 
the type of issues which will be considered.  By using 'Societal' as part of the 
sources of social power use of Mann's model will move away from analysing the 
relationship between class and modes of production which has occupied much 
writing on historical sociology.  More relevant to the case studies is the focus on 
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identity - the concepts of nationalism and identity are of greater concern to much 
writing on issue of new wars.  The fifth category used by Buzan is 
'Environmental'.  This will not be included as a separate source of power as it is 
an issue which ties into the other sources rather than an independent source of 
power within itself.  Where relevant environmental degradation will be 
considered according to its economic, political and societal implications. 
3.3.3 Historical Sociology Conclusion  
Historical sociology can thus offer an alternative to realism in answering the 
research questions where structural realism, liberal, critical and constructivist 
security theory founder.  This thesis will instead use realist principles within a 
framework offered by historical sociology.  These will include; the continuing 
importance of the state, the pursuit of power, and the impact of system on the 
state. But recognise the importance of other actors, the need to move beyond 
the international-national dichotomy, that power comes from non-political/military 
sources.  There is also the need to incorporate historical change and 
contingency.   
Although a number of writers such as Shaw have tackled questions of 
globalisation,67 work which has been undertaken in the second wave should not 
be neglected as a basis for further research.  Mann’s framework which offers the 
best starting point for such an approach. His IEMP model is most relevant to 
theorising the impact of CMSPs on the state.  The IEMP model has been used 
in a number of his works, from the Sources of Social Power Mann's in which he 
undertook the large scale analysis of power relationships and change, to specific 
questions; such as his analysis of US foreign policy in Incoherent Empire.  
However valid criticisms of his work have been made which need to be 
considered to improve the use of this model in answering the research 
questions. 
3.4 Analytical Model 
The final part of the chapter will elaborate how Mann's IEMP model will be 
adapted by drawing upon Buzan's sectoral approach to theorise the relationship 
between the use of CMSPs and other actors within the state.  The sources of 
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social power - Societal, Ideological, Military and Political will be defined, along 
with the relationship between them and how as a result different forms of power 
structure emerge.  The levels on which these sources of social power interact 
will then be addressed by, considering the vertical component of Mann's theory. 
3.4.1 Power 
As with realist approaches to international security at the heart of Mann's 
framework lies power.  According to Mann power is "the ability to pursue and 
attain goals through mastery of one's environment".68 The motivation behind the 
pursuit of power is human nature (as with Waltz's definition of first image 
theories).  However, the pursuit of power is driven by the act of socialisation 
which is enacted through the four sources: 'Ideology', 'Economics', 'Military' and 
'Political'.69  Mann argues that power is not in itself a resource, instead power is 
exercised through resources.70 
Within the sources, power can take a number of forms.  These are (1) 
'Distributive' and 'Collective'.  Distributive being the power of one actor over 
another, the outcome of which is a zero-sum relationship.  Collective power is 
when two or more actors combine to use their power over another.  (2) 
'Extensive' and 'Intensive'.  Extensive power is a level of minimum control over a 
wide area, compared to intensive which sees a high level of control over a 
restricted area.  Finally (3) 'Authoritative' and 'Diffused'.  'Authoritative' power is 
the ability of an actor to command and obtain obedience, against 'Diffused' 
which is through state institutions, and spontaneous power achieved through 
societies and norms.   He also identifies 'Bureaucratic' power, that of state over 
society and of state leaders over officials.71 
However, at the core of Mann's theorising of the changing nature of the 
state lies the differentiation between 'Despotic' and Infrastructural' power.  
Despotic power is "the range of actions that the state elite is empowered to 
make without consultation with civil society groups "72.  Infrastructural: "the 
capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and implement its actions 
across it territories."73  This is subsequently expanded to a two way relationship 
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in which society can also influence the state.74  These were originally developed 
to explain political power.75  Mann argues that state power is a combination of 
these two types of power creating a typology of the ideal types of states which 
power the distribution of power between these categories created: 
 
 Fig. 3.176 Mann's Two Dimensions of State Power 
The various sources of power will now be considered the form which power 
takes within them and how this can be related to the use of CMSPs 
3.4.1.1 The Role of Ideology  
First it is necessary to deal with the issue of ideology, which is perceived at the 
most problematic of Mann’s sources of social power.  He has received criticism 
for the vague definition used, as a result other factors tending to be dumped in it.  
Mann acknowledges these criticisms and has sought to remedy them as 
subsequent volumes of the Sources of Social Power have been released.  
Although ill defined Mann is keen on its analytical importance.  He criticises 
Bobbitt for concentrating on economic and military causes, and ignoring 
ideological and political, thus creating a dangerous determinism which is 
Ethnocentric, merely validating the neoconservative foreign policy of the US.77  
Mann's ultimate definition of ideological power is "the control over meaning 
systems", which tend to be diffuse; "transcending with ease the boundaries of 
states, the reach of markets and the striking range of armed forces."78   
There are two problems which have excluded the use of ideology in the 
form adopted by Mann.  The first is the range of factors considered within 
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ideology Kiernan argues that it can be question whether ideology should be 
considered as one of the sources of power when it does not contain a theory of 
religion.79  More importantly Stearns argues that too little emphasis is placed on 
cultural influences.80  The latter is of particular importance as ethnic fissures are 
a source of instability within weak states.81  While defining ideology as access to 
meaning systems does grant it power, it should be viewed within the context of 
each of the sources of social power.  If considered as a separate sector then the 
definition granted to ideology means there is a danger it could become the 
primary source of power - the existence of such a source of power having 
already been denied by Mann.  Instead the term 'Societal' should be used, the 
definition of which will be explored in more detail below.  This will better account 
for the cultural, religious and national identities which Stearns and Kiernan argue 
that Mann misses.  This is supported by the fact that Mann considers ideology to 
be more about social movements than theories.82  Buzan also mentions ideology 
within the context of each of the sectors, rather than identifying as a specific 
sector.83   
3.4.1.2 Societal 
Thus the first source of social power to be considered is that of societal.  
Drawing from Buzan Societal power is taken to be ideas and practices through 
which individuals are identified as a member of a social group, this can be on a 
small or large scale.  The source of identity can be national, religious or racial.  
For Buzan this societal identification is often referred to as national identity, but 
he argues that this is deeper than the notional attachment to a nation-state 
which has created an identity and is political in nature.  The notion of society can 
result in a national identity which coincides with the boundaries of a state.  
However, there is normally a weak sense of nationalism in many weak states.  
This is exacerbated by the fact that the political identity of a state is spatially 
bounded, whereas a community with a common societal identity need not have 
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such a restriction. 84 
The importance of societal issues as a contemporary form of meaning 
system are reflected in the focus on warfare and nationalism. The importance of 
ethnic identity in the conflicts which dominated the post-Cold War period is 
accounted for in a number of works on 'New Wars'.  Buzan includes a number of 
regional examples to illustrate the security implications of societal security within 
the context of securitisation which are relevant to the case studies.  In Africa 
tribal and ethnic identities have resulted in the majority of threats to the state 
originating internally. In the Middle-East national boundaries often do not 
coincide with state boundaries and overarching identities have conflicted with 
attempts by the state to engage in nation building  There are deep divisions and 
recurring conflicts, while at the same time a more regional identity has emerged 
in reaction to outside influences.85  The distribution of power within these sectors 
could therefore be either intensive - in the form of small geographically close 
communities, or extensive when a single identity is shared over a wider area.  
However the form of power taken is also likely to be diffuse, with norms and 
ideas likely to be prevalent. 
3.4.1.3 Economic 
Between Buzan and Mann the more coherent conceptualisation of economics is 
offered by Mann; for Buzan this is a messy category which is dependent on the 
ideological approach taken to the economy.  According to Mann "economic 
power derives from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social 
organisation of extraction, transformation, distribution and consumption of the 
resources of nature".  These activities are associated with the generation of 
classes.86  Economic organisation is defined as production, distribution, 
exchange and consumption, and have form a prominent role in social 
development.  Mann links this to the development of class in his work.87  This is 
done to define who has access to economic resources.  The ruling class is the 
one which is able to monopolise other sources of power to dominate a state. 
In terms of power, production is intensive, but markets diffuse, spreading 
across state boundaries.88  This can be seen in the case studies where the first 
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priority of CMSPs is often to secure the economic modes of production.  For 
example in Sierra Leone and PNG mineral extraction and Iraq the rebuilding of 
economic infrastructure and protection of pipelines.  The regaining of access 
resources by the state not only increases the revenue of the state but denies 
them to other groups - local or transnational.  Again in Sierra Leone the RUF 
and Liberia were able to exploit the diffuse markets of the diamond trade which 
involved Lebanese traders and resulted in the return flow of military supplies into 
the country.  Mann contends that Economic power is diffuse, while at a 
transnational and global scale this may be true, at a local, national and 
international strong state institutions should be able to regulate many aspects of 
economic power and organisation. 
3.4.1.4 Military 
Military power is "the social organisation of concentrated lethal force.  It is 
authoritative, indeed arbitrary and violent."89  Buzan and Mann both agree that 
the military power has two dimensions.  The traditional approach is to distinguish 
between military power used for (1) defence and offence; and (2) to protect the 
state from internal and externally threats.  Immediately this leads to a focus on 
the state.90  Adopting a position towards military force which emphasise the 
importance of the state often leads to the criticisms covered above in which 
theoretical approaches are criticised for being state centred, ignorant of 
historical change and therefore realist.   
The relationship between the state and force will be considered in more 
detail in chapter 3, however it must be acknowledged that in the contemporary 
context the legitimate use of force is associated with the state.  Buzan 
acknowledges that although other sources of force exist the state has greater 
economic power to obtain military force, and the political power to delegitimize 
other forms of force.91  Whether a state is able to regulate such legitimacy is 
depended upon the strength of the state and will form a component of analysis 
within the case studies, particularly how the use of CMSPs impacts on this 
control. 
A number of power components are associated with military power, 
especially when concentrated, intensive authoritative power are required.  
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Ownership confers collective and distributive power.92  Coercive, intensive 
power stems from the ability to organise and inflict force, the striking range of 
which has increased as technology has developed.93  Military power can directly 
coerce labour in unskilled tasks - such as the RUF forcing civilians to participate 
in the extraction of alluvial diamonds - but is of limited utility when skilled work is 
required.94  The extensive power of the military stems from the terroristic 
component of military force.  Thus the brutalising effect of the use of force can 
be used to communicate to a wider population - the RUF using amputation to 
deter civilians from participating in political activity. 
It is useful to separate political and military sources of power as the 
relationship between the two can be understood in greater detail.  Particularly as 
the military can play a significant role in destabilising the country.95  It also 
demonstrates the limits of CMSPs as a tool of the state.  They are a military 
actor as such their direct impact is limited to the intensive use of power in certain 
areas. 
3.4.1.5 Political 
While Mann has a strong sense of political power for Buzan there is a danger 
political is likely to become a miscellaneous category.  However, Mann applies a 
strict definition in which political power is judicial power, backed by coercion, but 
exerted by the state, administered centrally and territorially bounded.96  This is 
the only source of power which he ties to geography.97  Through political control 
the state elite are able to exert collective and distributive power.  It is through 
political power that Mann distinguishes between the despotic and infrastructural 
power.  Through political power Mann also adopts a realist approach to 
international relations in which he recognises the power the state over its own 
geographical territory, but this is rather more limited when faced with 'geopolitical 
diplomacy'.98 
Despite Buzan's misgivings towards the way in which political may be 
used he does offer some useful components.  He defines political as "...about 
the organisational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies 
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that give governments and states their legitimacy.99  Which can include 
structures, processes and institutions.100  Political threats are aimed at the 
organisational ability of the state; either to the internal legitimacy of the state, or 
its external recognition, thus political security is tied to state sovereignty.101  
While both approaches attempt to distinguish between military and political 
power Mann does not divorce them totally.  However the use of coercion as 
political power is tied to its use by the state.  By including Buzan's control of 
structures, processes and institutions a more satisfactory understanding is 
reached, rather than being effectively restricted to the institutional use of force.  
Adopting such an approach means that depending on how they are used 
CMSPs can be understood as political agents when used by political elites as 
part of the coercive capacity of the state. 
3.4.2 Crystallisation 
While the identification of the sources of social power is an important 
development by Mann, alone they do not alone offer enough to justify the use of 
his theory.  Where Mann further distinguishes himself is how these various forms 
of power relate to each other.  Mann is clear that his theory is not a social 
system divided into four subsections.  Rather it is an analytical starting point for 
dealing with mess.102  Instead of merely providing a Realist theory of the state, in 
which the various forms of social power interact by bouncing off each other 
again like billiard balls he argues that these power sources are “impure and 
promiscuous, weaving in and out of one another.”103  None of the sources of 
social power is granted the status as the ultimate source of power.104  Instead 
different societies are composed of different balances between the various 
sources of power and manner in which they intertwine.105 
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Fig. 3.2 Mann's Interaction 
Mann uses the following diagram to illustrate the way in which the 
sources of power are generated, the types of power they utilise and the way in 
which they with each other.  As with realist approaches Mann recognises there 
are factors which fall outside of the scope of this model.   
The relationship between the sources of power is based on Mann's 
reluctance to use the term 'society' to describe a single entity.  He argues 
instead that although the four sources of power do have social elements they 
each have their own independent boundaries.106  This is a useful distinction to 
make.  Thus while Soifer and Matthais von Hau are right to raise the conceptual 
difficulties in lacking a single referential object,107 Mann does allow the 
complexity of power relations to be recognised.  And although the sources of 
power interact with each other they also operate separately with the potential to 
create their own independent networks of authority.  Mann argues that each of 
these structures has its own "infrastructures" which are used to facilitate their 
power.  These can be shared by different sources of power, although they can 
be used for different reasons by each of the sources.108 
This framework allows the state within each of the case studies to be 
broken down and the impact of CMSPs be accounted for, not just in the context 
of each of source of power, but how they combine and relate to each other.  In 
Mann's model it is not just the case that an increase in the power or one source 
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increases power over the others, but that it can also impact on how the other 
sources function. 
3.4.3 Mann and the State 
The outcome of the interaction between the sources of power is a definition of 
the state in which Mann builds upon the traditional Weberian definition normally 
used when discussing the relationship between the state and force.  Mann 
identifies four features: 
 The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel 
 embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and 
from a centre, to cover a 
 territorially demarcated area over which it exercises 
 some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some 
organised political force.109 
The state is characterised by its institutional functionality and those which run it.  
Both political and military power are recognised as being linked to power 
centres.  Territory is still recognised as being important.  However, Shaw argues 
that this definition abandons the idea of idea of a fixed monopoly of legitimate 
force.110 Doing so leads to a much more nuanced understanding of the state, 
more in line with the reality of the control of force possessed by the states in the 
case studies.  To be effective within the context of the state authority a 
combination of all the sources of power is required; for Mann military power 
alone is insufficient to claim statehood.111 
Thus the issue of the states domestic power arises.  According to 
Hobson Weberian historical sociology grants the state moderate agential power 
"...to make domestic or foreign policy as well as shape the domestic realm, free 
of domestic social structural requirements or the interests of non-state actors".112  
Where does power come from?  Embeddness within the social structures, or 
despotic control over them?  Domestic insecurity is caused by low levels of 
social cohesion a regime legitimacy.113 
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Despite this strength comes from the relationship between the ruling elite 
and the dominant class.114  Mann cites support from Hobson and Weiss who 
have made similar arguments.  The language used here is important - Mann 
distinguishes between dominant and most populous.  Although Mann is 
approaching the concept of class, to talk about social classes, this has important 
ramifications when looking at ethnic groups.  In some states, such as Iraq 
minority groups have held the most power within the state. however this 
arguably to the detriment of the long term stability of the state as the resources 
become dedicated to repressing the majority group, leading to repression. 
These are important questions to consider with the use of commercial military 
service providers.  Does another route to improve the fungability of economic 
resources into military power allow elites to separate the state from society? If 
this is the case, as per the assertion by Hobson is the long term stability of the 
state damaged as such a course is unlikely to be sustainable. 
This has important ramifications for the use of private security.  If the 
companies are bought in to support an unpopular regime, can they instead drive 
a further wedge between the state and the groups within in, in fact weakening 
the state and its ability to remain in control over the longer term.  The balance 
between stability is debated in a number of places democracy.  Is it better to 
build security institutions first if democracy does not necessarily mean 
stability?115  While in the short term a more powerful military built up to enhance 
state security can help to separate society and state, however is this 
sustainable, or beneficial in the long term?  This thus questions the motivations 
and effectiveness of both the long and short term use of external sources of 
force for security. 
3.4.4 Networks of Social Power 
A common criticism of Mann is that his approach to the international system is 
based on structural realism.  While Mann has accepted there were realist 
elements to his earlier work he argues that such criticism does not reflect his 
later work.  This can be seen in his use of networks.  These serve as far more 
than a redundant category for miscellaneous variables which do not fit easily 
into the rest of his work.  Mann's understanding of networks feeds into his 
assertion that societies are not closed systems that can be bounded by 
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geographical or social space. 
The relationship between state and society uses an approach to global 
sociology which moves beyond structural realism by drawing on a constructivist 
relationship between state and structure advocated by historical sociologists like 
Hobson and Halliday.  Although the 'trinitarian' relationship between state-
structure-state of Hobson's work is criticised by Shaw for being outdated and 
basic.116  Hobson defends the use of the spatial trinity in his approach to 
Weberian historical sociology by advocating Mann's approach to the relationship 
between structural and unit levels.  He argues that although the spatial trinity 
may appear to be expressed in a simple way it addresses interactions in 
sufficient depth. 117  The creation of analytical models will inevitably utilise 
categories which simplify empirical narrative; Mann's approach is a middle 
ground between the parsimony of structural realism and reductionism. 
The sentiment behind Shaw's criticism of an overly simplistic 
understanding of global sociological interactions is still relevant.  The complexity 
of the modern international system has led to proponents of globalisation to 
question the continuing importance of the state.  A contention which has been 
challenged by historical sociologists like Mann, who argues that globalisation as 
an intensification of social relations rather than a weakening of the state,118 
which has added more networks to the existing ones, rather than replacing 
them.119  He identifies five 'socio-spatial networks' range from local to global 
networks, within these international, transnational and sub-national levels are 
covered.  The outcome is a framework with sufficient explanatory power to make 
conclusions as to shifting nature of power from and to the modern state.  The 
strength of Mann's framework is such that Hobson and Shaw both see merit in 
it, despite reservations as to each other's approaches. 
The five levels identified by Mann are: 120 
1. Local networks - which means interactions at a sub-national level. 
2. National networks - networks structured by the nation-state. 
3. International networks - refers to the 'hard' and 'soft' political interaction 
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between national.  Mann argues that these interactions are nationally, 
rather than state constituted. 
4. Transnational networks - pass through national borders and are 
unaffected by them.  These can be large or small scale.  Spread of 
warfare between states can be a major source of security threat.121 
5. Global networks - these can be universal or particularist entire world.  
Political legitimacy of states often comes from this level.  States only 
exist because of the Westphalian approaches to sovereignty.122 
The networks will be used within each of the sources of power to 
theorise how the various sources of power are shaped by interactions at 
different levels.  Of most relevance to is the way Mann has seen the sources of 
power interact in the twentieth and twenty first century in the form of 
infrastructural power and the globalisation of the nation-state.123 Mann 
distinguishes between the history of infrastructural power in the West and North 
and that of the South.  In the North there has been an intensification of 
infrastructural power and the rise of the nation-state, which has seen the 
integration of social life and the taking off of common citizenship.124  The 
fundamental feature of states in the north has been the substantial difference 
between the capability of these states and how much has been utilised; which is 
demonstrated by how states were able to react to World War I & II.  But even 
during these periods political power did not overwhelm any of the other sources 
of power, rather the growth of infrastructural power has been based in economic 
and ideological power.125  
In the South he considers North East Asia, South East Asia and Africa.  
Of most interest here is Africa.  Mann misses out on Central Asia and the Middle 
East in this analysis, two of the areas to be considered here.  Though he has 
offered a detailed understanding of Iraq in the context of the US 
invasion.(interviews).  In Africa, citing the works of Jeffrey Herbst and Robert 
Cooper, Mann's emphasis is on the variation in the region.  There is a failure by 
states to project force over a distance, originating from the colonial state which 
emphasised control of regions of economic productivity.  This is important for 
understanding the use of CMSPs, as this is where they have been most active.  
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The reasons for this infrastructural arrangement is down to the attempts at 
imperial efforts at maximising profits from the colonies, and the way in which the 
states were created from territory which had been divided up.  Infrastructural 
power is developed upon particular segments.  Power flows out of the country 
through economic power infrastructures of MNCs, via the capital.  Two 
exceptions to this are Rwanda and Botswana, both are small states correlation 
between states size and the strength of their infrastructural power.  Smaller 
states have thus tended to be more centralised.126 
African states are vulnerable to three types of military challenge: 1 - local 
elites in lightly governed hinterlands. 2 - elites in mineral rich zones. Challenges 
from these two areas result in the state becoming a method of furthering the 
interests of particular groups and vulnerable to being taken over. 3 - a conflict 
between infrastructural and despotic power - if the military seizes power then the 
growth of despotic power becomes centralised, undermining the growth of 
infrastructural power as the state becomes separated from civil society.127  Thus 
the function of the state resembles its colonial antecedents, which were 
designed for profit maximisation, rather than the northern and western states 
which tie civil society to the state. 
These networks interact with other so that factors external to the state 
can intertwine with the relationship between the elite and dominant class.  For 
Mann the trend has been the diminishing of local networks while national, 
international and transnational have become 'denser.  Emergence of genuine 
global networks. National and international are constrained by the national state.  
Mann asks.  Are national (2) and international (3) networks declining relative to 
local (1) and transnational (4).  To what extent are global networks emerging?  
How far are these affecting the balance between (1, 4) and (2,3)?128  He 
concludes that globalisation impacts in four different ways.  (a) there are 
differing impacts on different types of states in different regions, (b) some of 
these trends weaken the state and others reinforce it, (c) some regulation is 
being dispersed from national to international and transnational networks, and 
(d) others trends are strengthening nation-states and transnationalism.129 
Again the relationship between state and society is questioned in terms 
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of the ability of the state to achieved its desired aims, this time at the 
international and global levels.  Is the agential power of the state "the ability of 
the state to make foreign policy and shape the international realm free of 
international structure requirements or the interests of international non-state 
actors."130  Or, does becoming embedded in a global society and increasing 
infrastructural power compared to the isolation of despotic power.131  Can view 
despotic power is a usable resource.  Despotic power could be employed as a 
source of agential power which decreases as it is used, weakening the state.  
Infrastructural power serves as a more sustainable source of power. 
These networks are relevant to understanding the implications of CMSP 
activity within each of the sources of social power.  In each of the case studies 
the state is weak with processes occurring within local and transnational 
networks which undermine the authority of the state or pose a direct challenge.  
Can the employment of CMSPs allow the state to regain control over processes 
occurring within these networks which should in fact be within the scope of 
national and transnational networks?  Conversely, does employing a commercial 
enterprise undermine the ability of the state to control processes which should 
occur within national and international networks, moving them to transnational 
and local networks, and thus undermining the power of the state?  The impact of 
global networks poses the question of how feasible and effective the 
establishment of working practices and CMSP regulation has been.  Finally, the 
presence of CMSPs can cast light on the interaction between 'weak' and 'strong' 
states at an international level as the debate over the control and accountability 
of CMSPs often occurs between the home or employing state of a CMSP and 
the state in which they are actually being used. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Mann's model allows the analysis of CMSP activity on the state.  It can explain 
how the use of CMSPs impacts on the balance between the different sources of 
social power.  How the five levels of socio-spatial networks interact with each 
other.  And finally the relationship between state and society.  These three areas 
allow the research questions to be addressed in a level of detail beyond that 
offered by structural realism, while still retaining a structured, problem solving 
approach to security.  This is within an approach which accounts for change 
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over time by accounting for the contingent nature of phenomenon being studied.  
Although some historical sociologists and realists will oppose the incorporation 
of these principles, which they view to be detrimental to each approach, there is 
room for such a theory.  The task of the next two chapters is to set the context 
for the analysis of the case studies by explaining what is exactly is meant by 
CMSPs, outlining some of the issues which have been raised with their use and 





The Historical Use of Commercial 
Force 






The employment of individuals, or groups, from outside of state structures to 
provide martial services is a long running trend throughout the history of warfare, 
albeit one that has varied over time.2  It is claimed that while no one likes 
mercenaries, everyone has used them.3  Various political groups or individuals 
have sought means to improve their military capabilities, while at the same time 
individuals or groups have been prepared to provide these services in return for 
remuneration.  This occurred to the extent that mercenary use became 
fundamental to the conduct of warfare and by the 17th Century most wars were 
fought by mercenaries.4  This chapter will provide an overview of the historical 
use of commercial force up to and including the contemporary market.  
Examining the trends behind the commercial use of force will place the current 
market for commercial military services in context.  While this type of overview is 
often utilised by academic and non-academic literature, it is necessary to 
establish the position of this thesis as to the historical significance of the use of 
commercial force. 
This chapter does not seek to provide a comprehensive historical 
overview of the commercial use of force, to do so would effectively be a history 
of warfare.  Instead, five historically significant periods will be compared to the 
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contemporary market: Medieval Europe, the Italian City States, the Thirty Years 
War, the state collection of force from the 18th century to the middle of the 20th 
century, and the Cold War.  These periods are significant for their use of 
organised companies, from which historical trends and parallels can be drawn 
with the present industry.  They show how the commercial use of force has been 
a long running aspect of state security, which has intertwined with the formation 
of the state.  Many of the issues which arise when examining the modern use of 
commercial force have historical parallels, which are valuable when considering 
the implication of their use in their current form.  The term mercenary will be 
used when referring to individuals operating on an ad hoc basis, and military 
company when they are in an organised unit. 
4.2 Trends 
There are three trends which will be considered in the historical cases: (1) the 
degree to which commercial force has been used, (2) the reasons for its use, 
and (3) the consequences of doing so. Taking the first trend, although 
commercial force has been a constant feature of the history of warfare, the 
extent to which it has been used has varied.  The consolidation of military 
functions by the state from the late 17th century, was an ad hoc and incomplete 
process, but served to shift the majority of the burden of warfare from 
commercial actors to national militaries.  By the mid-20th century it was expected 
that modern states possessed their own militaries.  This does not mean that 
commercial actors ceased to be employed, rather that the emphasis shifted so 
that states were expected to have their own armies.  As such instead if viewing 
the use of each as absolutes, it is better to view them as coinciding with each 
other, but with a change in emphasis. 
The arguments of Thomson and Ortiz are typical of the literature which 
tries to emphasise the importance of continuity.  Thomson is one of the earliest 
writers and is often referred to in the rest of the literature and Ortiz represents 
the more recent literature.  According to Thomson the monopolisation of force by 
the state was not an intentional, natural, even, or irreversible process.  Rather, 
the state consolidated the means to prosecute warfare as it became politically 
expedient to do so.5  She challenges the popular notion that monopolisation of 
force by the modern state is normal, was inevitable, or is actually accurate.  
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Ortiz builds on this argument by offering a choice for those who are looking at 
the current growth of commercial military services, that we can either view the 
non-state use of force as a historical constant, but one that has changed over 
the past couple of decades.  Or, that force has been collected by the state, and 
that the current trend is an affront to this.6  Ortiz emphasises the use of non-
state force as far more of a constant than Thomson. 
A mixture of both these arguments best represents the processes which 
occurred.  Ortiz is correct in asking us to consider whether recent developments 
are more subtle than most people would think, rather than being indicative of a 
radical break.  But the dichotomy behind the choice offered by Ortiz is 
intentionally too stark.  The intention being to make the reader challenge their 
current perceptions and move away from the perception that the current market 
is an anomaly.7  Despite the claim to continuity, the degree to which commercial 
actors were used in the 1990s and post 9/11 reflects a reversal towards the 
increased use of organised commercial actors. 
The answer to the second question is somewhat more complex as the 
exact circumstances are dependent on historical contingency.  They can 
however be abstracted to the interplay between supply and demand factors.  
The importance of these push and pull factors are commonly used in analysis of 
the current market,8 but can also been seen through the historical use of force.9  
While Urban places the emphasis on the demand side,10 either can stimulate the 
market, though the most dynamic growth occurs when the two coincide.  The 
companies tend to move from strong states to areas of weakness on 
demobilisation.  Mercenaries thrive in weak states or areas where they can exert 
more influence.  There is quite often a link with other business in order to 
increase profits.11   
On the demand side, a number of states have viewed it to be politically 
expedient or necessary to buy in military services rather than develop their own 
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capabilities.  Examples include the Italian City States12 and a number of 
decolonised states in the 1960s.13  These trends can be viewed as self-
reinforcing; for example demand leading to the formation of more companies 
during Renaissance Italy and the sudden availability of skills providing states 
with more options for their security predicaments; again the presence of the first 
English companies in Italy.  Mercenaries tend to thrive in unstable conditions.14 
On the supply side, the end of periods of conflict often results in the 
release of quantities of personnel who still wish to use these skills to make a 
living.  There is a tendency for them to market this training to other employers; 
both state and non-state.  Some examples of this are: the end of the Hundred 
Years War, which led to English mercenaries moving to Italy;15 the end of the 
WWII, which led to the formation of the first modern companies,16 and the 
characters which ended up in Africa,17 despite the emergent Cold War; and the 
end of the Cold War, which led to the release of a number of well-trained troops 
which marketed their skills.18  According to Spicer the demand for their services 
centres on two factors: efficiency and technology.  Mercenaries proved to be 
more effective than feudal levy and brought expertise of different weapons 
platforms.  Fundamentally, mercenaries provide their employers with an asset.19 
Thus, despite the drawbacks of their use, the potential advantages they 
brought secured their continued employment.  It was only when they ceased to 
perform on the battlefield that their employers looked for alternatives.  In periods 
of instability, when smaller numbers of well-trained troops have been required, 
commercial actors have been employed. The link between quantity and quality 
is key; mercenary troops being more useful, and therefore employed more, 
when the latter was the most important.20  This can be seen in the drop in 
mercenary use during the periods of mass mobilised warfare, such as the 
Napoleonic Wars, World War I and World War II. 
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The final trend is the impact of mercenary use.  The impact of mercenary 
activity is rather mixed.  In some cases they have provided a degree of stability, 
including being credited with a role in facilitating the Italian Renaissance.21  
However, in other cases, such as after the Thirty Years War, they were seen as 
agents of destabilisation and a threat to the state, which led to the 
delegitimisation of their use.  A fundamental dynamic in understanding the long-
term effectiveness of mercenary activity is how embedded its use becomes in 
society.  Mann argues that the use of mercenaries is indicative of a state which 
is less embedded in society.22  This is part of the compromise between political-
social integration and military pragmatism; with mercenary use occurring when 
citizen armies have become less effective.23  As will be seen in the examples of 
mercenary use below, it is possible for mercenary interaction with the state 
power structures to lead to a degree of embeddedness.  Mercenaries are not 
always out of control and prone to behaving recklessly, damaging and alienating 
local populations; rather the problem seems to be with their employers.  In most 
of the examples the state has been able to exert a degree of control.  Some of 
the acts of abuse which are criticised are in fact the policy decisions of the 
employers.  Mercenaries are most effective when they become institutionalised, 
paradoxically at this point they start to share the characteristics of national 
forces. 
4.3 Medieval Mercenaries 
The use of mercenaries is often associated with the medieval period.  Although 
they operated before this time, it is from this period that many current 
perceptions originate.  The use of mercenaries was part of a complex security 
environment of competing power sources, in which a number of actors made 
use of some form of force.  Direct comparison to the modern state system is 
problematic, but the breakdown of states in Africa and the Balkans at the end of 
the Cold War has prompted claims of the emergence of a form of neo-
medievalism.24  In these regions, competing sources of authority appeared at 
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different levels, as the state has failed to provide the services which are 
expected of the modern state.  This encouraged the emergence of a number of 
actors which either tried to take advantage by further challenging the state, or by 
offering an alternative to the protection of the state.  Both of these outcomes 
further complicate the security environment. 
Mercenaries existed alongside other non-state actors who also used 
force to generate an income.  Urban calls these ‘wandering bands of organised 
robbers’ as ‘pirate[s]’ or ‘outlaw[s]’;25 though the contribution of mercenary bands 
to security can also be questioned.  There is also a difference between 
bodyguards and the emergence of military units.  Although bodyguards had 
been used for centuries, during the medieval period more organised units began 
to appear.26   The trend was to employ units of troops, rather than individuals; on 
the grounds that the former offered far more combat effectiveness than a 
collection of individuals.27 
As with the current market there is some difficulty in defining  the concept 
of mercenary during this period.  DeVries identifies two elements as being 
present through many of the traditional definitions of the medieval mercenary; 
being "paid", and a sense of "foreign".28  France also looks at the relationship 
between terms of service (politically determined to economically determined) 
and embeddedness in the society being served, citing a typology created by 
Stephen Morillo between these two axis.29  However, DeVries believes both of 
these qualifications to be highly problematic; classing particular groups as 
mercenaries merely undermines attempts to understand the motivation behind 
their actions, particularly associating modern conceptions of identity.30  DeVries 
concludes that good soldiers were always needed during the period, soldiering 
was their occupation and that if individuals or companies could improve their pay 
why should they not seek employment.31  France concludes that the complexity 
of relationships between troops and their commanders means the term has little 
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contemporary reality.32  Though in the latter part of the period, “as armies 
became more professional, the mercenary appears as a distinct and identifiable 
figure.”33 
 During this period mercenaries were employed because feudal oaths 
and local militias were insufficient.34  Feudal levies provided poorly trained 
troops, who were reluctant to join and leave.  Companies of troops therefore 
provided a way for political elites to wage war without levies draining poorly 
trained members of the economic classes.35  They therefore offered better 
efficiency and access to better technology than the alternatives.  The use of 
mercenaries during the medieval period is associated with the employment of 
specialist weapons; such as Genoese crossbowmen, English long-bowmen, 
Burgundian handgunners and German or Hungarian gunners. Though it has 
been argued that this only occurred towards the end of the period.36  There was 
a brief lull in the use of the mercenaries as cities became fortified and required 
permanent forces for defence.37  However, they were used as garrison troops 
during the crusades; when military orders hired them to make up numbers in the 
garrisoning of castles.38  Despite their widespread usage, they could only be 
employed by those who had the means to secure payment, which meant either 
governments or quasi governments.39   
The medieval use of mercenaries establishes several key trends behind 
the historical use of mercenaries with dislike of mercenaries often traced back to 
this period.  They have been accused of cruelty in the execution of force; while 
certainly participating in this aspect of medieval warfare, their employers were 
often complicit in the use of these methods.40  Urban argues that during this 
period mercenaries are seen as being the problem, when in fact they were a 
symptom; the problem lay with those who employed them.41  Fickleness is often 
a charge which is laid at mercenaries; although switching sides was 
commonplace during the period, there are examples of mercenaries displaying 
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loyalty in order to protect their reputation and future employability.42  Even 
though the distinction between duty and desire for gain was artificial it has 
formed the basis of modern perceptions of who is a mercenary.43  Mercenary 
use was very much a symptom of the instability of this period.  The supply and 
demand dynamic meant that during times of peace soldiers would sometimes 
become freelance operators, or form free companies, moving to areas which 
were at war.44  It was often safer for citizens during times of war.45   
Attempts were made to control the use of mercenaries.  The Magna 
Carta is an example of an attempt to remove mercenaries from a country, in this 
instance Britain.  While the use of mercenaries in the country ceased it did not 
stop them being used in foreign conflicts.46  Still, they were often employed for 
emergencies, during which time their employers would do their best to control 
them, and then dismiss them.47  Mercenaries were a necessary part of medieval 
warfare, making up for the deficiencies in existing military structures.  For the 
soldiers who hired out their skills it became a necessary form of income during 
times of peace. 
4.4 Italian City States 
Chronologically the use of mercenaries by the Italian City States overlaps with 
the medieval period, but it is worthy of consideration in its own right; the 
conditions that arose following the end of the Hundred Years War are often 
compared to those at the end of the Cold-War.48  The companies (condottieri) 
which fought for the city states are linked with modern military companies 
because of the contracts (condotta) they fought under.49  The condatto precisely 
outlined the terms of service and would stipulate the length of employment, the 
requirements of the job, the cost and how this was to be fulfilled.50  The initial 
use of mercenaries in Italy was the product of two conditions: the 13th Century 
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collapse of the empire which led to competition between the city states, most 
notably Venice and Florence; and the arrival of English mercenaries, following 
the end of the Hundred Years War.  Sir John Hawkwood and his Great Company 
stand out, though over time the market for force became domesticated.  Cities 
like Florence, Milan and Venice made extensive use of the companies, in what 
can be seen as either a boom period for mercenaries, or typical of many of the 
problems associated with their use. 
As with the rest of the medieval period, the demand for mercenaries in 
Italy was driven by the increasing complexity of warfare; which to be effective 
had come to require a level of coordination between combined forces which was 
beyond the capability of part-time citizen militias.  The use of mercenaries was 
also preferable because the population could focus on what they were skilled at: 
economic production.51  The demand was driven by the political system within 
the Italian peninsula where overlapping power structures fostered competition 
and instability.52 
This demand for commercial actors was fed by the English companies 
that had formed after the Peace of Bretigny ended the Hundred Years War in 
1360.  They moved to Italy after being threatened with punishment from London 
for continued looting in France following the peace.53  Such prohibition merely 
moved the companies around Europe.  The English companies were not the first 
self-sufficient mercenary companies seen in Europe; this being the Catalan 
Company, which formed under Roger di Flor and ended up in Athens.54  
However, they became central in the warring between the Italian City States, as 
mercenary companies became the main source of military power.55 
A number of problems have been associated with the use of the 
condottieri.  Most frequently their reliability as a fighting force.  Percy argues that 
even at the time they were unpopular and in need of control.56  The companies 
are criticised for frequently switching employers between contracts, even if this 
involved fighting against their previous employer.  Hawkwood switched sides 
between Pisa and Florence several times; though he gained popularity in 
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Florence, where a painting still sits in the corner of the Cathedral.  Overreliance 
upon the condottieri also left cities vulnerable to being overrun by the very 
soldiers who had been employed to defend them.57 
Over time the condotta became longer term and the mercenary forces 
became more established.  This suited both employer and contractor, as the 
interests of the companies’ income became more secure and their interests 
became tied to that of their employer.  This system led to domestic stability.58  
When under contract the condottieri were well controlled by their employers - 
being accompanied by political commissioners and with several notable 
examples of punishment being enacted for transgressions.59  In the end few 
condottieri actually established their own principalities,60 and the wars on the 
peninsula were primarily caused by the politicking of the cities, rather than the 
companies they employed.61 
A second criticism which is often levelled at the companies is that they 
lacked conviction when fighting each other; preferring not to risk themselves on 
the field of battle. A number of commentators either logically extrapolate that in 
the pursuit of profit it was in the interest of the condottieri for wars to be as long 
and bloodless as possible.62  Machiavelli is also cited as a contemporary source 
for the unreliability of mercenary forces; he is critical of their performance, 
especially when compared to militia .63  However, these contemporary criticisms 
are challenged by modern scholars who argue that in fact, many of the bloodiest 
battles of this period were between mercenary forces.64  Neither of these 
criticisms can be taken at face value.  The contested nature of each criticism 
shows that while some companies did not perform, there were also situations 
where the use of commercial entities functioned as intended. 
Alongside these criticisms there are several interesting points to note 
about the use of the condottieri, particularly in the context of contemporary 
companies.  The first is the relationship between the companies and their ‘home 
states’.  It is argued by France that Hawkwood often represented the interests of 
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the English government while he was in Italy.65  This has similarities to the 
modern market and questions arise over how closely the companies would 
cooperate with their 'home states' when choosing clients.  The second is the 
growth of the domestic market in Italy to supply the demand for commercial 
military actors.  The role of foreign companies diminished over time and Italian 
companies came to play a more important role.  Though this did not completely 
end the influx of foreign troops.66  The growth of a domestic market is a trend 
that occurs in several of the case studies. 
Of further relevance to the modern market is the economic model which 
developed around the use of the companies.  McNeill argues that the success of 
the system stemmed from the way that the money spent on the companies 
became self sustaining, as it was returned to the cities by the spending of the 
soldiers.67  Although this worked on an economic-military level, the introduction 
of market interests was detrimental to societal-political bonds as it broke existing 
social bonds forged by the use of citizen soldiers.68 
Conclusions as to the role of the condottieri are mixed.  They have been 
associated with the creation of the conditions which led to the Renaissance.69  
However, from a security point of view mercenary armies proved ineffective 
long-term when facing outside threats.  France invaded in 1494, and the city 
states moved towards the outcome of which was the development of citizen 
armies.70  Though arguably the inability of the city states to work with each other 
was more detrimental than the use of the mercenaries themselves.71  According 
to McNeill, where cities were able to effectively implement sustainable 
continuous mercenary employment, domestic stability followed.72  Ultimately the 
companies formed a central place in the socio-political-economic development 
of warfare during this period.  They were sought out because their use was 
advantageous compared to conscripted militias.  However, as changes in 
warfare and politics occurred other methods of security became preferable. 
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4.5 The Thirty Years War 
The Thirty Years War is a second significant period for the use of commercial 
military actors.  Parallels are often drawn with the use of the condottieri by the 
Italian city states, though the processes which occurred in these two cases 
diverged.73  It is therefore useful to see how the use of the companies differed 
under similar initial conditions.  The war was a pan-European struggle for control 
of the Holy Roman Empire, which began as a war between Protestant House of 
Habsberg and Bohemia, after the installation of the Catholic, Ferdinand II in 
Bohemia.  The war between the Habsbergs and Bohemia became an 
international conflict which drew in neighbouring states, including the Danish, 
Swedish and French.  The Thirty Years War is of importance when considering 
the historical use of CMSPs because of the way in which troops were raised, 
with military entrepreneurs as the main source of troops.74  The most well known 
of these entrepreneurs, Albrecht von Wallenstein, raised several armies before 
he was assassinated in 1634.  The outcome of the war was a stalemate and the 
devastation of a vast tract of Europe's countryside.  The consequence of this 
devastation was the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which is widely considered to be 
the birth of the modern state system. 
The use of commercially raised forces was a solution to poorly trained 
and reluctant-to-fight conscripts.75  They were successful to the point that it has 
been argued the ability of the entrepreneurs to raise the armies sustained the 
war.76  Troops enlisted within these armies for a variety of reasons.  Primarily the 
promise of pay, but also to avoid being plundered; it was generally safer to be 
inside an army.77  The Thirty Years War witnessed the rise of the professional 
general, the link has been made to modern CMSPs and the supply of high-end 
expertise.78  Two of the most famous military entrepreneurs were Wallenstein 
and Maurice of Nassau, they raised armies at the height of the military 
entrepreneurs power.79 
The problem with the armies came from a lack of control and the way in 
which they were sustained.  The logistics of moving vast amounts of supplies 
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was difficult when troops moved beyond the river system.  This led to looting, 
which was severely punished by commanders.80  The ineffectiveness of the 
governments that raised the armies led a protracted war.  Once raised, armies 
could not be paid, controlled, or organised to achieve victory, perpetuating the 
war.81  It is the individuals who employed these armies who should be blamed 
for the length and conduct of the war,82 as much as the companies themselves.  
Parker is unaware of any forces raised without commission which were 
subsequently offered for hire - although on occasion they did switch sides.83  
The reliance of the companies on living off the land meant that they were only 
really effective when used for offensive purposes.84 
The precise impact of the Thirty Years War on Germany is unknown.  
Parker argues that much of what was originally recorded as population decline 
or economic destruction was due to population movement as civilians sought 
refuge from vulnerable villages to walled cities.85  However, he argues that the 
Thirty Years’ War was a devastating experience for the civilian population inside 
Germany, the population loss being proportionally higher than World War II.86  
The impact of the entrepreneur system was short lived, especially compared to 
the military organisations developed by the Danish, Swedes and French.  
Gustav Adolphus' system of public conscription was more effectively 
institutionalised and therefore survived following his death,87 whereas the forces 
raised by entrepreneurs were integrated into standing armies because of the 
threat they posed.88  Though even Adolphus was forced to rely on mercenary 
companies, with 4/5 of his forces coming from this source.89 
The end of the Thirty Years War marks one of the major junctures in the 
collection of force by the state.  The use of mercenary armies had become 
unsustainable and damaged the German provinces economically the outcome of 
the thirty years was to lead to the establishment of standing peacetime armies.90  
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The independence of these armies had reached a zenith with Maurice and 
Wallenstein, and declined after their deaths.  The use of entrepreneurs 
continued after this point as a method of avoiding administrative reforms,91  but 
the threat posed by the colonels of these commercial forces had led to their 
integration into the state.92  By living off the land, their use fulfilled a short-term 
need for troops, but this was unsustainable as a long-term solution.  The 
economic base of the country was damaged and the military separated from 
society.  This compares to Italy where the condottieri formed an effective and 
sustainable relationship with the city states.  The successful long-term use of 
mercenaries therefore depends upon how they become embedded within the 
existing state-societal structures.  In the case of the Thirty Years War they were 
"...an expensive and temporary solution to a permanent problem."93  However, 
the state has a degree of control, even where the relationship is detrimental. 
4.6 The State and the Collection of Force 
Following the Thirty Years War the state began to exert ownership over the 
forces that would execute force.  By the late 18th century mercenary forces were 
being replaced by more organised armies which were better suited to the large 
scale warfare which dominated Europe.  This period is associated not only with 
changing warfare, but also the development of the modern state; “the state 
made war and war made the state”.94  The formation of national armies was part 
of a long running process led by the French in the 15th century; while full of 
problems they proved more effective than their opponents.95  Even though the 
use of CMSPs did not completely cease during this period, the emphasis shifted 
away from the use of commercial sources of force.  Even Ortiz acknowledges 
that by the 19th century it was common practice that state forces were drawn 
from its citizens.96 
The collection of force by the state occurred over a number of years, but 
the use of citizen armies had become significant by the time of the Napoleonic 
Wars.97  According to Keegan, the French Revolution "effectively killed 
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mercenarism".98  There were two reasons for this shift.  The first was military 
efficiency, as warfare shifted the emphasis away from well-trained troops to 
weight of numbers.99  From an infrastructural point of view it had become 
inefficient to keep raising and disbanding military forces.100  The second reason 
was a change in relationship between the state and its citizens which 
delegitimised the use of commercial force.  It came to be expected that states 
would take responsibility for the actions of their citizens.101 The destabilising 
impact posed by out of work soldiers was beginning to be addressed, such as 
dealing with the release of personnel that would occur at the end of major 
conflicts.  The foundation of the French Foreign Legion was to deal with 
stateless people after the Napoleonic Wars who were thought to be a threat to 
the state.102  This can be compared to the end of the Hundred Years War when 
such persons were left to sell their services.  States also began to make use of 
foreign troops by more effectively integrating them into their own forces, such as 
the use of Gurkhas by the British.103 
Despite the collection of force by the state commercial military 
enterprises continued to be used.  Some were militaries which had become 
disassociated from their own states, while some states continued to hire out 
their forces. This was in part due to the economic liberalism of the 19th 
century,104 but also down to necessity.  The British employed Hessian 
mercenaries during the American War of Independence; to overcome an 
insufficient number of British troops.  However their use proved to be 
unsuccessful in retaining control of the colonies, with lack of commitment to 
defeating the American forces being blamed.105  But their use was becoming the 
exception, with many countries turning towards citizen armies.106 
Ortiz's argument relies on the significance of the continued use of 
commercial forces during this period.  While correct that there was continuity, 
the shift which occurred in the relationship between state, society and the use of 
force is more significant.  An increase in the infrastructural power of the state, 
and changes in the scale of warfare meant that it was more efficient for states to 
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directly raise and operate their own forces.  This was even to the extent that the 
state was trying to find institutional ways of dealing with disbanded troops at the 
end of large conflicts, beyond moving them on to be someone else's problem. 
4.7 The Commercial Use of Force in the 20th Century 
The 20th century witnessed the largest conflicts in human history, with the power 
of the state as a war-making structure at its peak.  World War II in particular 
demonstrated how devastating warfare had become as entire populations were 
mobilised. The Cold War required the continuation of the state as a monopoliser 
to continue to dominate the use of force.  But there are two forms of non-state 
force which emerged after 1945.  The first is the ad hoc use of mercenaries, 
which goes back to the individual out of work soldier.  The second, and more 
significant was that the genesis of the companies which have formed the 
commercial market since the end of the Cold War was already underway. 
The first modern companies appeared after World War II.  The outbreak 
of peace resulted in wide scale demobilisation, as a consequence a number of 
ex-servicemen sought further employment with the skills they had learnt. .  
David Sterling, who had established the SAS during WW2, was to set up one of 
the first modern CMSPs after the end of the war using personnel he served with.  
This is a familiar trend, but helps to set the tone for the end of the Cold War, if a 
state releases personnel they are likely to use the skills developed on a 
commercial basis.  CMSPs are one way of doing this. 
The process of decolonisation created the demand and opportunity in the 
1960s for a number of Western individuals to become involved in several African 
conflicts, primarily what was at the time the Belgian Congo.  Characters like 
Mike Hoare, Bob Denard and Jean Schramme became infamous as various 
mercenary leaders offered their services in 1960, 1964 and finally 1967.  Much 
of the poor reputation of modern mercenaries stems from the actions of these 
individuals.  They are seen as having acted purely for profit, and often against 
the interests of the populations of the states they operated in.107 Spicer argues 
that despite the poor reputation attached to them after their activities, they did 
prevent the situation from worsening.108 
More damaging was the activity of a small group of mercenaries who 
became involved in the Angolan Civil War between the Marxists and the 
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National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) which had 
developed after the withdrawal of the Portugese.  These were effectively a group 
of thugs led by Costas Georgiou, which Spicer argues did much to damage the 
reputation of the mercenary.109  More significantly the activity of these individuals 
spread to the implication in the overthrowing, or attempts to overthrow, 
legitimate governments.  This included: Hoare in the Seychelles in 1977 and 
1982 and Denard in the Cormoros Islands in 1975, 1978 and 1995.  In 1995 
Denard was removed, or just as likely rescued, by the French government. 
Spicer believes that these events resulted in the belief that a small group 
of well-trained, white, soldiers could make a difference in African Wars.  This led 
to the involvement of what he calls excitement-seeking thugs – different from his 
version of the traditional mercenary.110  Shearer views the negative perception of 
mercenaries in the context of World War I and II where the sheer scale of the 
destruction meant that outside of the state structure it was considered to be 
inappropriate, particularly in the pursuit of profit during civil wars.111 
4.8 The Growth of the Sector after the end of the Cold War 
The development and role of CMSPs since the end of the Cold War is a 
continuation of the interaction between supply and demand dynamics.  Two 
events are significant in shaping the commercial military sector since the end of 
the Cold War.  First, the end of the Cold War, which radically reshaped the 
structure of the international system, the nature of perceived security threats and 
the priorities of major actors.  Second, the September 11th 2001 attack on the 
World Trade Centre, which again shifted security priorities and led to the US led 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as part of a 'War on Terror'.  The end of the 
Cold War is the more significant of these two events and established 
contemporary commercial military service providers as legitimate actors, thus 
they were seen as a way of fulfilling the demands created by the 'War on Terror' 
after 2001. 
The end of the Cold War precipitated the rise of companies providing 
military services as major actors during the 1990s.  Although some of these 
companies had been operational since the 1970s their use has been more 
evident since the 1990s.112  South African, British and American companies were 
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able to benefit from a number of demand and supply factors.  Executive 
Outcomes became one of the most (in)famous companies of this period for its 
role in Angola and Sierra Leone.  Sandline International intervened in Sierra 
Leone and Papa New Guinea.  Military Professional Resources Incorporated 
(MPRI) began training the Croatian army in 1994, although denying it played a 
direct role in Operation Storm, MPRI is credited with much of the Croatian forces 
subsequent success.113  DynCorp was involved in Colombia as the US tried to 
support the war against the drugs trade.114  The use of CMSPs was considered 
during the Rwandan genocide in 1994.115  The implications of the increase in the 
use of CMSPs was sufficient to cause concern among a number of states, 
leading the UN to appoint Enrique Ballesteros as a Special Rapporteur on 
Mercenaries. 
The end of the Cold War increased demand for CMSPs in a number of 
ways.  It quickly became apparent that the initial optimism of writers such as 
Fukuyama, who asked whether Capitalism's victory over Communism would 
result in the 'end of history;116 was simplistic.  Instead, global politics had 
become more complicated and unstable, while the dragon was no longer a 
threat, a variety of poisonous snakes now posed a threat.117  Conflicts which had 
been frozen began to thaw and proxy wars were abandoned.  The old security 
blocks weakened, domestic regimes collapsed and several states broke up.  
The result of these changes destabilised a number of regions including the 
Balkans, parts of Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and South America.  The 
outcome was a number of potential market for CMSPs.118 
Not only did the end of the Cold War fail to bring widespread peace, but 
there were suggestions of a shift in the nature of the conflict.  Instead of inter-
state warfare, civil wars seemed to be the new threat to international security in 
which economics drove fighting.119  Although overemphasis on the frequency 
and 'newness' of these 'New Wars' has rightly been criticised, there is no doubt 
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that a number of wars occurred within failed and failing states.  These involved a 
range of actors, and broke down the boundary between what had become 
perceived as conventional warfare and criminality.  Non-state actors were seen 
to be taking an increasing role, with the international community failing to control 
them.120 
The involvement of CMSPs in the chaotic security environment which 
emerged was increased by the mixed involvement of other actors.  The major 
powers of the Cold War had seen its end as an opportunity to the scale back on 
national armies.121  Many governments reduced their commitments and were 
now reluctant to get involved in the distant conflicts which posed no direct threat 
to their security.  An early enthusiasm for peacekeeping was soon derailed by an 
aversion to casualties; armies designed for war fighting, not policing.122  The 
circumstances surrounding the death of 13 US soldiers in Mogadishu in 1993, 
and the subsequent deterioration of public support are indicative of the difficulty 
of becoming involved in complex civil wars.  The reluctance of western 
governments also impacted on the capabilities of the UN, which relied upon 
states loaning troops, and resulting in the international community's torpor 
during the Rwandan massacres of 1994.123 
The more circumspect approach to distant conflicts adopted by the major 
powers created an opportunity for regional responses.  However, unwillingness, 
animosity and opportunism meant that regional organisations failed to provide 
an adequate resolution to failing states.  These problems can be seen in several 
of the case studies covered in this thesis: Australia, the nearest regional power, 
declined to intervene in Papa New Guinea; Liberia encouraged the collapse of 
Sierra Leone into civil war in order to exploit natural resources; and Pakistan has 
received criticism for colluding with the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Where 
intervention has been undertaken it can be of questionable quality; with 
developing regions suffering from decaying state armed forces caused by a lack 
of funding, training, disease and corruption.124  Troop contributions are often 
made to UN peacekeeping operations in order to save a state money, or keep 
unreliable troops away from where they can cause damage.  These problems 
have undermined a number interventions; for example Sierra Leone, where the 
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OAU proved to be ineffective, and peacekeeping troops often exacerbated the 
criminality which was occurring within the state.125 
The post-Cold War world thus fostered an environment in which CMSPs 
became a serious option for states, Multi-national Corporations (MNCs), NGOs 
and even Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs).  Instability within a number 
of states was exacerbated by the unwillingness of major powers, who were now 
ill-equipped, to act.  International organisations were too reliant upon these 
same major states, which left a patchwork of unreliable local responses.  The 
significance of this period also lies in the supply side factors, which increased 
the ability of CMSPs to react to these opportunities by expanding the scale and 
scope of their operations. 
The release of well-trained personnel at the end of the Cold War did not 
just weaken the major powers, it also made available a great deal of experience 
and expertise for anyone willing to employ them.126  Like soldiers from 
generations before they found themselves with a specialised skill set, which had 
few comparable civilian alternatives.  CMSPs were thus able to draw upon a 
large number of ex-soldiers who had been expensively trained with a range of 
specialised skills.  The end of apartheid in South Africa and the collapse of white 
rule in Rhodesia also stimulated this trend, though on a more regional level.  Ex-
South African Defence Force Troops (SADF) with years of experience fighting in 
places like Angola formed EO and soon found themselves returning. 
It was not only personnel which became available on the open market.  
Huge stockpiles of conventional weapons which had been built up over the 
previous half-century were now redundant.  As the Soviet Union retreated 
across Eastern Europe these stockpiles were exploited - the consequence of 
weak states and corrupt officials was a golden age for arms dealers such as 
Victor Bout.127  The sheer scale and range of hardware was staggering.  While 
conventional weapons were rightly seen as huge threat in the developing world, 
fuelling instability,128 a number of non-states groups, along with CMSPs were 
able to equip themselves with a range of equipment.129  Some CMSPs were able 
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to field forces with all the trappings of modern armies, including air support. For 
example, Executive Outcomes was able to make use of ex-Soviet Hinds in 
Sierra Leone.130 
Towards the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 20th century some 
states began to tighten control over the use of the companies.  South Africa, 
unhappy with the reputation its citizens were gaining, enacted anti-mercenary 
laws which effectively shut down Executive Outcomes.131  Sandline came into 
conflict with the UK government over the supply of arms to Sierra Leone,132 and 
began to consider the issue of regulation with a government Green Paper.133  
However, a second event was to shape the CMSP sector for the next decade.  
The attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11th 2001 set in process an 
aggressive foreign policy by the US which renewed focus on security.  
Underpinned by a neoliberal approach to economics and state building,134 firms 
such as Halliburton became a fundamental part of the events that followed.135  
This boom has been primarily demand driven, but is significant enough for it to 
become self-sustaining. 
The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 placed a huge 
strain on US and coalition forces.  This was exacerbated by the limited coalition 
which resulted from the failure of the US to garner wider international support for 
the invasion of Iraq.  The scale of the reliance on the commercial provision of 
services to support the military can be seen in the changing ratio of contractors 
to soldiers.  During the Gulf war in 1991 there was on average 1 contractor for 
every 100 soldiers; following the Second Gulf War, by 2006 there was 1 
contractor to every 10 soldiers.136  Singer has drawn parallels between the 
private security sector after 9/11 and the ‘internet boom’ of the late 1990s.  
Economic conditions led to the decline of other industries in the US, however 
companies within the security sector increased in value by an average of 50%, 
while some doubled or even tripled.137  For reasons covered in the introduction 
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the statistics assembled by academics and journalists to quantify the use of 
CMSPs are unreliable, however they are illustrative of the scale of the sector.  In 
2005 it is estimated that 1.5 million people were employed by CMSPs; another 
1.5 million worked in a form of the more traditional mercenary, half of those 
again being child soldiers.  The turnover of the industry at this time estimated at 
$300 billion.138   
Although Iraq and Afghanistan were the main sources of the boom, they 
are far from the only source of CMSP employment, by 2006 companies were 
operating in over 50 countries, with an annual revenue of $100 billion per 
year.139  The websites of CMSPs normally indicate head offices in multiple 
locations across the globe, with diverse lists of current and past operations.  
According to Singer the continued decline of local state governance and reversal 
of the growth of the state shapes the security environment in much of the 
developing world.140  Proponents of-globalisation often overstate the impact on 
the state, there is a strong argument that a number of already weak states are 
struggling to maintain a claim to the monopoly over the legitimate use of force. 
The scale of demand and the potential profits has driven the expansion 
of the private sector in order to fulfil security contracts, impacting on the supply 
side.  Instead of being fed by major states slimming down their armed forces, 
state armed forces are losing key members of special forces outfits to 
companies before retirement.  Special Forces units in the UK and US have 
struggled with shortages of recruits as extensively and expensively trained 
soldiers found their skills to be highly profitable when offered commercially.  
Leading to fear of a ‘brawn drain’.141  This cycle is theoretically self-perpetuating 
as it encourages further use of CMSPs to make up the shortfall.  Lower paid 
international and local workers also form a significant portion of the sector, 
though the reliability to these employees is often questioned.142 
As western involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan begins to wind down 
questions have been posed as to the future role of CMSPs.  For the moment 
there appears to be several sources of continued demand to sustain them.  A 
number of other markets have emerged, such as the protection of merchant 
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shipping from pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden.143  Western governments have 
continued to rely on their services.  The shrinking defence budgets of western 
states following the financial crash of 2008 will likely continue to stimulate 
demand for CMSPs by reducing the capabilities of the remaining forces and 
supply by releasing more personnel onto the market.144  Future interventions are 
likely to be more reliant upon CMSPs.  The UN expects that demand for private 
security, including CMSPs, will continue to increase.145  MNCs will also have 
continued reason to use them.  Nigeria is a lucrative source of oil for several 
western companies, but dangerous for its workers.  Recent attacks in Algeria 
indicate that the revolutions of the Arab Spring have made neighbouring states 
more dangerous. 
4.9 Conclusion 
Historically, political elites have purchased military expertise, to expand the 
state's capabilities beyond those which could be raised from their own 
populations alone.  The near constant warfare which afflicted Europe created 
both the need for military capability; and at the end of each conflict a supply of 
unemployed soldiers which could fulfil this role.  Commercial forces were 
employed as long as they served this purpose.  The emergence of a different 
style of warfare made the use of massive armies more effective and drove the 
centralisation of force by the state.  This did not completely remove mercenaries 
from the battlefield, expediency kept mercenaries employed in more limited roles 
during the 19th and early 20th century, but at a reduced level.  The end of the 
Cold War and the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan facilitated the increased use 
of CMSPs, to the point that more contractors were operating in Iraq than soldiers 
working for national militaries. 
In some ways Ortiz is correct, there is greater continuity in the current 
market than is often acknowledged; commercial sources of force have been 
employed throughout history.  But his argument is overstated, there was a clear 
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shift in the towards states developing and running their own forces.  A more 
pertinent question is whether this represents a long short, medium, or long-term 
change in the trend towards the provision of force.  It seems unlikely that the 
burden of warfare will shift.  Much as Thompson argues that the state collected 
force in order to suit its needs, the state can also relinquish the execution of 
force to other actors. 
The implication of the historical use of mercenaries for the research 
questions is that they are indicative of a state which is less embedded in 
society.146  In the compromise between political-social integration and military 
pragmatism, mercenary use has occurred when citizen armies have become 
less effective.147  The use of mercenary forces is often associated with negative 
connotations; that mercenaries are out of control and prone to behaving 
recklessly, damaging and alienating local populations.  As a consequence 
CMSPs have proved that historically they are not always a panacea.  But, 
culpability also needs to be attached to their employers.  Rarely are the 
companies completely out of control, in most of the examples the state has been 
able to exert at least some form of control. 
Keegan argues that it is possible to make effective use of mercenaries 
within a well regulated market.148  Militia rely upon a class that are tied to the 
state by property and conscription is unsuitable where arming subjects would 
leave the state vulnerable to being overthrown.149  There are parallels here 
which can be drawn with the use of CMSPs in the case studies; comparing the 
relationships between networks which are affected by the use of commercial 
military service providers.  Such as in Italy, when the recycling of money from 
the companies to the citizens within the country created a sustainable 
relationship.  The question over the use of CMSPs in the case studies is 
whether they created sustainable relationships in the state's power networks.  
Or, whether they damaged these relationships and drain power away from the 
state. 
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The Sierra Leone Civil War 
"I believe without diamonds this country couldn't have been in this state of 






The Sierra Leone civil war, which ravaged the country between 1991 and 2002, 
is an important example of CMSP activity in the 1990s.  Although CMSPs were 
involved in numerous conflicts during the decade, Sierra Leone is significant 
because of the social, political, military and economic roots to the origins and 
perpetuation of the war.  It was part of a wider conflict in West Africa which drew 
in neighbouring states, regional organisations, the UN and Britain.  A number of 
CMSPs were employed by various parties during the war.  Although smaller 
companies were used by mining companies to protect their interests, these did 
not play a strategically significant role.  Instead, it is the contracts directly with 
state actors which are of concern here, in particular the use of Executive 
Outcomes (EO) and Sandline International.  Two companies which are widely 
viewed as archetypal military companies in this period. 
 This chapter will consider the implications of CMSP activity on the 
relationship between the sources of social power across the networks - how 
their use affected the agency of the state in relation to other actors, what the 
implications were for the relationship between state and society, how this 
affected the progression and outcome of the civil war and whether this was to 
the detriment of the long term development of the state.  There is a dichotomy 
between approaches to the civil war. One approach sees a political-economic 
conflict in which sub-state, and regional actors sought to profit from the 
breakdown of the state.  Alternatively, the social issues have been cited as the 
cause of the war, with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) representing 
popular dissatisfaction with the political elite.  Of these scenarios the first credits 
                                                          
1
 Martin Meredith, The State of Africa (London: Free Press, 2006) pp. 566-7. 
 110 
 
CMSPs with a more significant and positive role.  It will be argued here that the 
war was a complex combination of both.  Although the war was the immediate 
outcome of the political-economic breakdown of the state, some of the 
symptoms of which could be dealt with by purchasing military services.  
However, a longer lasting peace required deeper issues, which underpinned the 
dysfunction of the state, to begin to be addressed.  CMSPs therefore have a 
mixed impact on the state in Sierra Leone.  They gave short-term breathing 
room to the state, and at least acted in the interest of the government, unlike the 
regional actors.  But, their use was still vulnerable to other, stronger actors.  
More problematically CMSP could not leverage the government to remedy the 
deeper problems of the legitimacy of the state and it's degree of embededness 
within society.  Although these deeper issues are yet to be addressed, a credible 
move towards peace was only achieved when Britain and the UN became 
substantially involved, addressing problems which were a legacy of the colonial 
experience and the process of independence. 
 As with each case study, to answer these questions the chapter will be 
divided into three sections sections: (1) A chronology of events; (2) Analysis of 
the interaction of the four sources of social power across the networks; and 
finally, (3) The impact of CMSPs on the state.  The overview of the civil war in 
the first section of this chapter is split into four parts, by involvement of CMSPs.  
First the background and early part of the war; second, the involvement of EO; 
third, Sandline; and finally the ending of the war.  Accounting for the root 
causes, progression and closure of the civil war is also important in placing the 
role of CMSPs in context.  Otherwise, there is a danger of overstating the 
importance of CMSPs on the course of the war.  Doing so will focus on the role 
CMSPs played during the war, but place them in the context of the other events 
and actors, allowing a full range of factors to be considered in sections two and 
three. 
 The second section of the chapter will place these events and actors in 
the analytical framework established in chapter three.  Firstly it will examine the 
interaction between the various sources of social power across the networks.  
How local, state, regional and international actors acted as a dynamic in the 
conflict.  The actors will be grouped into the different networks of the modified 
IEMP model; at local, national, trans-national, international, and global levels.  
And the sources of social power within them.  Then the sources of social power 
and how they crystallised.  It will be shown that CMSPs were one of the more 
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reliable military actors, but that the purely military focus again meant they were 
limited.  Only the UN and Britain were able to bring in other institutions which 
dealt with wider aspects of the war.  It will be shown how the use of CMSPs, 
although with some detrimental side effects, was of a short-term military benefit 
to the stability in Sierra Leone.  Although CMSPs did not end the war, the 
prospects faced by the state by not outsourcing some military functions would 
have been far bleaker.   
 Finally the third section of the chapter will consider the impact on the 
state as per the definition in chapter three.  It will be argued that there was some 
short-term strengthening of the state as CMSPs became involved.  But this did 
not improve the long-term stability of the state.  By fragmenting the institutions of 
the state it also caused weakness.  An interesting hypothetical question remains 
as to what would have happened if Sandline and Executive Outcomes had been 
allowed to remain in the country and their contracts fulfilled. It is likely that the 
military situation would have improved in the short to medium term.  But in the 
long-term the dysfunctional military-political, and social-political relationship 
would have persisted, perpetuating the societal schisms. 
5.2 Chronology 
The chronology of the war is split into four parts, around the involvement of 
Executive Outcomes and Sandline International.  The first part is a brief history 
of Sierra Leone up to the involvement of EO, including the beginning of the civil 
war and its progression.  This will address the root causes of the civil war which 
are key to understanding why it was so difficult to resolve.  The CMSPs which 
preceded EO and Sandline will also be covered here due to their minor role in 
comparison to the two main companies. 
 Part two will deal with the progress of the civil war during the period EO 
was contracted by the government.  This will include the events directly leading 
to the company’s employment, through to the ramifications of the contract's 
cancellation.  From which it will be argued that there was merit to the short-term 
military role of the company in providing security from the RUF, particularly 
when faced with a lack of other military options.  However, what the contract did 
not do was address any of the underlying instability within the state.  As such, 




Fig 5.12 Map of Sierra Leone  
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Part three will cover the role of Sandline International. There are two 
elements to the story of Sandline: (1) Their involvement in the security situation 
in Sierra Leone; where it is debated  how much of an impact Sandline was able 
to make in the time in was involved.  (2) Their involvement and the resulting 
scandal that they became embroiled in back in the UK.  The ‘Arms-to-Africa 
Affair’ is of interest as Sandline was operating as an extension of UK foreign 
policy, with disputed knowledge of those in government. 
The final part of this section will deal with the final stages of the war up to 
the 2002 ceasefire and the subsequent reconstruction. This will involve an 
overview of the various actors who became involved in operations after 
Sandline’s involvement.  This will bring the war up to date with proposed 
elections for 2007, despite the continued presence of the UN in the country. 
5.2.1 Background 
Sierra Leone lies on the west coast of Africa, sharing land borders with Guinea 
to the north and Liberia to the south east, it is 71,750 square km in size.3  The 
capital, Freetown, is on the west coast. The country has a number of valuable 
natural resources which included rich forests, alluvial diamonds,4 bauxite and 
rutile.5  The key mining areas are Kono (in the East), the Tongo concessions 
and Zimmi fields (the south).6  Around the time of the war the population of 4.4 
million was split between thirteen ethnic groups, the main two groups being the 
Mende in the south and the Temne in the North.7 
The recent history of Sierra Leone begins with the founding of Freetown, 
in 1787.  The city was founded for black veterans of the American War of 
Independence, who had supported the British.  Britain began the formal 
colonisation of Sierra Leone in 1808 and the country became an official 
protectorate in 1896.  Sierra Leone became an important staging post for 
Britain's access to other parts of the Empire.8  Rule through this period, apart 
from some antagonism between the indigenous population and the incoming 
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Creole, is generally seen as peaceful.  However, rule through informal structures 
outside the state established a pattern of paternalism.  There began to emerge a 
shadow state, where the power of officials came from their control of the market.  
The shadow state was expanded through the colonial period, even during 
periods when state authority was increased.9 
 The process of independence from British rule began in the 1950s and 
was secured by 1961.  The first government was formed under the Sierra Leone 
People’s Party (SLPP), and led by the Margai brothers.  They were accused of 
corruption, favouring the Mende and attempting to establish a one party state.10  
The Margai brothers continued the expansion of the shadow economy to 
maintain their popularity.11  Elections were held in 1967 where the All People’s 
Congress (APC) led by Shiaka Stevens was successful.  A coup delayed the 
transfer of power and it was not until a counter coup in 1968 that Stevens could 
take office. 
 Stevens’ term in office has been heavily criticised; many of the social, 
political, military and economic problems that have been linked to the civil war 
originate in this period.12  Stevens managed a continuation of the shadow 
economy and ran the country as a one party state.  He facilitated the exploitation 
of the country's natural resources by foreign companies,13 using a network of 
Lebanese dealers.14  The regime was heavily corrupt and concessions were 
used to secure loyalty, patrimonalism became deep rooted as a method of 
fostering and maintaining political control.15  State formation was designed as an 
instrument of repression.  Stevens clamped down on opposition to his 
government and by 1973 Sierra Leone had become a ‘de facto’ one party state, 
five years later it was ‘de jure’.16  The army was weakened and officers were 
vetted to ensure they supported the APC.17  This stifled opposition and alienated 
the military.  At the beginning of his rule the diamond trade made up half of 
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government revenue, but by 1985, after a period called the 'seventeen year 
plague of locusts', Sierra Leone was bankrupt.18 
 In 1985 Stevens stood down, and he passed control of the country over 
to a handpicked successor, Joseph Momoh.  Momoh continued to pursue 
Steven's economic policies and a further $300 million left the country.  The lack 
of revenue led to the collapse of the education system and the creation of an 
alienated youth underclass, which were called 'rarray boys'.  Civil servants 
ceased to be paid and they looted their offices.  The declining economic and 
social conditions led to the emigration of the professional class.19  The abuses of 
power during this period are blamed for directly causing the civil war.20 
 The civil war began on 23rd March 1991, when the RUF invaded Sierra 
Leone from Liberia.  The RUF was led by Foday Sankoh, a photographer and 
ex-member of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who had previously been found 
guilty of leading an army revolt against the government over poor pay.  They 
carried the rhetoric of revolutionary group struggling against the social failings of 
the government, but in reality they were trying to secure the Kono mines for 
themselves and Charles Taylor who had recently taken control of Liberia.21  By 
October 1992 the RUF had established bush camps and threatened the Kono 
mines.22  The RUF were initially popular, finding support from a population which 
had been alienated by the political elite over several decades.  Recruits were 
found in the youth of the country, who felt the greatest disconnection from the 
government.23 
 The government reacted to the invasion by tripling of the army to 14,000 
troops, using 'rarray boys', prisoners and Liberian exiles to fill the ranks.24  Local 
militias began to form and Nigeria and Guinea were approached for support.  
The endemic corruption continued as the military continued to be underpaid and 
was further alienated, while at the same time their commanders siphoned off 
pay and supplies.25  In April 1992 the first successful coup of the civil war 
deposed Momoh, when Valentine Strasser led an army protest over rice rations.  
Strasser had not intended to seize power, but when Momoh fled in the face of 
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his protest he became president.26  Strasser started with support and populist 
ambitions of reforming the country.  But, like many of the leaders before him, 
soon became part of the country's corrupt political system.  Income from the 
diamonds was channelled into his personal fortune, rather than the state.27   
 Meanwhile, the RUF continued their advance, by 1994 they had overrun 
the bauxite and titanium mines, further reducing government income.  The RUF 
to increase their resources.  The displacement of Lebanese and Senegalese 
traders who had previously exploited the industry and Liberian facilitation of the 
sale of diamonds and purchase of vital supplies gave the RUF renewed impetus.  
By 1995 the RUF was in a position to attack Freetown.28 
 The first CMSP to be used in Sierra Leone was by Strasser.  The British 
company, Ghurkha Security Group (GSG) was employed between 1993 and 
1995 in order to train the military.  They met with little success.  An RUF ambush 
in 1995 caused 20 casualties, including the commander whose body is alleged 
to have been cannibalised.29  The military has been accused of tipping the RUF 
off.  If true this is an indication of the resentment by the military of outside 
involvement.  The ambush also illustrates the fragility of some of the companies.  
Avant argues that fear of conflicts of interest with British foreign policy meant 
that GSG limited the role it undertook, so contributed little to security in Sierra 
Leone.30 
5.2.2 Executive Outcomes 
By 1995 the government was close to collapse.  1.5 million people had been 
displaced and over 15,000 killed.31  The RUF had achieved significant gains 
against the poor government forces.  Freetown was about to fall and vital mines 
had been secured by the RUF.  The government sought further support from the 
international community, but requests to the US, UN and UK were all rejected.32  
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It was at this point that EO was contacted.  EO was a South African CMSP, 
which had been formed in 1989 from members of the South African Defence 
Force (SADF), and by this point already been involved in the Angolan Civil War.  
EO has been linked with the Branch Energy, a company which had mining 
concessions in Sierra Leone.  As a result of which it has been alleged that EO's 
services were paid for by mining rights. 33  It is said that payment was to be $1.8 
million per month, and a profit sharing scheme with concessions being granted 
to the Branch Energy (a company linked to EO).34  There is still some debate as 
to this relationship, the complex nature of the group of companies making it 
difficult to verify.35 
 EOs contract was based on 4 key objectives.  It is important to 
remember these when evaluating the part played by EO, as this is what the 
government was paying it to achieve.  The contract required EO to: 
 1. Secure Freetown. 
 2. To regain control of crucial resources. 
 3. To destroy the RUF headquarters. 
 4. Clear the remaining areas of RUF occupation.36 
EO set to work quickly, undertaking five major operations.  These can be seen 
on the map in fig. 5.2. 
Employing 170 soldiers and six aircraft EO secured its contractual 
objectives between May and October 1995.  EO forces in the country were 
comparatively small, especially when considered alongside peak UN and 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) missions.37  However 
they also made effective use of heavy equipment, including an MI-8 helicopter, 
and were supported by the kamajors.38  EOs effectiveness has also been 
credited to their experience of low intensity warfare in Angola, and the use of 
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military intelligence.39  The effect of these operations was significant.  They 
made concerted attacks with the objective of holding ground, rather than hit and 
run attacks.40  Canadian Brigadier General Ian Douglas “You have to stop 
violence before you start negotiations.  EO did that in nine days.  They literally 
stopped the war.”41 
  
Fig 5.242 Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone 
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 Pressure was placed on Strasser to hold elections to which he reluctantly 
agreed.  But when he announced that he would stand for the presidency there 
was concern he would not relinquish power.  A coup was staged by Gen Julius 
Maada Bio which removed Strasser.  EO was not involved with the coup, but 
preferred working with Bio, over Strasser.43  Despite his own ambitions for the 
presidency he permitted elections to go ahead.44  Ahmed Tejan Kabbah won the 
election and was installed, but he was faced a bleak situation.  The government 
had no money, few foreign states could be counted on as allies and the army 
was no better than the RUF.45  EO continued to fulfil their contract and attacked 
the RUF, the pressure from which allowed negotiations.  In talks facilitated by 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) a peace treaty was 
signed in Abidjan.  However, part of the conditions instructed that the use EO 
had to cease.  Further difficulties in arranging the finances to pay EO, including 
pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reduce military 
expenditure, led to the cancellation of the contract with EO and they left the 
country.46  EO, having already prevented two coup attempts, as they left made a 
famous prediction that Kabbah would only last 100 days.47 
 Kabbah lasted 95 days before he was overthrown by a military led coup.  
In May 1997 Major Johnny Paul Koroma seized power.  The prominence of the 
Kamajors as a security force was increased when they became further 
institutionalised by the state by their incorporation into a Civil Defence Force 
(CDF).48  The army rebelled when they became aware that Kabbah's deputy 
defence minister was negotiating a contract with another CMSP to train the 
Kamajors.49  Koroma cited grievances of the low status of the military and the 
preference the government had of using Kamajors over the army.50  The coup 
was unpopular with ordinary citizens, who stopped work in protest.51  This did 
not stop Koroma, who seized Freetown and announced the formation of the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the RUF was invited into 
Freetown.  An initial deployment of Nigerian as part of an ECOMOG force, but 
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this was unpopular with the now exiled Kabbah.52  They were attacked by the 
AFRC and RUF, and a peace settlement was negotiated.  This led to looting and 
atrocities against the civilian population.53  Britain and the US stepped in, but 
only to evacuate their own expatriates.54  The military seized control of mining 
resources.55 
5.2.3 Sandline International 
By 1998 the civil war had reached a low point.  Freetown was now in the hands 
of the RUF and the military had taken over the government.  ECOMOG forces, 
led by Nigeria, had been forced out of Freetown along with Kabbah.  
International pressure was placed on Koroma to allow the return of Kabbah.  
Britain used its position on the UN security council to draft resolution 1132, 
which imposed an embargo on the importation of weapons to the country and 
called for the restoration of Kabbah.  However, Koroma resisted this pressure.56  
There were some clashes between Nigerian forces and the AFRC, RUF 
coalition.  The peace between the AFRC and the RUF soon broke down, and 
the RUF began to pursue their own agenda again. 
 A deal was brokered between the exiled Kabbah and Sandline 
International to restore him to power.  This involved Rakesh Saxena, a financier 
who wanted to invest in the growing mineral extraction industry in Africa, and 
Peter Penfold, the British ambassador to Sierra Leone.  A number of questions 
have been asked about the role of Saxena, particularly his situation, motivation 
for restoring Kabbah, and the compensation for doing so.  The course of events 
between these three which led to Sandline's involvement is also disputed, with 
each party providing their own interpretation of who approached who to broker 
the deal.57  Despite these differences the arrangement seemed to suit all of the 
parties involved. 
 Kabbah appears to have agreed to the arrangement after considering the 
success achieved by EO.58  There are several reasons why Sandline became 
involved.  The company was already in the country in some form or another 
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through Lifeguard Security, Sandline also had an office in Freetown and were 
operating a helicopter in the north of the country.59  It is also been alleged that 
Sandline was motivated to reinstall Kabbah because the government still owed 
EO for their final contract, with the AFRC refusing to complete the agreed upon 
payment plan.  A number of sources argue there were close links between EO 
and Sandline, through the Branch Heritage Energy Group, and certain personnel 
such as Tony Buckingham.  It must be noted that this relationship is strongly 
denied by Lt. Col. Tim Spicer.60  The opportunity came at the perfect time for 
Spicer, after the company's last contract, with the government in Papua New 
Guinea, resulted in a military coup and Sandline being kicked out of the 
country.61 
 Plans were made for Sandline to support a Nigerian led ECOMOG force 
in restoring Kabbah, then train the Kamajors.62  In February 1998 there was a 
second battle for Freetown.  This was a Nigerian led attack following the failure 
of talks with the military Junta, which resulted in it being abandoned by the 
AFRC and RUF.  The significance of the role played by Sandline has been 
questioned.  A cut in the budget of their operation from $10 million, to $1.5 
million meant that they only had committed 12 troops and one helicopter, 
compared to 12,000 Nigerian troops.  The supply of arms which was brokered 
with Kabbah only arrived in Lungi airport, which was under the control of 
Nigerian troops under ECOMOG, afterwards.63  By March 1998 Kabbah had 
been returned to power and the deal with Saxena and Sandline had fallen 
apart.64 
 Sandline International's involvement in Sierra Leone led to controversy in 
Britain.  Problems then arose between Sandline International and the British 
government when a customs investigation was launched into the alleged 
breaking of Security Council Resolution 1132, which had been worded to 
prohibit the sale of arms to either side in the war.  Sandline's contract involved 
the supply of arms which it was said was a breach of the sanctions.  There was 
controversy over whether the arms embargo referred to all parties, or only the 
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RUF.65  The customs investigation was later dropped due to poor chance of 
achieving prosecution.  The decision to investigate has been criticised due to the 
ambiguity in the wording of embargo as implemented by Britain.  Particularly as 
by supporting Kabbah, Sandline was following British policy.66   
 The way in which Sandline became involved has come under much 
scrutiny and led to investigations by the UK government.  Sandline claimed to 
have the approval of the British government, which was denied.  However, it 
would appear that certain elements of the government were not only aware of 
what was happening, but helped to broker the deal.  Peter Penfold the British 
High Commissioner in Sierra Leone was keen for Sandline to work with Kabbah.  
The Legg Report into the affair cleared the government of its role.  This let to 
accusations of a cover up, it was argued that the government was attempting to 
bush the issue aside.  However, a later independent investigation agreed with 
Legg.67  Much of the criticism within the report was direct towards the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office.  though care was taken with Penfold due to high 
profile support by Tony Blair  The outcome of the report was that all sides have 
claimed this justifies their actions, except the FCO.  Tony Blair was apparently 
pleased with the result as Kabbah had been restored.  The main issue was with 
the failure to clear the affair by other MPs.68 
 Kabbah was now back as president in Sierra Leone.  However, the civil 
war was still ongoing and the arrangement had fallen apart between Sandline, 
Kabbah and Saxena.  Drohan argues this was inevitable from early on as 
Saxena struggled to put up the finances required.69  Spicer came away from the 
affair unhappy about the way Sandline was treated.  A notice on the company's 
web site blames lack of governmental support for the closure of Sandline.70 
5.2.4 After EO and Sandline 
After the return of Kabbah a UN observer mission was established (UNOSIL).  
Although the general population was happy to see Kabbah returned, he was still 
dependent upon Nigerian troops for security.71  Of more concern, so was 
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UNOSIL.72  The RUF was still active and the country remained divided, with the 
Kono mines in the hands of the RUF.73  The RUF attacked Freetown again in 
1999, overrunning part of the city and resulting in between 5,000 and 6,000 
deaths and nearly defeating the Nigerian forces.  The defeat of the AFRC and 
RUF, along with Kabbah's return meant that it was possible to bring about a 
ceasefire in 1999.  Sankoh was captured and stood trial for treason, where he 
was found guilty and sentenced to death.74  Further talks occurred which led to 
the Lome Peace Accords.  It has been argued that Kabbah was pushed into 
signing this by the international community.75  The Lome Peace Agreement 
tentatively moved towards disarmament, with the RUF included in the 
government.  Sankoh was released and given the post of vice-president.  He 
was made minister of natural resources, which gave him control of the diamond 
mines over which the RUF had been fighting for control.  However, this did not 
lead to an end of the war. 
 Nigeria decided to remove its contingent from the ECOMOG force in 
1999, which passed the burden of security onto the UN.  The UN reacted by 
increasing its observer mission from 300 soldiers to 6,000 in late 1999.  The 
observer mission was replaced by UNAMSIL and a concerted effort was made 
at disarmament.76  UN troops levels rose from 11,000 by 2000, then 17,500 in 
March 2001.  Sierra Leone became the largest running UN mission and a 
concerted effort was made by the international community at securing peace.77  
However, the RUF was able to stage attacks, in 2000 500 peacekeepers being 
taken hostage.  Reacting to the threat of another attack on Freetown, Britain 
began to offer financial and military support and allowed the UN forces to be 
bolstered.  Public demonstrations were staged in Freetown, onto which 
Sankoh's bodyguards opened fire.  Sankoh's compound was attacked and he 
was arrested.78 
 As the intervention in Kosovo drew down and RUF troops again 
threatened Freetown, Britain became further involved.  Operation Palliser was 
undertaken to evacuate expatriates.  Next Britain moved from supporting the UN 
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to become the only stabilising force in the country.79  Including a training 
program for the Sierra Leone military.80  Britain's involvement deepened beyond 
the military support; by providing more money, aid and political support than any 
of the African states involved.81  A more robust response was required following 
the hostage taking of 11 British soldiers by a group called the West Side Boys.  
They were rescued, after some negotiations, by an attack on their camp by 
British forces.  Interestingly - when it comes to looking at Blackwater employees 
being in the wrong place at the wrong time in Iraq - questions were raised as to 
what the captured troops had been doing.82  Following the British intervention 
the RUF fragmented and in November 2000 a ceasefire was signed. 
 In January 2002 Kabbah declared the war over.  By that time 50,000 
people had been killed, 20,000 maimed and 75% of the population had been 
displaced.  Sierra Leone's had slipped to the bottom of the UN Human 
Development tables.83  Elections were held on May 14th 2002 and nearly 2 
million voted.  With Sankoh in jail, disarmament was ongoing and there were 
expectations of peace..84  In August 2003 Charles Taylor resigned and went to 
Nigeria.  He was indicted for war crimes, and in 2012 at the Hague found guilty 
of being indirectly involved in the atrocities committed by the RUF.  Though the 
judgement did not 85 
 As Sierra Leone now stands it is a poor, but improving country.  Having 
been bypassed as the most failed state by the countries to be considered in the 
next two chapters.  Its future is not certain, commentators continue to urge 
caution as the poor human development record persists,86  but Sierra Leone is 
better placed for peace than at any time since 1991.  Concerted efforts at 
disarming soldiers and militia on all sides have improved stability in the country, 
with the peaceful nature of the 2007 elections was taken as a positive 
development.87  This does not mean that security companies have completely 
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left the country.  Their use has continued, though it is now smaller scale 
'security' firms which are providing guards for mineral extractions companies.88  
5.3 Sources of Social Power across the Networks 
The relationship between all four of the sources of social power led to the 
perpetuation of the civil war.  However, political power sits at the centre.89  
Political corruption at the national level resulted in poor economic management 
that damaged the development of state institutions over several decades.  
Social alienation was an almost inevitable result of this mismanagement.  The 
relationship between political and military groups within the state became 
dysfunctional with neither trusting the other.  The short-term solution to the civil 
war was to stabilise the government by providing military support.  While the 
long-term solution to the civil war lay in repairing the relationship between 
political-military and political-social.  However, both were necessary, there were 
aspects to the war which required a military victory. 
 While division within the state formed a core part of the conflict, the war 
was exacerbated by transnational and international regional actors.  The 
balance made between the capabilities of sub-regional peacekeeping, against 
the vested interests they bring.90  Sub national actors took on some of the 
responsibilities that the state was no longer able to provide.  These both 
contributed to security and aggravated tensions at a national level.  Whereas, 
transnational actors across military, political and economic sources took power 
away from the state.  The relationship with international actors was dependent 
upon the state involved.  Some contributed to military, social and political power, 
while others sought to undermine them.  Finally, at a global level some of the 
most constructive actions appeared, but often belatedly. 
 CMSPs therefore provided both a positive and negative contribution to 
the outcome of the war.  They were able to provide effective military support, 
protecting the state from complete collapse at key moments.  But, they 
exacerbated the longer term problems of the state, by further damaged the 
military-political relationship and removed the incentive to remedy the poor 
political-social relationship.  Use of kamajors was an important part of EO's 
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strategy, each arguing that they would not have been successful without the 
other.91  Singer says the training of the kamajors created an independent force 
which complicated domestic politics.92  But this was a perpetuation of policies 
already pursued by the political elite. 
5.3.1 National 
At a national level it is difficult to look beyond the political misrule of the elected 
presidents as a source of instability.  At independence Sierra Leone possessed 
a favourable political geography compared to many other African states, the 
relatively small size of the country suggested that the state would be able to 
maintain control.93  However, the patrimonial system used by Stevens and 
Momoh and perpetuated by Kabbah and Strasser undermined this.94  The 
outcome of their political misrule was poor economic development, a fractious 
relationship with the military and social alienation.  The system of patronage led 
to a degree of ethnic tension as mistrust resulted from the favouring of different 
groups.95 
 Easy access to a diamonds, along with metals such and bauxite and 
rutile, encouraged the reliance upon the few key natural resources.96  Political 
elites allowed the decision to maintain a high value currency stifled the 
diversification of the economy.  A 'shadow economy' emerged during Steven's 
rule and profits from diamonds helped to sustain the war.97  The relationship 
between the poor economic conditions within the country and sympathy for the 
RUF cannot be ignored.  Inequality between the elite of the country and the 
youth was fed by the way politics diverted revenue from diamonds into the 
hands of the elite.98 
 The conduct of the war at a national level was overshadowed by the 
dysfunctional relationship between the SLA and the government.  The SLA was 
to prove decisive at key points in the war, however for the wrong reasons.  The 
military was prone to staging coups; Strasser, Bio and Momoh all came to power 
in this way.  There were also numerous unsuccessful attempts; Kabbah survived 
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three attempts in only the first 10 months after his election.99  The military has 
also been accused of conspiring with the RUF.  The alliance between the 
soldiers and rebels between 1997 and 1998 led to the coining of the term 'sobel'.  
Civilians were unable to distinguish between the two.100 The military often 
proved to be just as hazardous to the local populous as the RUF and have been 
accused of various attacks on civilians and exploitation of the countries mineral 
resources.  Danger that training the military would just make it more efficient at 
threatening the government.101 
 Due to the poor reputation of the military as being untrustworthy, the 
government and CMSPs preferred to use civil defence forces as the military.  
There is a strong argument that the use of CMSPs further alienated the military.  
Several of the coups started as protests over marginalisation as other military 
actors were used, poor equipment and low pay.  This was a long running 
process of alienation which went back much further.  The 1992 coup, long 
before the introduction of EO was the product of neglect felt by the military.102  
The SLA struggled even after the dramatic expansion in 1992.103  This is hardly 
surprising consider that they were recruited from prisons and the alienated 
youth. 
 How far did EO and Sandline interfere with the interaction between the 
sources of power at the national level?  They propped up the elected 
governments, protected civilians in the areas they operated, and defended 
Freetown.  The main element of the contract for EO was to defend Freetown, a 
task that was comfortably achieved.  Sandline was employed to assist in the 
restoration of the Kabbah government and the recapture of Freetown.  Retaining 
control of the administrative centre of the country was important as it was the 
basis for widening control.104  Introducing a more reliable force into the country 
than the military strengthened the government against other political and military 
actors in the country.  This was important as the weakness of the elected 
governments has been linked to brutalism to maintain their power.105  However, 
it has been questioned how far the government was able to control EO, 
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particularly when payment became problematic.106  Their link to extraction 
companies meant that priority was towards their interests, rather than that of the 
government.107  The use of EO resulted in the loss of some political power.  
When the links with extraction companies are assumed to be correct it meant a 
loss in control over economic entities.108 
5.3.2 Sub-National 
At the sub-national level, the social and military sources of power influenced the 
course of the war.  The failure of the government to either exercise control over, 
or secure the loyalty of the military led to the formation of the CDF.  They were 
popular locally and used by the CMSPs because of the failures of the 
government troops.  The kamajors were important to EO as they provided the 
bulk of the manpower.109  But the use of CDFs by the state alienated the military, 
and has been directly attributed to several of the coups.  There is also a 
question over the conduct of the CDF.  EO claims credit for improving the 
conduct of the troops which came under their control, but this has been 
contested.110  The Kamajors have also been accused of acts of brutality.111  The 
success of EO in the short term cannot be doubted.  Supported by the kamajors 
and military, they were able to expel the RUF from key positions within the 
country.  Arguably played an important role in bringing about the first set of 
peace talks in Abidjan.  There was enough stability to allow the resettlement of a 
large number of refugees.  EO proved to be popular on the whole, however their 
beneficial effects were geographically limited to the strategically important areas 
where they had been operating.  However, it cannot be ignored that their use 
diffused the control of military power by the state.112 
 The second source of power, social, was directed against the 
government, the military, and the RUF.  Civic society groups are credited with 
playing an important part in the civil war.  Even going so far as to credit them 
with bringing about the end of the conflict, but their role should not be 
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overstated.113  The Sierra Leone Women's Movement for Peace placed pressure 
on Bio to hold an election following the coup in 1996.114  However, the RUF 
failed to get support from the wider population within Sierra Leone, even in 
areas which had traditionally opposed the government.115  Following the attack 
on UN troops in 2000 civic groups came out to pose mass demonstrations 
involving 30,000 people.  This led to the fleeing of Sankoh's bodyguards and the 
arrest of Sankoh.116.  While there were some proactive elements to social 
activity, they function better as a barometer of the feelings of the general 
population towards other various groups within the country.  This is a good 
indication of the relationship between social, and other sources of power, with 
the embeddness of the state in society important to long-term stability. 
 Sub-regional actors were reacting the failings of both the state and the 
RUF, and indicate the main issues which needed to be addressed to end the 
war.  The military by increasing security, and social by improving the degree to 
which the state benefitted the population beyond the political elite.  The use of 
power at a sub-state level moved power away from the national level.  It is unfair 
to completely blame CMSPs.  But the increased use of Kamajors by EO did 
further damage to relations between the government, and military and is cited as 
a reason for the 1997 coup which ousted Kabbah.117  The plans, which were 
being put in place before Abidjan, to implement security reforms and placed a 
heavy emphasis on the use of EO, were likely to lead to further alienation.  But 
this was a policy which was also undertaken by the state, outside of contracts 
with CMSPs. 
5.3.3 Transnational 
The two main trans-national actors were the RUF and the network of private 
traders who facilitated the trade in diamonds.  They worked within the military, 
economic and political sources of power, taking power away from the state.  The 
private traders had worked on behalf of various parties since the British ran 
Sierra Leone as a colony and gave De Beers access to the mining areas.  When 
these companies worked for the government they contributed to the political 
power of the government, but also to the shadow economy which facilitated the 
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undermining the economic and social development of the state.  These networks 
were displaced when the RUF took over the mining areas and traded them for 
arms from Liberia. 
 The characteristics of the RUF were mixed.  A sympathetic interpretation 
of the RUF takes its rhetoric of disaffection with the government at face value.  
From this perspective the RUF was a form of opposition to the corruption in the 
Sierra Leone government.  It claimed political aspirations, was comprised of 
personnel from Sierra Leone and acquired formal political power on several 
occasions.  However, the actions of the RUF during the war undermine this 
claim.  The RUF lacked a coherent ideology or political strategy, despite the 
anti-corruption rhetoric.118  Killings and mutilation of civilians meant that the RUF 
failed to mobilise popular support.119  It was also a military force that 
collaborated with Liberia to exploit Sierra Leone's natural resources and spread 
across a number of states causing wider problems for the region.  Peace 
agreements were consistently ignored when they were no longer advantageous, 
the first subsequent acts were either atrocities against civilians or attacks on 
mining sites. 
 Although the RUF was not a coherent group,120 which would have 
contributed to its mixed characteristics, the RUF should not be mistaken as a 
revolutionary movement with an extreme fringe.  The organisation as a whole 
destabilised Sierra Leone and alienated any possible support by brutalising 
populations in RUF controlled areas.  Even when given the opportunity to 
participate in government, and de facto control of the diamond mines, the RUF 
soon reverted back to arms.  The conduct of the RUF during the war; with the 
use of mutilation, taking of slaves to mine for diamonds and 'recruitment' of child 
soldiers; gave them little popular appeal.  The widespread civil protests at the 
behaviour of the RUF, which ultimately lead to the arrest of Sankoh, show how 
limited their wider support among the civilian population was.  It is telling that in 
a country with such disaffection with the government the RUF failed to appeal to 
the wider population. 
 CMSPs were effective in displacing the RUF militarily.  Where the RUF 
was more effective than EO and Sandline was in their political dealing with 
international and global actors.  The RUF established themselves as more 
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legitimate to a number of outside actors, thus they benefitted from political 
negotiations.  Or, they were protected as a useful actor in keeping Sierra Leone 
weak, which benefitted several neighbouring states. 
5.3.4 International 
International actors affected the balance of power within the state by 
strengthening and weakening the military, political, economic and social sources 
of power.  Although the root causes of the civil war originated from within Sierra 
Leone, it was another state which was responsible for initiating the bloodshed.  
During the war a number of regional and wider international states tried to 
manage the conflict, some to stabilise the conflict, others to exploit it in pursuit of 
their own interest political and economic interests.  However, it was an 
international actor which took on a major role in bringing the conflict to an end. 
 Liberia, under Charles Taylor, was the primary negative external 
influence on the stability of Sierra Leone throughout the war.  Herbst argues that 
the cause of Sierra Leone’s degeneration ‘into the category of failed state’ 
resulted from the spread of the civil war from Liberia.121  Liberia did more than 
inadvertently spread conflict though, Charles Taylor is accused of using the RUF 
as a tool for his own pursuit of power in the region, with part of the initial 
invasion coming from Liberia.  Taylor is alleged to have supported the RUF in 
order to have a friendly government in Sierra Leone.122  Taylor's support for the 
RUF stemmed from his own struggle for power in Liberia.  He sought to exploit 
Sierra Leone’s natural resources to fund his own regime, which facilitated the 
sale of diamonds and purchase of equipment by the RUF.123  He also sought to 
punish Sierra Leone for allowing ECOMOG to base troops at Lungi airport, 
which had tried to prevent him from coming to power.  To damage the work of 
ECOMOG in trying to resolve the Liberian civil war.124 
 Nigeria took on the largest workload of the countries trying to stabilise 
Sierra Leone, with Nigerian troops forming the majority of the ECOMOG 
contingent.  It was decision of Nigeria to withdraw these troops which forced the 
UN to increase its presence.  Although Nigeria's involvement was primarily 
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through ECOMOG, it is worth considering separately as a state-on-state 
relationship.  There was mixed support for the contribution made by Nigerian 
troops; who were viewed either as heroes for fighting the RUF, or imperial 
occupiers.125  Historically many Sierra Leoneans were suspicious of the reasons 
for Nigeria's intervention, which viewed itself as a regional hegemon.126  
Especially given the contradiction of a Nigerian dictator intervening to support a 
democracy.127  Nigerian troops also seemed to fall into the trap of exploiting the 
Sierra Leone’s natural resources and began illegal diamond mining by mid 
1998.128  Conversely, Nigeria felt that its role was under appreciated, especially 
compared to the credit Britain received.129  They certainly made a major 
contribution to security in the country, protecting the government from the RUF 
and returning Kabbah to government, but this was on Nigeria's terms. 
 Apathy among the wider international community as to the plight of 
Sierra Leone has been blamed for prolonging the war.  Especially compared to 
Kosovo, which prompted high profile airstrikes by NATO.130  The US, often at the 
centre of major peacekeeping operations, only undertook limited military action 
in Sierra Leone. Following the overthrow of Kabbah in 1998 US forces 
intervened to evacuate ex-patriots from Freetown.  However, following the 
experience of the US in Somalia there was no enthusiasm to offer military 
support to Kabbah's return.  The US made some financial contribution towards 
the running costs of the UN missions, but there was a lack of self interest.131  
This was certainly to the detriment of stability within Sierra Leone.  The military 
capability which the US could have provided would have benefitted the 
government.  Though the political implications for reaching a long-term 
settlement are less certain.  An incident similar to that experienced by GSG may 
have prompted a Somalia like withdrawal.  Either leaving the government 
suddenly lacking support, or being pressured into negotiations with the RUF.  
Neither outcome would have been helpful in the long-term. 
 Britain played the largest role of the non-ECOWAS states in ending the 
civil war.  Using its position as a permanent member of the UN’s Security 
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Council to pass resolution 1132 following Kabbah's overthrow.  It was the 
unilateral military actions it undertook that were significant in stabilising the 
country.  As the former colonial power Britain had the more interest in Sierra 
Leone than the US, or other EU states.  However this intervention still followed 
almost a decade of inaction.  It was only after Sandline's intervention had drawn 
the attention of the British public, and this inactivity was shown to contradict 
Blair's ethical foreign policy, that the government acted.132  There is a strong 
case that if this support had been given earlier then Sandline would not have 
been involved.133 
 Blair, encouraged by the response of outgoing U.S President Bill Clinton, 
felt like he had singlehandedly stopped the civil war.134  The early stages of 
Britain's intervention was not without problems, and lacked a coherent long-term 
strategy.135  However, the overall outcome of the intervention has been 
described as Blair's most successful military intervention.136  While Nigeria took 
on more commitments over a longer period of time, Britain's intervention was 
more proactive in bringing about an end to the conflict.  Giving the UN a better 
foothold in the country than that left by the outgoing Nigerian forces.  To the 
extent that some civilians would have liked Britain to return and run the 
country.137 
 CMSPs gave the governments of Sierra Leone a way of moving away 
from the realist logic of international power politics, where the bonds created by 
social power were too weak to generate a response.  They were able to resist 
Liberia's proxy attacks through the RUF and exploitation of economic resources.  
The companies were more representative of the interests of the governments 
who were paying them than some of the regional powers with vested interests, 
and they gave Sierra Leone an option when more impartial observers were 
unwilling to intervene.  Britain came the closest to responding on social grounds, 
but this was only when Sandline's actions and confusion over approval 
contradicted Britain's ethical foreign policy.  CMSPs were not as powerful as the 
other state actors they were leveraged out of the country by external actors 
exerting political power.  Compared to the role of Nigeria in restoring however, 
Sandline's role was minor.  Britain's military response has been credited with 
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providing the improvement in security, rather than CMSPs.138Though this only 
came after nearly a decade of disinterest. 
5.3.5 Global 
There are a limited number of truly global super-national organisations, of these 
the UN and IMF had a role in trying to stabilise Sierra Leone.  This network will 
also include regional organisations which operated at a super-national level; in 
this case ECOWAS, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).139  These 
organisations altered the distribution of power during the civil war between 
political, military and most importantly social sources of power.  However, 
divisions with these organisations, and the vested interests of some states 
undermined many of their efforts.   
 Looking first at the regional organisations, the AU took a role in 
negotiations, but was largely ineffective.140  Whereas ECOWAS was much more 
involved at both a political and military level.  This was inevitable considering the 
regional links to conflict which affected several states including Liberia and 
Guinea-Bissau.  ECOWAS intervention had mixed results, although states like 
Nigeria brought specialist knowledge of the area they were also motivated by 
their own political self interest.141  As was covered above, Nigeria took on the 
majority of the military workload, but has faced criticism for bringing vested 
interests.  As a whole, ECOMOG forces were poorly equipped, with a significant 
proportion of troops lacking the required equipment.142  To an extent military 
intervention helped, but it was imperfectly executed. 
 In trying to reach a political solution to the civil war, there were three 
main attempts at negotiated settlements; Abidjan, Conakry and Lome.  All of 
which have been judged as failures.143  Divisions within ECOWAS hampered 
efforts at making these peace agreements work.144  The parties involved, even 
the supposedly impartial organisers, have been criticised for pursuing their own 
interests.  The Ivory Coast had a substantial role in the Abidjan peace talks, but 
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was seen to favour the RUF.145  As part of those peace talks the RUF was 
offered a political role.  The support Sierra Leone received was as much part of 
quietening the region to the benefit of regional actors, as it was improving life for 
the people of Sierra Leone. 
 The IMF provided financial support to the government.  However, this 
assistance came with political leverage which was used to pressure Kabbah into 
restructuring government spending.  This did not meaningfully reform the 
economy, but it did remove the main source of security within the country.  This 
demonstrated the danger of trying to reform the country when security was 
weak. 
 The UN was initially involved as a monitoring force, But poorly funded 
and ill equipped it did little to positively influence the course of the war.  The UN 
presence in Sierra Leone was weakened by an ambivalent international reaction 
to the civil war among major states, caused by peacekeeping failures in Somalia 
and Rwanda.146  Instead, the UN became reliant upon ECOMOG forces for 
security.  This hampered UN efforts to enforce Lome following the withdrawal of 
Nigerian forces.147  The UN presence was subsequently expanded to a full 
peacekeeping mission, though this was still of limited effectiveness compared to 
the short British military intervention.  The disarmament, demobilisation and 
rehabilitation (DDR) camps, established after Lome, were initially ineffective.148  
UNAMSIL has been criticised at points for lacking urgency and having no 
‘endgame’ plan.149  However, when given the space granted by British military 
action; the long-term use of agencies to disarm and reintegrate the RUF, civil 
defence forces and Sobels it was more effective.   
 Global organisations were potentially able to exert power across all of 
the sources, with more resources than CMSPs.  But in practice, internal 
divisions, self interest and poor planning limited their effectiveness.  As with the 
international actors, there was a failure of cooperation, through social power.  
ECOMOG was militarily effective, but left the Sierra Leone government 
vulnerable.  The IMF was trying to restructure the spending away from military 
expenditure, when the priority was military stability.  Finally, the UN was well 
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intentioned, but less effective than CMSPs in creating the short-term space for 
security.  However, once there was a degree of security within the country the 
UN was able to effectively use the full array of social and economic agencies. 
5.3.6 Crystallisation across the networks 
Across the networks actors from above and below the state interacted with all 
four of the sources of social power.  Some reinforced the power of the state, 
others undermined it.  The origins of the war came from within the state, but the 
immediate cause and its perpetuation were exacerbated by outside actors.  
Because of this, although the root causes and long-term solution to the war were 
part of the breakdown of political-social, political-military relations, the social-
economic.  In the short-term the military and economic power of the state 
needed to be re-established to take control of the state from hostile external 
actors.  In the medium term the political and military power of the country 
needed to be reinforced, re-establishing the infrastructural power of the state.  
Finally in the long-term, the relationship between political and social power 
needed to be repaired. 
 The first sources of power which the state needed to establish control 
over were military-economic.  Freetown required protection and control over 
mining areas re-established.  The importance of economics at this point was that 
the pursuit of economic power by military means, at a local, transnational and 
regional international level was central to the short-term perpetuation of the war.  
The military struggle for control of Sierra Leone's natural resources was one of 
the cornerstones of the war, which weakened the other sources of power.  
Without addressing this struggle the longer-term solutions to the war were 
irrelevant.  The diamond and ore mines were attractive for their ease of 
exploitation, high value and potential fungability into military and political power.  
As a result the economic power of Sierra Leone was exploited and degraded by 
local, international and transnational actors.   
 The actors which had the most to gain from these resources were the 
most enthusiastic to become involved in the war.  Liberia and the RUF were 
complicit in taking control of the diamond mines.  The RUF, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone government all had infrastructure that relied on access to these 
resources.  Regional actors who intervened to fight the RUF also found access 
to these resources too much of a temptation and were not above exploiting them 
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themselves.  Conflict over these resources perpetuated the war.  It was 
inevitable that the main focus of fighting outside of Freetown would be in the 
mining areas.  The value of the diamond and ore mines was insufficient to 
override the lack of national interest of states in the wider international 
community.  This delayed, or prevented some states from intervening.  
However, this meant that when they did become involved these actors were 
more interested in investing in the state and building it up in the long-term, rather 
than the short-term exploitation of economic resources. 
 CMSPs helped to enhance state control over both of these sources of 
power; they protected the capital and restored government control of the mines.  
The latter denied the RUF revenue from diamond sales was key to ending the 
war.150  But in doing so they indirectly exploited them, by requiring revenue 
which allegedly was based on access to the mines.  These terms were not 
unsustainable, and preferable to monopolisation by other actors, which 
perpetuated themselves by purchasing military power.  From this perspective 
CMSPs should be viewed as a success.  EO more so than Sandline.  There is a 
question over the military significance of the role played by Sandline in the 
recapture of Freetown.  Adebajo argues that Sandline played virtually no role, 
with the arms they imported into the country remaining in Lungi Airport.  With 
Kabbah giving the credit for the defeat of the AFRC and RUF to Nigerian 
troops.151  However, Sandline still used their helicopters to provide air support, 
acting as a ‘force multiplier’.152  EO offered good value, stopped the fight and 
cost only a third of the annual military budget.153  The securing of military-
economic power in Sierra Leone was only bettered by British troops. 
 The medium-term solution to ending the civil war was to the reinforce the 
state institutions through military and political power.  The problem lay in the 
weak military power of the state, caused by the ineffectiveness of the military 
and the dysfunctional relationship with the political elite.  The government had 
been forced to turn away from the SLA which became as much as problem as 
the RUF.  Security in Sierra Leone was left to the whims of the international 
community.  International and global actors contributed troops, with different 
degrees of effectiveness.  Regional organisations were often militarily 
                                                          
150
 Hirsch, Sierra Leone, p.15. 
151
 Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau,  p.89. 
152
 See chapter 3 
153
 Ibid, p.114. 
 138 
 
limited.154They also came with vested interests in the political outcome and 
forced the government to accept unfavourable political solutions.  The role of 
Nigeria should be appreciated as Sierra Leone was reliant upon them at several 
points.  But, the most positive application of military power came from Britain, 
who also worked with the government and military. 
 Although CMSPs allowed the government to secure itself in the short-
term, their limitations appear at this point.  The success of EO created a 
dependence for more support.155  CMSPs were contracted to undertake some 
training of indigenous forces, but in doing so increased reliance upon the CDF 
which was detrimental to long-term state building.  This is a difficult problem to 
resolve and in this case only occurred when effective international actors 
intervened.  Ironically, without Sandline's actions bringing attention to the failings 
of British foreign policy.  CMSPs also showed themselves to be politically weak, 
especially when employed by a weak entity.  EO and Sandline were both 
defeated politically.  They were leveraged out of the country.  Whereas, EO was 
pushed out of the country by a combination of national, international, 
transnational and global actors.  Sandline's involvement was ended by Britain. 
 The long-term solution to ending the civil war lies in resolving the issues 
which fermented it: the shadow economy which developed around the system of 
patrimony.  Resolving the relationships between political and social power; 
political and economic power; and finally economic and social power.  
Investment from international and global actors has been necessary to address 
them, as the state was effectively bankrupt after years of exploitation by the 
political elite.  There were some early attempts to resolve them, when the IMF 
contributed to government spending and tried to reform the public sector.  But, 
the stipulations on how this was spent, it damaged the political and military 
power of the country.  At that point EO had just been able to achieve short-term 
stability.  But, by rushing the medium and long-term steps and removing the only 
credible military actor, this was doomed to failure.  By investing heavily in Sierra 
Leone, Britain and the UN have helped to progress between these three stages  
The more established contributors to peacekeeping operations were distracted 
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by Kosovo.156  These problems are yet to be fully resolved, but the most recent 
developments are positive. 
 It is this level of involvement which CMSPs are inappropriate.  Yet, this 
step is vital for the long-term stability of Sierra Leone, rather than just freezing 
the conflict.  Bigger questions over the role of CMSPs and their relationship with 
economic power and social power are relevant at this point.  It has been 
questioned as to who the companies benefit; the government or society.157  
Singer questions the long-term implications of mortgaging access to minerals in 
return for security.  Argues that the market value of the concessions granted in 
return for Sandline's intervention were $200 million, compared to about $10 
million worth of services.158  In the longer-term reliance upon CMSPs becomes 
truly counterproductive. 
 Through these short, medium and long-term stages, the state's control 
over the sources of power needed to be restored, and the relationships between 
them repaired.  CMSPs were able to help restore economic and economic 
power to the state, and to a certain degree political independence.  But, they 
weakened the relationships between the military and the political elite; and 
political elite and society.  The result was that they could take provide a short-
term solution to the war, but not medium or long-term.  In this case, other actors 
finally took responsibility for ending the civil war and stabilising Sierra Leone.  
However, it was the inaction of these states which caused the government of 
Sierra Leone to use CMSPs.  CMSPs also had a role in highlighting the failure of 
social power in the international and global networks to generate a timely 
response.  Without the role of CMSPS in addressing the military and economic 
situations the country would have experienced greater hardships. 
5.4 Impact of CMSP activity on the state 
The impact of CMSPs on the state, as per the definition in chapter three, was 
mixed.  CMSPs directly increased authoritative power by providing organised 
'political force', improving control over the territorially demarcated area that was 
the state.  But, they weakened the state by exacerbating tensions within the 
institutions of the state, which undermined the long-term capability of the state.  
perpetuating the alienation of the state.  The short-term strengthening of some 
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state institutions and physical control over territory, came at the expense of the 
long-term institutional development and state embeddedness in society. 
 Herbst argues that Sierra Leone's geography at the time of 
independence was favourable for exercising political control.  But the small size 
of the country made Freetown vulnerable to attacks.  It was unable to defend 
itself properly when the civil spread from Liberia.159  CMSPs were able to 
partially mitigate this weakness by enhancing the immediate power of the 
government to exert organised political force.  EO and Sandline protected or 
recaptured Freetown and gained control over the diamond mines.  In exerting 
military power CMSPs were as effective as any other actor, except perhaps 
Britain.  Compared to other actors the provision of military power came with the 
least constraints on the agential power of the government.  The only restriction 
was in prioritising targets which would facilitate the payment of the companies.  
This made sense for the state, and was better than the alternatives, They 
improved the military, authoritative power of the state over the country.  
Regaining it from the transnational actors. 
 The problems with CMSPs were that they aggravated relations between 
the institutions of the state and perpetuated the reliance of despotic power over 
society.  The dysfunctional relationship between civilian government and military 
was exacerbated, which weakened the long-term stability of the state.  The 
success of CMSPS which facilitated a perpetuation of the shadow state, which 
stabilised the immediate future of the state but undermined it in the long-term.  
They could improve the despotic power of the state over society, but not the 
embededness of the state within society.  Thus in the short-term, power came 
from CMSPs to the state.  But it did so by taking the place of states institutions.  
In the long-term it undermined the strength of the state. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The effect of CMSPs on the power of the state during the Sierra Leone civil war 
was mixed, they demonstrated some of their strengths and flaws.  Their use has 
been described as a short term success, but a long-term failure as the 
government became dependent on them for security.160  Given the analysis of 
the interaction of CMSPs with the sources of social power, this is an accurate 
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appraisal of their role.  They functioned well in the short-term, but were more 
limited, even counter-productive to the stability of the state in the medium and 
long-term.  However, CMSPs played an important part in the conflict and 
compared to the other actors were among the more beneficial. 
 Given the poor reliability of the SLA, the political elite and general 
population were reliant upon external sources of security.  Britain and the UN 
only intervened effectively after 1998.  Nigerian troops helped to prop up the 
government, and played a major role in the reinstallation of Kabbah, but came 
with their own agenda which alienated the general population.  The strength of 
EO was in providing effective military support for the benefit of the government, 
stabilising the country in the short-term.  Where ‘a rabble of drugged-up 
teenagers with Kalashnikovs were terrorising an entire country.  A relatively 
small force of professional soldiers were able to stop them in a matter of 
months’161  EO and Sandline had important implications for the state in several 
of the key areas.  Militarily they created a situation which allowed negotiation 
with the RUF.  They helped to return control of important natural resources to 
government control.  To both deny the RUF access to important revenue and 
The success of EO showed British forces how the RUF could be countered in 
the field.162  There is a convincing argument that Kabbah "made a fundamental 
mistake" in ceasing to use EO.163  
 The impact of CMSPs on the economic power of the country was 
positive in the short-term.  Before EO was employed the government had lost 
control over most of the country, including the valuable mining areas in the south 
east of the country.  The role of CMSPs is interesting when the potential links 
with extraction companies are made.  These allegations are strongly denied EO 
and Sandline, but they do open up an interesting question.  Why should the 
government of Sierra Leone not have been able to use these resources to 
improve the military power?  Much like the Italian city states, to an extent this 
relationship was sustainable.  The security of the state was improved, outside 
influence removed and access to the mines, which had fallen out of government 
control anyway was restored.  What right do other states have to criticise Sierra 
Leone for finding a way for convert a resource which was not even under their 
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direct control into security?  Spicer denies the links, reasonably arguing that 
cash is far more useful to a CMSP than mining concessions.  However when 
combined with parent companies such as the alleged links with the Branch 
Heritage Group,164 such practice makes sense.  Critics argue that by doing so a 
country s mortgaging out its future.  But in a case such as Sierra Leone when 
outside assistance was not forthcoming and the assistance that was forthcoming 
tended to exploit the mines as well. 
 The weakness if CMSPs was that the long-term solution to the war 
required wider reforms.  Despite the impact of CMSPs in reinforcing the state, 
the task of ending the wider conflict required the long-term support of the 
international community.  The involvement of British troops in the final stages of 
the war was key to restructuring of the country and preservation of peace.  The 
UN was initially weak in this role, but improved over time.  The use of CMSPs 
created a shadow military, which perpetuated the shadow economy. 
 Connaughton describes Sierra Leone as the 'good', compared to the 
'ugly' of Iraq and 'bad' of Croatia.165  This distinction is rather simplistic.  CMSPs 
in Sierra Leone would be more accurately called "the next best option".  They 
were the best option available to Strasser and Kabbah when they were 
employed.  Though behind a functional UN and Britain in winding down the 
conflict.  Although Angola and Sierra Leone are the only examples of companies 
operating at this level.166  These lessons are important as continuing instability, 
UN divisions and the reluctance of states to intervene where their national 
interests are not relevant means that that this type of company could appear 
again, in similar circumstances in the future.  CMSPs had a positive effect on the 
state during the Sierra Leone.  However, this was not without problems.  Over 
time the problems of relying on an outside source of force would have become 
more acute.  They fulfilled a specific role, at a specific time, in a specific set of 
circumstances, but outside of this were not a solution to ending the war. 
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The Invasion and Reconstruction 
of Iraq 






No study of CMSP activity over the last ten years can overlook their use in Iraq 
since 2003.  The U.S led invasion opened a new chapter in the post-Cold War 
use of CMSPs, which rapidly expanded the size and scope of the industry.  
Although, the heavily-equipped combat companies of the 1990s had become 
marginalised,2 CMSPs still undertook a wide range of services, even expanding 
them further.  From logistical support, intelligence and training, to guard and 
close protection work; demand for commercial enterprises to provide military 
services boomed.  CMSPs worked for the coalition forces, multinational 
organisations, multinational corporations and the Iraqi government.3  It has been 
called 'the first contractor's war.'4 The use of the term 'first' is hyperbolic, but 
does reflect the sheer scale of outsourcing which reignited the debate over the 
use of CMSPs.  Particularly in relation to the oversight and accountability of 
forces which were operating outside the traditional military chain of command.  
The question here is what were the implications for the Iraqi state with the 
coalition relying so heavily on CMSPs. 
The invasion of Iraq was highly controversial, and provoked widespread 
opposition.  Many of those who initially supported the decision to overthrow 
Hussein's regime have subsequently changed their minds.  This chapter will not 
retread the general debate over the decision to invade Iraq, but  focus on the 
part played by CMSPs once the invasion began.  In particular how the use of 
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CMSPs contributed, or was detrimental to the reconstruction of the state.  This is 
not to say that the controversy is completely irrelevant.  There were implications 
to the lack of support which affected the reconstruction process. 
The use of CMSPs was necessary, but problematic, even more so than 
in Sierra Leone.  Their role in direct combat was more controversial than that of 
the coalition troops, whose presence was already divisive.  But, CMSPs were an 
important part of the reconstruction effort as in Sierra Leone, CMSPs were more 
reliable than domestic actors.  They provided services to the military, or which 
the US military would otherwise have provided for other actors.  Thereby 
increasing the military power of a number of actors; including, NGOs, the 
coalition forces and the fledgling Iraqi forces.  There was a degree of economic 
trade off in the use of CMSPs.  Money which had been designated for 
reconstruction was leaving the country, and problems with oversight have led to 
several examples of overcharging.  However, this was more of a missed 
opportunity, caused partially by inefficiency and partially by a cost trade-off of 
looking for a more effective source of military power.  The loss of economic 
power was reduced by reconstruction being largely funded by external actors, 
rather than leaching domestic revenue.   
The biggest problems of CMSPs use was again the implications for the 
long-term building of state institutions.  The coalition forces, and then the Iraqi 
state was forced to balance between increasing military power, and building 
political power which worked with the social power, embedding the state in 
society.  The difference between Iraq and Sierra Leone is the attitudes of 
international actors to CMSPS, compared to national level political elites.  The 
US government has been more supportive of the continued use of contractors.  
Whereas, the Iraqi government has preferred to regain control of military actors 
in the country, military power had become devolved across the networks.  This 
can be seen in the changing implications for the impact of CMSPs on the state 
as responsibility passed from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to the 
new Iraqi government.  Despite the poor performance of domestic forces in 
establishing its own credibility and improving the embeddness of state in society.  
These difficulties are important as the long-term goal of coalition forces, who 
employed the CMSPs, was to rebuild the state and withdraw. 
This case study will again be divided into three sections.  The first part of 
the chapter will be a chronology of the war, which is based around the phases of 
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coalition forces activity and divided into four parts.  Beginning with the 
background and initial invasion.  Next, the initial boom in the use of the 
contractors, which includes four major incidents that have punctuated the use of 
CMSPs.  Third, the surge in US troop numbers which coincided with a 
consolidation of military companies.  Finally, the drawdown of coalition forces as 
the burden of political and security responsibilities fell onto the Iraqi government.  
This will show how CMSPs interacted with the main phases of the coalition effort 
at rebuilding the state, as one regime was destroyed, another created and then 
power passed on. 
The second section will look at how CMSPs interacted with other actors 
across the networks at local, national, trans-national, international, and global 
levels.  And the sources of social power within them.  Followed by the sources of 
social power and how they crystallised.  It will be shown that CMSPs were 
imperfect, but necessary.  None of the military actors were without fault, CMSPs 
were militarily more effective than the newly trained Iraqi security forces, 
supporting the military power of the coalition forces in rebuilding the state.  But, 
this was detrimental to fostering a closer relationship between the state and 
society.  In Iraq CMSPs were not used to influence the fundamental distribution 
of military power between actors.  Coalition forces were more effective by being 
able to exert concentrated offensive military power.  Although they were the 
weakest military actor, only the increased use of Iraqi forces could contribute to 
the long-term power of the state by strengthening the.  It will be shown how the 
use of CMSPs, although with some detrimental side effects, was of a short-term 
military benefit to stability in Iraq, but they were mixed when it came to 
transferring power over to Iraqi forces.  CMSPs numerous role did not end the 
war, the prospects the state faced without outsourcing some military functions 
would have been far bleaker. 
 Finally the third section of the chapter will consider the impact on the 
state as per the definition in chapter two.  It will be argued that CMSPs 
contributed to the short-term strengthening of the state after the state institutions 
of the Ba'ath Party had been dissolved.  But, this did not improve the long-term 
stability of the state.  There has been increasing resistance from the new Iraqi 
government to the use of CMSPs.  The long-term stability of the state lies in 
developing more reliable state institutions, which increase the power of the state 
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The chronology of this chapter is based around the main phases of the invasion 
and reconstruction of Iraq.  First, a brief history of Iraq, focusing on factors which 
are relevant to the difficulties experienced during reconstruction.  Up to the end 
of the 2003 invasion by coalition forces, taking the capture of Baghdad as the 
point at which invasion shifted towards reconstruction.  CMSPs also took a role 
during this period, by supporting the 2003 invasion.  Some of the reasons for the 
escalation of violence which broke out following the invasion can be traced back 
to this period. 
 Part two will address the phase of reconstruction between 2003 and 
2007.  From the capture of Baghdad up to the peak of the civil war.  Once the 
invasion had been completed a civilian chain of command was established, with 
the CPA taking over the administration of Iraq until a new government was 
established.  The CPA rapidly outsourced many elements of the reconstruction 
to commercial companies, including military services, which resulted in a boom 
for CMSPs.  During this period the majority of major incidents involving CMSPs 
occurred, of these four will be covered by this chapter in more detail.  The 
scandal at Abu Ghraib implicated contractors in the mistreatment of prisoners.  
The killing of Blackwater employees, which contributed to an assault on Fallujah 
by coalition forces.  The role of contractors during the assault on Najef.  Finally, 
the shooting of civilians in Nisur square by Blackwater employees.  These were 
not the only incidents, but they are worthy of more detailed consideration.  
During this period the Iraqi government was created, but competition for political 
power led to a civil war between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, and violence 
escalated. 
 Part three will address the US response to the escalation of violence.  
The 'Surge' not only increased troop numbers, but led to a change in tactics.  US 
soldiers moved into the major urban centres and remained there.  This was 
combined with a concerted effort to build-up and incorporate Iraqi forces into 
operations.  CMSPs continued to be used, but the market underwent several 
changes as the Iraqi government became more vocal in its opposition to their 
use.  Some of the smaller companies disappeared, merged, or were bought up 
by larger companies.  Blackwater became a high profile casualty from the fallout 
of the earlier incidents.  The company underwent two name changes to try and 
throw off the reputation it had gained. 
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 Finally, the fourth part will look at the reduction in troop numbers as 
coalition forces sought withdrew from Iraq.  Britain lessened its commitment and 
withdrew earlier in the conflict.  The US was then caught between trying to 
reduce its role, and leaving Iraq in a state from which some form of success 
could be declared.  Security responsibilities were passed on to the Iraqi 
government.  However from this, arose the question of the role CMSPs would 
play.  This section will bring the security situation in Iraq up to date, as violence 
has started to increase again. 
6.2.1 Background and invasion 
Iraq is located at the top of the Persian Gulf.  Surrounded by Iran to the east, 
Turkey to the north, Syria and Jordan to the West, Saudi Arabia to the South 
West and Kuwait to the South.  A small area of coast between Kuwait and Iran 
provides access to the Persian Gulf.  Much of the country is desert, with urban 
centres focused around two major rivers; the Tigris and Euphrates.  Iraq was the 
creation of the British and French when they divided up the region.  As a result 
the ethnic makeup of the country is mixed.  The three main groups are the Sunni 
and Shi'a Muslims, with Kurds in the North.  Sunni Muslims make up 20% of the 
population, Shi'a 60% and Kurds 20%.6  Conflict between these three 
populations is a source of instability within the country.  They are not necessarily 
homogenous groups; the Shi'a population has been divided between pursuing 
an Iraqi national identity, or wider Arab nationalism.7  Tripp argues that the 
history of Iraq is one of political domination.   
 Iraqi was an Ottoman province whose mandate was given to Britain after 
WWI.  Independence was granted in 1932.  After independence the country was 
run by a monarchy from 1932 to 1941 and 1941 to 1958.  The Ba'ath Party took 
over the country in 1968.  They took control of the army by separating it from 
politics and shaping it as a tool of the party.8  Tried to build up the national 
identity of the country.  Used a system of patrimony to foster loyalty to the 
regime, which was helped by the nationalisation of the oil industry in 1972.9  
Antagonistic relationship with neighbours, particularly Iran led to the Iran-Iraq 
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war.  At this point the US saw Iraq as an ally during the Cold War, and lent 
support. 
 Iraq under Hussein had an acrimonious relationship with Iran.  The two 
were at war between 1980 to 1991.  Iraqi forces enjoyed early success, but the 
conflict soon ground down and forced Iraqi forces onto the defensive.10  During 
the Iran-Iraq War the regime pacified the Kurdish population using chemical 
weapons.  In 1990 Iraq took centre stage when Hussein took the decision to 
invade Kuwait.  Seizing control of important oil fields.  The international 
community responded with a coalition which expelled Iraqi forces.  Bombing of 
Iraqi military installations and infrastructure.  The success of the coalition forces 
was taken as a positive indication of the superiority of western forces over the 
Republican guard when the 2003 invasion was being planned.  Though in 1991 
the core of the Republican Guard was withdrawn to protect Baghdad, leaving 
western forces to fight the remaining, poorly trained units.11  Some attempts 
were made to incite groups in Iraq to overthrow Hussein.  However this was not 
adequately supported and the decision was taken to stop with the liberation of 
Iraq, rather than follow up and attack Baghdad.   
 Following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre, US foreign policy 
under the Bush administration became more aggressive.  After the invasion of 
Afghanistan attention shifted to Iraq, Iran and North Korea.  Several claims were 
made about the threat posed by Hussein's regime; of Iraq possessing weapons 
of mass destruction, harbouring terrorists including Al Qaeda.  Although these 
have since been debunked, the case was made for invasion.  Some close allies 
of the US lent their support, primarily Britain, though the wider international 
community ranged from scepticism to hostility.  After a rapid build up and a 
nominal effort to get Hussein to cooperate with weapons inspectors,  
 The invasion began on 20th March 2003.  Coalition forces rushed to 
Baghdad.  In order to justify the invasion there was a preoccupation with finding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).  There was a fear these would be 
evacuated out of the country.  The speed meant that a more significant threat 
was overlooked.  Stockpiles of conventional weapons were left unsecured in the 
rush.  These were raided and helped to feed the subsequent insurgency and 
                                                          
10
 Ibid, p.62. 
11
 Ibid, p.64. 
 150 
 
civil war.12  CMSPs supported the invasion.  Camp Doha in Kuwait was operated 
and guarded by contractors.13  CMSPs rearmed weapons platforms, including 
the F-17, Apaches, F-15 and U-2.14  Even operated UAVs.15 
 The end to conventional phase of the invasion occurred after three 
weeks, on 10th April,  with the toppling of Saddam's statue in Baghdad.  Bush 
declared that the invasion a success with his mission over speech on May 1 
2003.  Although US troops had displaced the Republican Guard and Hussein 
was captured soon after this was only the beginning.  The task now faced the 
US and her allies of trying to rebuild the country. 
6.2.2 Reconstruction 
The invasion was followed by an occupation and reconstruction which shifted 
control over to civilian commanders.  The chain of command was divided 
between military and civilian command with the establishment of the Green 
Zone in Baghdad.  Ambassador Paul Bremer took command of the CPA in April 
2003, which was established to run the country.16  A process of de-
Ba'athification was undertaken in which members of the Ba'ath Party were 
removed from their political and military posts and refused further employment.17  
The CPA seized Iraqi government assets and took control of the administration 
of the country.  The privileging of US business interests in rebuilding led to the 
feeling among Iraqis that the US was taking control for its own economic 
purposes.18 
 The decision was taken to disband existing state security structures 
which had been run by the ruling Ba'ath Party.  This led to the sacking of 7 
million Sunnis who formed a disproportional portion of the political elite.19.  
Resistance by the Republican guard and an influx of foreign fighters.  
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Widespread looting.  On 13th December 2003 another symbolic point was 
reached with the capture of Saddam Hussein south of Tikrit. 
 Part of the coalition strategy was to restore an infrastructure which in 
places was still damaged from the Iran-Iraq War, the US bombing in 1991 and a 
decade of economic sanctions.20  The re-establishment of oil extraction was of 
particular interest, as it was key to providing the new regime with an income.  
However, this infrastructure was vulnerable to attacks, particularly pipelines.  
Despite the initial pledge, work progressed slowly, which stirred up resentment. 
 The task of reconstruction increased the reliance of the coalition upon 
CMSPs.21  Isenberg contractors used for the security of civilian personnel, and 
the security of non-military sites and convoys.22  While CMSPs were employed 
to train the new Iraqi forces.  Vinnell Corporation had one such contract.23  One 
contract to guard the excavation of a mass grave, $2 million of the $9 million 
budgeted was spent on security.24 
 Over the summer of 2003 to 2004 there was an upsurge in violence.  
The result of which was CMSPs delaying, suspending or ending the contracts 
they had undertaken.25  The US had failed to foresee that an insurgency would 
occur on such a scale, thus foreign actors became increasingly reliant upon 
CMSPs for security, expanding the roles which were undertaken.26  The number 
of contractors expanded until they formed the second largest contingent, behind 
the US.27  There were two stages to this initial employment of CMSPs.  During 
the first stage established companies, including Blackwater and Triple Canopy, 
took advantage of the requirement for extra capacity by the coalition.  However, 
the short-term contracts they signed meant that a second wave of companies 
appeared.  These companies tried to undercut those more established, by 
dramatically underbidding them.  The focus was on the profit they could make, 
rather than whether the services could actually be delivered.28  Interestingly one 
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of these, Blackwater, which Venter refers to as responsible was to crop up in 
several of the major controversial incidents which were to occur. 
 Insurgents began to equate contractors with the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), and used this to motivate attacks against them.29  The most well 
known role of CMSPs was in providing close protection work, running VIPs from 
Baghdad airport to the Green Zone along 'Route Irish', which was to become the 
most dangerous stretch of road on the planet.30  Contractors operating on this 
route were told to "Drive it like you stole it".31  Bounties were placed on the head 
of contractors.  When Blackwater was protecting Paul Bremer this was said to 
be $30,000.32 
 Initial concern over the use of contractors led the CPA to set guidelines 
for minimum standards.33  A Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction 
(SIGIR) was established in 2004 to improve the oversight of the reconstruction 
effort, including running audits and inspections, with the power to begin criminal 
investigations into the conduct of contractors.34 The US also responded by 
setting up a body to co-ordinate the activities of CMSPs with the coalition 
military forces.  Controversially, not only was this role outsourced to a CMSP but 
the tender was won by Aegis, a new established company which involved Tim 
Spicer, which raised even more questions.35  The industry itself responded with 
the foundation of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) which 
acts to promote the interests of CMSPs.  The IPOA expresses a desire to 
promote high standards of conduct and ethics.36 
 The US and UK pursued differing strategies.  The latter were more likely 
to pursue a 'hearts and minds' approach.  The low level of violence which 
occurred in British areas gave more freedom to pursue these avenues.  
However, there was difficulty as the general population was unreceptive to the 
approach just following the invasion.37 
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The Iraqi interim Government led by Allawi, took over from the CPA in 
June 2004,  which was recognised by the UN.  Elections were held in 2005.   In 
2006 Hussein was tried for crimes committed by his regime and sentenced to 
death; executed by hanging.  Following the formation of first government in 
2006, Nouri al-Maliki was voted in as President.  In July the same year 
Muthanna is the first province which is passed over to the new government. 
6.2.2.1 Major Incidents 
The four major incidents which occurred during this period will now be covered 
in more detail.  The first was the scandal at Abu Ghriab, from April 2004, which 
implicated contractors in the mistreatment of prisoners.  Followed by the assault 
on Fallujah, again in 2004, which was in part the result of the death of 
Blackwater employees, and the increase in tensions following Abu Ghraib.  
Next, a more positive role, with the effectiveness of contractors in the assault on 
Najef.  Finally, the shooting of civilians in Nisur square by Blackwater 
employees.  As stated above, these were not the only incidents, but they are 
worthy of more detailed consideration and contribute towards the interaction of 
the sources of social power. 
6.2.2.2 Abu Ghraib 
There have been several highly publicised incidents of the abuse of Iraqis taken 
prisoner following the invasion, including torture and murder.  The biggest 
scandal, and one which had ramifications for the security situation in Iraq, was 
that of Abu Ghraib.  Abu Ghraib was a correctional facility near to Baghdad, 
which had been built in the 1960s and was being used by the US to house 
prisoners.  There had been concerns from the Red Cross that prisoners were 
disappearing for extended periods of time.38  However in April 2004, CBS 
brought worldwide attention to the conditions in Abu Ghraib when it broadcast 
photos which showed evidence of the ill treatment of prisoners.39 
 There were two issues of concern for the use of CMSPs.  The first was 
that of the proven acts of abuse, one third had been committed by contractors 
working under contract with the Department of the Interior.  Because they were 
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working for the Department of the Interior, rather than the Department of 
Defence (DoD) their legal accountability was questionable.  The CPA had 
secured coalition troops and contractors immunity from prosecution under Iraqi 
law.  Because the contractors  were working for the Department of the Interior 
neither were they accountable under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
(MEJA).  This meant that as of 2012, no contractors involved had been charged 
unlike members of US forces which had been involved.40 
 The outcome of events was to exacerbate tensions between coalition 
forces and Iraqis, making soldiers and contractors the targets for revenge 
attacks.41  This led to pressure and the amendment of the MEJA to include all 
contractors.42 
7.2.2.2 Fallujah 
The next major incident occurred soon after the invasion.  Four employees from 
Blackwater were attacked and killed in Fallujah in March 2004.  Coverage of the 
attack was widespread in the media.  While the incident in itself was a tragedy, 
the ramifications of the incident were far worse.  US forces were prompted to 
respond by attacking Fallujah in force, which led to the death of a number of 
civilians. 
 The attacks were preceded by a number of events.43  Fallujah lay in the 
'Sunni Triangle', and was the stronghold of the Ba'ath Party.  The Imams were 
happy that Hussein had been overthrown. but not with the destruction of the 
Ba'ath Party, or the nature of the military defeat inflicted by US forces.44  The 
local population had fled, but the presence of US forces attracted foreign fighters 
from neighbouring states.45  An incident on 28th April 2004, led to the shooting 
of Iraqi civilians by US troops.  US forces retreated from the city to a camp just 
outside, and insurgent forces responded by attacking and killing local security 
forces for working with US forces.46  There was a change over to marines who 
tried to adopt a softer approach to working with the population, but the damage 
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had been done by the army.  Around this time the Abu Ghraib scandal also 
came to light, which exacerbated tensions with the local population.47 
 On the 31 March 2004 what occurred next was to be the tipping point, 
one which drew attention to the place of CMSPs and their implications of their 
use.48  Four contractors travelling in two vehicles on Highway 10 in Fallujah.  
They were overexposed by travelling in such small numbers.  They were killed, 
and the bodies of two contractors were burnt and strung up from a bridge.  The 
resulting pictures were broadcast around the world, again drawing attention to 
the presence of contractors in Iraq.  The US reaction to the attack was to have 
greater implication for the reconstruction process. 
 The response of the American military was to capture those responsible 
for the attack by an offensive on Fallujah.  This included Iraqi troops.  This was 
not the only city in which major fighting occurred at the time,  but it was the most 
prominent.  The offensive did much to damage the relationship between the US 
and the middle classes they hoped to court in order to install democracy.49  
There was a shared interest in driving US troops from Fallujah, even among 
groups the US thought to be friendly.50  There was a pause in fighting, though 
insurgents continued to attack US troops.  There were attempts to use Iraqi 
troops in order to run patrols, but they were afraid of being too closely 
associated with the US.51  Then in November 2004 there was a second 
offensive involving the marines and army, which effectively had to start the 
offensive again. 
 The operation resulted in the deaths of 2,300 Iraqis, along with 85 US 
and 11 Iraqi soldiers.  CMSPs cannot be held responsible for the scale of the 
military reaction, especially as Fallujah was already increasingly hostile to 
coalition forces.  However, CMSPs did play a role in the lead up to the 
operation, showing how they can shape the direction of the conflict. 
7.2.2.3 Battle of Najaf 
Not all of the incidents involving CMSPs were negative.  They have also been 
able to display their military effectiveness.  In 2004 Blackwater employees 
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played a prominent role in protecting US forces during an attack in Najaf, a town 
located to the south of Baghdad which has a Si'ite majority.52  During the 
engagement 8 Blackwater contractors, a US marine and four policemen 
protected a CPA Headquarters.  They fought off an attack by hundreds of 
fighters which lasted three and a half hours, and came under fire from a sniper.  
During the attack a Blackwater helicopter helped to resupply the position and 
evacuate the wounded troops.53  Relief by US forces only came after the attack 
had ended.  It was remarked after the battle that the Blackwater employees, 
who had inflicted a large number of casualties on their attackers, had conducted 
themselves confidently.54 
7.2.2.4 Nisur Square 
There was a pattern of aggressive behaviour towards Iraqi civilians while 
contractors carried out close protection work.  There are several high profile 
examples of contractors opening fire on Iraqi civilians.  Footage has been 
posted online showing contractors working for Aegis in such circumstances.55  
There is also evidence of incidents when CMSPs fired upon coalition troops.  It 
is difficult to take individual incidents out of context given the nature of the 
security situation.  CMSPs are not alone in their conduct being questioned.  
Coalition troops have also been accused, and found guilty of, aggressive 
conduct towards civilians, which led to deaths.  The problems come because of 
the accountability of those involved.  One incident in particular has attracted 
widespread condemnation and tested some of the legal mechanisms which had 
begun to be instituted - Nisur Square.  
 The shooting involved Blackwater.  By this time the Iraqi government 
already had a problem with the company as a result of other incidents,  including 
the shooting of civilians in 2006 and hostile confrontations with Iraq security 
forces.56  In this case Blackwater employees claim to have come under fire.  The 
result of their reaction was the death of fourteen civilians and the wounding of 
twenty more, all of which were unarmed.  The Iraqi government responded by 
revoking Blackwater's license and banning it from the country.57  There were two 
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problems with doing this: there was no license as these did not exist; and the 
U.S had become so reliant upon Blackwater, that without it security was 
compromised.58 
 The initial prosecution began in 2008 and 2009, the FBI launched an 
investigation into the incident.  But there were some problems in holding those 
involved to account through the MEJA, which resulted in the charges against 
those involved being dropped.59  Although as of 2013 there was possibility of 
new charges being made against the Blackwater employees involved.60 
 The incident at Nisur Square is an extreme example of a problem of the 
aggression towards other parties by CMSPs undertaking close protection work.  
When their priority lay in completing their current contract, rather than the overall 
mission of rebuilding and reconstruction.  It also shows the difficulty of having 
competing institutions and authority in the state, none of which actually had 
effective control.  
7.2.3 The 'Surge' 
In order to address the worsening security situation, the US military undertook a 
concerted effort to quell the violence that has taken hold of the country.  The 
surge began in Al Anbar in 2006 and spread to Baghdad.  The process involved 
the steady increase in the number of troops in the country throughout 2007, 
peaking in June.61  Along with the increase in troops the US undertook a change 
in tactics.  US troops moved out of their bases into the city, taking a much higher 
profile and focusing on the areas of biggest problem.  Around this time there 
occurred the tribal awakening, when it is argued that the US moved from being a 
'despised occupier' to being seen as an 'impartial party'.62 
 By 2008 the ratio of contractors to military personnel was 1:1.  According 
to the DoD there were 148,050 contractors in Iraq.63  However, in 2007 there 
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had occurred a change in the accountability of CMSPs, when the Iraqi 
government ended the immunity of contractors from prosecution.  Immunity 
continued for coalition troops.64  Around this period the market for military 
services began to dry up as the boom came to an end as  the money which had 
funded this boom began to dry up.  The security situation deteriorated, during 
this time, as sectarian violence plunged the country into civil war.65 
 Following the boom there was a consolidation in the market.  There was 
still a large market for military services, in 2009 it was estimated the were 
100,000 contractors in the country, with about 10% of these providing frontline 
security services.66  Much like other industries, companies began to fold into 
each other.  Some closed, and others were purchased.  Blackwater changed its 
owner and its name - first to Academi, then Xe.  Halliburton remained strong, but 
KBR became independent again.  The largest security company G4S emerged 
from the consolidation of several companies, including Armor Group.67 
 The military began to question the degree to which CMSPs should be 
involved in operations.  Particularly if the actions of firms outside the chain of 
command were undermining efforts at mobilising popular support.68  In 2007 the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was changed to incorporate CMSPs 
into the chain of command.69  By 2008, 50 cases featuring contractors were 
ongoing.70 
7.2.4 After withdrawal 
The growing domestic pressure in the US and UK eroded support for an already 
unpopular war.  The focus shifted to finding a way to draw an end to western 
involvement, by handing over responsibility for security to the Iraqi police and 
army.  The Bush presidency came to an end in 2008, and the election victory of 
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Barak Obama changed control of the US presidency to the Democratic Party.  
Attention also began to shift back to Afghanistan. 
 Some of the coalition had already left, notably Spain which had 
withdrawn support in 2004.  But, it was the handover of security responsibility in 
its areas by Britain in April 2009 that marked the beginning of a new phase.  The 
US ended combat missions in 2010, although there were still large numbers of 
troops in the country.  The breakdown of talks over extending the immunity of 
US troops from prosecution led to the October 2011 announcement that US 
troops would cease their involvement.  The withdrawal of US forces marked a 
new phase in the reconstruction of Iraq.  This did not mean the end of the US 
presence.  There occurred the continued use of contractors to cover the 
defensive roles of exiting troops.71  However, the Iraqi government remains 
hostile to the use of contractors.72 
The deterioration of the security situation since 2012 is a  concern for 
the long-term stability of the Iraqi state.  Violence has increased, reaching its 
highest levels since 2008, with 7,000 deaths in the year up to October 2013. The 
escalation in violence has been blamed on a combination of the civil war in Syria 
spilling over into Iraq, and the weakness of Iraqi security forces.  Al-Maliki has 
requested Drones and F-16 planes from the US, though it has been argued that 
this will only solve part of the problem.73  Given the deteriorating security 
situation the future of Iraq remains uncertain. 
7.3 Sources of Social Power across the Networks 
At the heart of the insecurity in Iraq sits the exposure of the social divisions 
within the country.  The coalition invasion destroyed a brutal, but effective set of 
political and military institutions which had repressed the country since the late 
1960s.  The objective of the coalition was to build a state which used institutions 
based on a western understanding of the liberal democratic state.  The CPA 
formed part of an initial attempt to do this, power was subsequently transferred 
over time on to the Iraqi government.  The problem was that the state was weak, 
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and a power struggle developed.  Initial gratitude for the removal of Hussein and 
Baath Party was replaced by resentment at the presence of foreign troops and 
security decreased.  Other actors came into Iraq and CMSPs formed part of the 
short-term search for improved security, compensating for the limited resources 
of the coalition forces.  However, they complicated the institutional control over 
the use of force and had a mixed impact on the long-term pursuit for stability. 
7.3.1 Sub-National 
As with many ex-colonial states Iraq consisted of a number of groups which 
were held together during Saddam Hussein's time in power.  His removal and 
the dissolution of the Ba'ath Party resulted in a political-military-economic 
squabble for control of the country.  Iraq threatened to break down along 
sectional lines, with groups fighting for power as the old security apparatus 
broke down and democratic institutions were created.  At a sub-national level 
there were a number of groups which emerged during the civil war.  As the 
country fragmented security became diffuse and community based groups 
began to provide security.  Militias emerged which were affiliated with the main 
ethnic groups within the country.74 
 The former members of the Ba'ath Party formed one part of the 
insurgency which developed.75  Home grown insurgents also formed in response 
to the presence of the U.S and the weakness of the Iraqi government.76  The 
sectarian groups within Iraq formed militias, which fought against each other and 
coalition forces.77  Hussein had created a show state within the country.  After 
his arrest this lost its association with the Ba'ath Party and facilitated the Islamic 
and nationalist insurgency which resulted.78 
7.3.2 National 
At a national level the government was disbanded, dispersing ex-members of 
the Ba'ath party into the population.  The destruction of the existing state 
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structures in Iraq weakened the military political power of the fledgling state.79  
The CPA was initially established to run the country, then power passed over to 
the new Iraqi government.  However, this was a protracted process, with the 
new government competing for sovereignty with sub-national groups, 
transnational and international actors.  Early on in the occupation organised 
crime became a problem and was responsible for much of the early violence 
within the county.80  One of the main tasks has been to develop an effective set 
of security forces, but this has proved difficult.81 
7.3.3 Transnational 
Complicating the contest for political, economic and military power within Iraq is 
the fact that the three main groups involved are effectively transnational, rather 
than sub-national.  The Kurds which occupied the north of the country spread 
across neighbouring states including Iran, Turkey and Syria.  They had been 
fighting for independence for years and had been persecuted by Hussein's 
regime.  Sunni and Shi'ia Muslims which make up the majority of the rest of the 
population are groups which are spread across the region.  The Sunni minority 
which had benefitted from the previous regime were most threatened by the 
change in government, losing the domination they had over political, economic 
and military power.82 
 The unpopularity of the invasion attracted transnational actors who 
sought to oppose the US.  The US presence in Fallujah attracted fighters from 
neighbouring states, but also as far away as Chechnya.83 The presence of Al 
Qaeda in Iraq, which had been used as one of the possible justifications for the 
war, was unlikely.  However, the weakness of the state and the attraction of war 
against US forces resulted in the formation of Al Qaeda in Iraq, which recruited 
locally.84 
7.3.4 International 
The main international states involved were those of the initial coalition.  The 
coalition forces destabilised the country, then placed themselves at the centre of 
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rebuilding the state with liberal democratic principles.  Spain left in 2004, Britain 
reduced its commitments in 2009 and the US officially withdrew in 2011, though 
it continues to be involved.  The political influence of the US has subsequently 
waned as al-Maliki has strengthened the relationship between Iran and Iraq.85 
7.3.5 Global 
Iraq was rather isolated at a global level prior to and following 2003.  Iraq's main 
involvement with the UN in the decade prior to the 2003 invasion was to be the 
subject of security council resolutions, weapons inspections and an embargo.  
The lack of support from the wider international community in the 2003 invasion 
marginalised the role of the UN.  The US was also reluctant to relinquish power 
to actors at this level.86  The UN did have some presence in Iraq following the 
initial invasion.  However, after the bombing of the Canal Hotel and the death of 
Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN's senior official, the UN withdrew to Jordan.  This 
again demonstrates the weakness of the UN in situations of great military 
instability.87  This was part of a concerted plan by insurgent forces to isolate Iraq 
from the international community.88  As the US withdrew the UN has become 
more involved in the country. 
7.4 Crystallisation 
The war was a military-political struggle to remove the existing regime, institute 
a new government that would operate more 'responsibly' along the lines of 
political and social ideas of the international community.  In order to do so the 
infrastructure of the country was effectively destroyed, then rebuilt.  The 
challenge was in establishing political and military institutions that were socially 
embedded. 
 The first priority was the security of the country.  CMSPs made a 
significant contribution to the military capabilities of the coalition forces.  The 
Bush administration's approach to the invasion was short sighted.  They have 
been criticised for neglecting to plan for the reconstruction.  The administration 
was reluctant to commit further troops following the invasion due to 
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commitments in Afghanistan and fears of the political implications for the 2004 
election.89  The controversial nature of the invasion meant that the UN and 
NATO were not options.90  A coalition of more than forty countries lent their 
support to the invasion.  However, only 20,000 of the 300,000 troops mobilised 
came from states other than the US or UK.91  Some use was made of local 
militias by the CPA, but this was inconsistent and stirred up resentment.92 
There was no grand plan to use commercial firms, instead the expansion 
of services crept over time.93  There are difficulties in establishing the number of 
contractors involved. Some counts excluded those providing support services.94  
Estimates place contractors in 2006-8 as being over 100% of the coalition force 
numbers.  The size of this contribution led to the coining of the phrase "coalition 
of the billing" by Singer.95  Contractors came from over 30 countries.96  The 
outsourcing of functions was uneven across the members of the coalition.  The 
US embracing it the most, followed by the UK, whereas German forces were 
more reluctant to use commercial firms to support their forces.97  CMSPs 
reduced the political cost for the US.98 
The US had tended to view the main problems with CMSPs as 
administrative, particularly how to ensure coordination and common standards.99  
The military effectiveness of CMSPs, however, has been questioned.  There 
were difficulties with military coordination.100  Working for commercial firms led to 
better pay and more relaxed working conditions.  The outcome of which was 
some animosity between contractors and coalition troops.101  Relying on CMSPs 
for security could also be problematic given the absence of long-term 
responsibility to the task of reconstruction.  For example, following the deaths 
and hostage taking of contractors in 2003-4, contracts were suspended, delayed 
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or cancelled.102  Moreover, there was a lack of oversight as to the qualifications 
and training of contractors, particularly early on.  Those accused over Abu 
Ghraib lacked formal training, for example.103  CMSPs were keen to assure of 
their own self policing, in which contractors would be sent home and could face 
a civil law suit.104  However, this also proved to be insufficient.  Ineffective 
regulation has contributed to the failure to institutionalise CMSPs in the 
rebuilding of the political, economic and social structures of the country. 
Given the capability of the coalition forces CMSPs were necessary.  
Control of the borders had been lost for nine months following the destruction of 
the Ba'ath Party, which allowed foreign fighters into Iraq.105  Although Hussein 
distributed arms around the country, the decision to leave arms depots 
unprotected was a mistake.106  There was a balance between the coalition losing 
troops to CMSPs, and their expertise being retained when they would otherwise 
have retired.  Though there is a danger in the former creating a self-sustaining 
cycle.107  Difference between "professional" companies and "cowboy" firms.  
Avant argued that the US tended favour "cowboy" firms such as Aegis Defence 
Services, in part because of their reputation.108  The author refers to Aegis as a 
"cowboy" firm because its owner is Tim Spicer, citing the role of Sandline in 
Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone.  It is difficult to make a clear distinction 
between these categories. 
Training of Iraqi forces by CMSPs is an area where they could have 
made a more substantial contribution to long-term military power.  Contractors 
undertook training of the military and police.109  But, this was cut short when in 
2004 the US took control of training, following the poor performance of the 
contractor trained troops.110  There had also been drawbacks to this approach 
as the outsourcing of training of Iraqi forces meant that they lacked a rapport 
with coalition forces when they started to work alongside them post 2004.111 
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Coalition forces were not without fault, they were also responsible for 
acts which alienated the population. Concerted efforts in addressing the security 
situation came from the proactive use of coalition forces.  The degree to which 
the surge was actually responsible for the decrease in violence has been 
debated, however, at this time there occurred a definite drop in violence down to 
nearer the 2004 levels.112 
 Funding for the war came from the governments of the coalition forces.  
A significant amount of money was put aside for the invasion and rebuilding of 
Iraq.  Using companies from the coalition countries so that the money was 
directed straight back out of the country, rather than into Iraq was criticised.  And 
there was further criticism for the amount of money spent on security.  $2 billion 
was initially earmarked, but this was quickly expanded.  Contracts with CMSPs 
totalled $151 billion in 2006.113  The damaging costs of expenditure was 
compounded by corruption. Singer argues that it is not just lost money, but 
money that was redirected from reconstruction.114  A lack of oversight had 
contributed to this corruption. While the number of contractors was increasing, 
the number of those overseeing it had shrunk.115  Despite the establishment of 
the SIGIR the lack of personnel meant that oversight remained problematic.116  
There was a danger of bad money being spent by utilising contractors who were 
aggressively undercutting the more established firms.117  It was better to spend 
more money and actually have the services delivered effectively. 
 Political and military power came into conflict from the beginning of 
reconstruction.  Difficulties arose from the multiple chains of command which 
were established, particularly the separation of military and civilian operations in 
the country. This occurred following the appointment of Bremer.118  Iraqis were 
keen to become involved in the building of the state.  However, it was difficult to 
govern the plurality of ideas which emerged following the removal of the Ba'ath 
Party.119 Social differences were exposed, making it difficult to reach a trusted 
political consensus.  Sunni and Shia Muslims struggled with each other for 
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control of the government.  This was again undermined by the failure of the 
government to provide security.  The lack of overall coherency to the insurgency 
emphasised the importance of a political solution involving Sunni and Shia 
Muslims.120  However, security encouraged political cooperation. Petraeus 
credits the Surge with allowing major political breakthroughs in the formation of 
the state.121 
 The CPA and new Iraqi government also faced social challenges in 
building the state, particularly in relation to developing the relationships between 
political and social sources of power.  The secularisation of the country under 
Hussein retreated.  Iraqis began to identify with their religion over the tribal and 
ethnic affiliations.122  The conduct of the military was detrimental to the longer-
term stability of the state.  The failure to provide adequate security in the first 
few weeks after the invasion eroded the confidence of the population.123  
Conduct by coalition troops, particularly raids on homes, provoked hostility.  
Even those within the coalition recognised that they were alienating the civilian 
population.124   
7.4 Impact of CMSPs activity on the state 
The theoretical implications for the use of CMSPs on the state are interesting.  
This is a result of the interaction of the coalition forces, CPA and new Iraqi 
government.  As a set of differentiated institutions the Iraqi state was destroyed, 
rebuilt and then power transferred back.  The coalition, supported by CMSPs 
initially served to destroy the Iraq state as it existed in 2003.  There is a strong 
argument that without the support of CMSPs the invasion could not have gone 
ahead.125  CMSPs therefore played a key role in weakening the state.  The CPA 
was subsequently created as a custodian for the state while new institutions 
were established.  During this period power rested with the CPA.  The purpose 
of CMSPs was to increase the power of the state, by providing military power 
and facilitating the construction of economic infrastructure.  CMSPs contributed 
to the execution of organised political force by the CPA.  But at this point 
oversight and regulation of the companies was at its weakest. 
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The establishment of the Iraqi government and the transfer of power 
complicated the relationship between CMSPs and the state.  In theory the CPA 
improved the control of CMSPs, though in practice this was less effective.  
CMSPs continued to supplement the physical protection of state institutions 
against sub-national, and transnational threats to security.  However, CMSPs 
were not institutionalised within the new state.  They became a source of force 
which operated outside of the control of the new Iraqi institutions.  In doing so 
they weakened the Iraqi control of organised military force.  This was also 
challenged by the presence of regular coalition forces.  The longer the coalition 
forces remained in the country, the more resentment built against their 
presence, CMSPs were part of this presence, undermining the social power of 
both the CPA and Iraqi government and embeddness of the state in society.  
This resentment stimulated the military threat that military forces were trying to 
suppress. 
This situation again changed as the Iraqi government took on more 
responsibility for security.  The most important point being when contractors lost 
immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law.  Although CMSPs were unpopular 
with the government they became more accountable than coalition troops which 
still had immunity from prosecution.  The Iraqi state has repeatedly threatened to 
end the presence of contractors.  Though contractors have remained, the Iraqi 
government did have enough leverage for Blackwater to cease operating in Iraq.  
The withdrawal of the coalition forces from Iraq, and the passing of responsibility 
for security to the Iraq government, has placed more emphasis on the role of 
CMSPs in protecting US interests.  A more positive role for CMSPs could have 
resulted from the contribution made by training Iraqi forces, so indirectly 
contributing to the capacity of the state to control of the execution of political 
violence. But this was cut short by the US taking control of training following the 
poor performance of the troops they trained.126 
7.5 Conclusion 
The invasion and rebuilding of Iraq was fraught with problems.  The rushed 
approach to the war and inadequate access to military resources with troops 
also tied up in Afghanistan made the use of CMSPs appealing.  These problems 
were compounded by the destruction of existing state structures.  By eliminating 
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the Ba'ath Party the coalition quickly lost military-political control at a time they 
had aggravated social-political relations.  This could have occurred over time, 
rather than being a rushed process.  There would still have likely been 
problems, but continuity could have reduced the scale of the chaos which 
occurred after the initial invasion. 
The companies in the short-term had some positive influence.  By 
providing military support they helped to bring some security and allow the initial 
rebuilding effort.  However, the companies also caused some aggravation when 
given roles which involved direct.  They complicated the battle space and 
became involved in a number of incidents which damaged the relationship with 
Iraqi civilians.  Accountability and control proved to be a problem with so many 
different bodies claiming authority, and working with different sets of rules.  The 
power of the Iraqi state was weakened by the transfer of power away from the 
Iraqi state to the CPA.  Especially as the CPA proved to be ineffective in 
pursuing the effective oversight of the use of contractors.  Given this, and the 
number of other bodies using military force in the country it is unsurprising that 
the Iraqi government has been keen to bring CMSPs under tight control.  
Particularly by ending contractor immunity. 
CMSPs contributed to the undermining of interaction with social power at 
a domestic level by aggravating relations with the Iraqi population.  This was 
initially most problematic for the CPA, but became an issue for the Iraqi 
government as it took more control of security.  Economically, they defended 
infrastructure which was key to rebuilding the country and fostering good 
relations with the general population.  But, at the same time a money was being 
diverted out of the country rather than being invested into rebuilding Iraq.  
Evidence of overcharging has been used to question the value for money of 
their use.  Their use can be considered in the context of Mann's assertion that 
historically mercenaries were most effective when they became 
institutionalised.127  The bubbles that emerged were unsustainable from an 
economic perspective as they relied out outside funds, and they operated 
outside of the institutions of the state.  The boom was too much, too soon and 
unsustainable this is where the damage of poor oversight and corruption come 
to damage state building.  Where in Sierra Leone CMSPS gave the government 
power against the influence of international actors, in this case they lost power.   
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In the longer-term, CMSPs were an external, and temporary patch, for 
the weakness of the state's own forces.  The move from a dictatorship to a 
democracy was going to cause a radical change in the social-political 
relationship within the country.128  Part of improving the stability of the state was 
in the viability of its security forces.  The army and police had been unreliable 
and prone to infiltration, as much a threat to coalition troops as insurgents.  
However, for the Iraqi state to become viable they needed to be established and 
used.  There was an increase in the use of Iraqi security forces following the 
surge.  As coalition forces began to withdrew they were required to pass 
responsibility on to these forces CMSPs did play a positive part in this process 
by undertaking some of the responsibility for training forces to work within the 
institutions of the state.  The long-term impact of this process remains unclear 
however, given the recent increase in violence. 
It is important that Iraq serve as a learning experience.  It is too simplistic 
to condemn an entire sector, especially given that firms directly executing 
military force make up a small part.  Although the invasion created a boom 
which was unsustainable, the industry itself has remained strong.129  Given the 
historical precedent for the use of CMSPs it seems inevitable that they will be 
required in some form in the future.  The danger of negative attention focused 
on the companies providing security work, is in making it difficult for national 
governments to employ the support services they have come to rely upon.130  
The blame for the way the companies operated must lie with the CPA, the 
organisation which had stripped power from the Iraqi state in the first instance, 
for its failure to undertake adequate oversight. It was inevitable that some 
companies would be good and others bad, which was exacerbated by the 
tendering process used by the CPA.  However, CMSPs were a preferable 
alternative to relying on ad hoc groups which were prone to engaging in 
vendettas with each other.  However, ultimately the most effective use of 
CMSPs is in training indigenous forces and building up state capacity, reducing 
the reliance on CMSPs to provide direct security. 
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"No principality is secure without having its own forces." 
Machiavelli1 
7.1  Introduction - Opening Pandora's Box? 
The increasing use of Commercial Military Service Providers since the end of 
the Cold War has resulted in many debates over their conduct and the ethics of 
their use.  This thesis has built upon existing knowledge by theorising the 
implications of CMSPs use on the state.  The interaction between CMSPs and 
the relationship between the sources of social power within the state.  The 
question posed by the title of the thesis is whether this trend has opened 
Pandora's Box?  There are problems with the use of CMSPs, they can 
destabilise the states which they are employed to strengthen; however, to take 
such a negative approach to their use is to overstate these problems.  Although 
international regimes are weak, at the level of domestic even the weakest states 
have proved themselves too capable of controlling the use of the companies.  
CMSPs are not a direct existential threat to the state.  Other state actors, or 
state sponsored non-state actors, which the companies are often employed to 
combat, are more of a threat.  The companies themselves have limited political 
leverage and are subject to the political power of other actors. 
 This does not mean they are a panacea either.  By looking at the two 
case studies, Sierra Leone and Iraq, it has been shown that the answer is far 
more complicated.  Some elements of the state are strengthened, while others 
are weakened.  CMSPs can increase the short-term military power of the state.  
However, the weakness of CMSP use is in its impact on the relationship 
between the other sources of power, particularly when used for an extended 
period.  In each case the use of CMSPs complicated the relationship between 
political, military and social sources of power.  The biggest problem is with the 
relationship between the state and society.  Rather than seeking to address the 
social, political and economic weaknesses of the state and embedding itself in 
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society, the political elite merely increases it's authoritative military power.  This 
is what happened in Sierra Leone, but the government of Iraq has been trying to 
avoid. 
 An analogy of the relationship between CMSPs and the state is that of a 
drug on the human body.  By increasing military power, CMSPs act as a 
stimulant.  The political elite are able to boost the military power of the state, 
compensating for a weakness.  However, as with a drug, CMSPs can cause side 
effects.  These are not always easy to predict, however the long term use of 
CMSPs, as with the prolonged use of drugs can damage the state.  The threat to 
the relationship between political, military and social power can undermine the 
health of the state.  There is also the danger of dependency, the state therefore 
needs to consider that much like a drug addict going cold turkey the short to 
medium term can be painful, if not fatal, even if the long term objects are 
reached.  This thesis argues like drugs, CMSPs are a short-term solution that 
allow more fundamental problems to be addressed.  Careful consideration 
needs to be taken by political elites in balancing military weakness with effective 
building of institutions.  CMSPs are most effective when they support this 
process, not merely serve to patch up the state while political, military, economic 
and social institutions continue unreformed. 
7.2 Research Objective 
This thesis set out to look at the implications of CMSP on the state.  Chapter two 
established how the term CMSP would be understood for the purposes of this 
thesis.  By engaging with the debate on how to define and label the 
commercialisation of military services several decisions were taken.  The first 
was to focus on the provision of military services, rather than an all 
encompassing look at security firms.  It is the outsourcing of the state's ability to 
fight wars that is of greatest interest here.  The second decision was to use the 
term commercial, rather than private. The distinction between public and private 
becomes blurred when firms are working so closely with the public sector, 
instead the companies are characterised as commercial enterprises, which are 
working for profit, with a shifting relationship between public and private 
spheres. 
 The research questions, as outlined in chapter one, were placed in the 
context of existing literature on the subject which had begun to look at more 
conceptual issues, but in which there are still gaps in the use of security theory.  
The thesis therefore set out to answer four main questions. 
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 What is the impact of CMSP use on the relationship between the sources 
of social power in the different networks? 
 Do CMSPs undermine the power and/or the legitimacy of the institutions 
that comprise the state? 
 Does the existence of a body, possessing the quasi-legal ability to 
exercise force, compromise the relationship of the state with other actors 
within and outside the state? 
 Therefore, how effective are CMSPs in building a sustainable security 
environment within the state? 
7.3  Approach adopted 
In order to answer these research questions it was argued in chapters one and 
two that traditional approaches to security are inappropriate.  Instead, a different 
approach was required, one which could open up the state, while retaining a 
focus on power a recognised the continuing relevance of the state as a security 
actor.  As such realist, liberal, constructivist and critical approaches to security 
were rejected as they either lack the complexity required, or moved far from 
realism and its focus on power and the state.  It was argued that Historical 
Sociology was the solution to this.  Historical Sociology itself is a complex group 
of theorists who are each pulling in different directions.  The work of Michael 
Mann most closely reflects the theory required, in particular his IEMP model 
which was developed to look at the interaction of the sources of social power 
through history, their impact on the state and society.  The IEMP model focused 
on power and the state while being complex enough. 
Mann's division of military and political power is particularly important as 
it allows the two to be abstracted from each other and their relationship with the 
other sources of power to be considered separately.   There was one 
problem with the IEMP model when used to answer the research questions.  
Mann considered ideology as a separate source of social power.  This was 
problematic as ideology can be found across all of the sources of social power.  
Instead, social power took the place of ideology as a source of power.  This was 
combined with Mann's work on globalisation and the interaction of power across 
and between five networks.  sub-national, national, transnational, international 
and global.  The sources of power interacting between each other and across 
different levels of network.  Finally, Mann's approach is also one which does not 
overemphasise theory.  The 'zigzagging' between theory and historical narrative 
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recognises the unique historical contingency behind each case. 
7.4  The Case Studies 
In chapter one, two case studies were selected for a comparative analysis with 
this theoretical approach. These were Sierra Leone and Iraq.  They were chosen 
as they are well suited to answering the research questions.  The cases 
represent a range of CMSP activity; covering several geographical areas, and 
spanned the whole of the time period, rather than privileging either the role of 
the companies in the 1990s or since 2001.  In each of these cases CMSPs were 
employed to stabilise the state.  Given the difficulty of accessing information on 
commercial enterprises, which seek to protect their reputations and the privacy 
of their customers.  They are also cases in which there is sufficient material in 
order use the theoretical model to make suitable conclusions. 
 Security firms were a constant feature of the civil war in Sierra Leone 
between 1991 and 2002.  However, the war was punctuated by the use of two 
companies - Executive Outcomes and Sandline International - to provide 
significant military services.  Chapter five applied the modified IEMP model to 
place the role played by these companies in context.  Following the invasion of 
Sierra Leone from Liberia by the RUF EO was contracted by the government, 
led by Valentine Strasser.  The Sierra Leone Army was ineffective and 
trustworthy, ECOMOG forces of questionable capability and with vested 
interests, and the international community reluctant to become involved.  EO 
was employed to regain control of mineral extraction areas, and combat the 
RUF.  This was militarily successful, but EO was asked to leave and the military 
and RUF seized control of Freetown.  Following another military coup and 
destabilisation of Sandline was invited to help restore the exiled Kabbah.  The 
civil war was brought to an end in 2002 after involvement by the British resulted 
in a concerted effort at rebuilding the state. 
 CMSPs were used in Iraq during and following the 2003 invasion.  The 
use of CMSPs has shaped the way they have been understood over the past 
ten years.  CMSPs were used by a number of actors, but the use of commercial 
enterprises by coalition forces, particularly the CPA stimulated much of the 
boom.  During this initial period several incidents led to the questioning of the 
conduct of contractors.  Abu Ghraib, Fallujah, Nisur Square and the battle of 
Najef.  From by 2007-8 the market in Iraq had tightened and military firms 
consolidated.  The US and Iraqi government, for different reasons, tightened 
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control over the companies.  At this time the US responded to increasing 
violence by undertaking a major change in its approach to the occupation.  The 
'surge' increased troop numbers and moved them into troubled neighbourhoods, 
the result was a reduction in the violence.  The final stages of the war have been 
about US attempts to extricate itself from the country.  CMSPs have continued to 
play an important role as they have allowed troop numbers to be reduced, but 
the Iraqi government has opposed their use as it seeks to gain control over the 
country. 
7.5  CMSPs and the sources of social power 
The implications of CMSP activity on the sources of social power across the 
case studies can be generalised.  On the whole the primary purpose of 
increasing military power was achieved, though there were also problems. 
Political and economic power of the state both increased and decreased.  
Significant changes occurred to the relationship between the sources of social 
power.  Economic power was transferred to military power.  Military power both 
increased and weakened political power.  The relationship between military and 
political, political and social sources of power is the most problematic.  In 
returning authoritative power back to the state, CMSPs damaged the long-term 
embeddedness of the state in society.  The use of CMSPs also affected the 
distribution and relationship of power across the networks, some power was 
returned to the state.  Though when not working directly for the state CMSPs 
challenge the institutional power of the state through both military and political 
power.  The use of CMSPs remains subject to the power stronger states can 
exert over weaker states, either independently or through global organisations. 
 In each of the cases CMSPs demonstrated the ability to positively 
increase the military power of the state.  In Sierra Leone the other military actors 
were weak, unreliable, ,initially absent, or came with vested interests.  CMSPs 
were successful in defeating the RUF in targeted areas, including strategically 
important natural resources and the politically important capital centre.  They 
worked with local defence forces to train them and were more effective than 
most other military forces.  In Iraq CMSPs made up for a shortfall in the numbers 
of coalition troops by providing a substantial number of personnel which 
provided a range of services.  CMSPs were important given the decision to 
purge the Ba'ath Party from power, by disbanding the police and military.  The 
speed of the invasion resulted in a failure to secure Republican Guard weapons 
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depots which were looted and fed the resulting civil war and insurgency.  
CMSPs in Iraq were less instrumental in shaping the course of the war than in 
Sierra Leone.  They roles they undertook were to support and guard, even 
though this regularly led to the use of force.  It took the 'Surge' of US troops to 
change the course of the war.  There were incidents of confusion with coalition 
troops, and issues of abuse.  Oversight remained weak in practice, despite 
efforts to improve it.  But, on the whole CMSPs were more reliable and effective 
than Iraqi forces.  They began to take a role in long-term state building by 
training coalition and Iraqi forces, but this was cut short. 
 CMSPs strengthened the authoritative political power of the Strasser 
regime in Sierra Leone and the CPA in Iraq.  In Sierra Leone, Freetown was 
defended by EO and Sandline took a contested role in liberating it.  Weakness 
was shown by CMSPs as internal and external political pressure on the 
government led to the cancellation of the contracts with both Executive 
Outcomes and Sandline International.  EO, victorious on the battlefield, was 
effectively defeated by the RUF in negotiations.  The situation was rather more 
complicated in Iraq. In Iraq, CMSPs were under the employment of coalition 
forces, primarily the military and CPA.  While Iraq was under the control of the 
CPA, CMSPs helped to protect the administrative centre of the Green Zone and 
moved civilian officials around the country.  CMSPs themselves are able to exert 
some political influence, though they are not strong political actors.  There was 
weakness in oversight and control, which improved over time.  The Iraqi 
government had less control over the use of CMSPs.  This became more of a 
problem as power was passed to the Iraqi government, but CMSPs remained 
under the control of the CPA. This was a result of the greater relative power of 
the US compared to Iraq, rather than the CMSPs themselves.  However, as time 
progressed CMSPs came under the control of the Iraqi government, more so 
than US troops.  In both Iraq and Sierra Leone the use of CMSPS was to at 
least some degree dictated by other international and global actors.  Although 
CMSPs could isolate the state from some actors, both were susceptible to 
stronger political actors. 
 The impact on the economic power of the state was a trade-off in each of 
the case studies, both within economic power, and with the other sources of 
social power.  In Sierra Leone CMSPs increased the access to the diamond and 
metal mines which had been lost to other actors, allegedly in return for 
concessions.  In Iraq, the cost was money which had been allocated by the US 
government for reconstruction.  Money which was spent on CMSPs effectively 
 176 
 
left the country to the profits of the companies, or the pay of their employees.  
Though, CMSPs were used to support reconstruction which facilitated the 
rebuilding and the protection of infrastructure such as pipelines.  As a result 
there was a positive economic gain from their use, increasing the long-term 
economic power of the country.  There were problems of overcharging and 
wastage which has led to their value being questioned, though these affected 
the US rather than Iraq. 
Of the relationship between the sources of power the most obvious, and 
beneficial trade off, was that of economic to military power.  This is commonly 
mentioned use of CMSPs, allowing the fungibility of economic power into military 
power.  For a country like Sierra Leone with access to natural resources, but a 
weak military, it proved to be effective.  In Iraq it also allowed the vast quantity of 
money allocated for reconstruction to be used when coalition military capacity 
was insufficient and domestic actors were also weak. 
The purchase of military power also increased the political power of the 
state by isolating and marginalising the potentially unreliable military forces.  
This could be a short-term positive for the state.  By providing an independent 
source of military force CMSPs can reduce the political leverage of some actors 
on the state.  In Sierra Leone the army was a weak force which in frequently 
staged coups and was more of danger to the state than the RUF.  In Iraq the 
fledgling military and police forces were formed from inexperienced volunteers 
and were susceptible to infiltration.  The political influence of other internal and 
external actors was also reduced. The transfer of power from military to political 
institutions of the state was also problematic though.  By marginalising the 
military there is a danger it can become even more of a threat to the state.  At 
least one of the coups in Sierra Leone was a result of resentment against the 
marginalisation of the military.  The same reaction was induced in Papua New 
Guinea.  Before Sandline International could even start their contract the military 
staged a coup, arrested Spicer and threw the company out of the country.2  The 
implications for the CMSPs on the relationship between the political and social 
sources of power are one of the most problematic in the short-term.   
 The relationship between societal and the other sources of power is the 
most problematic in the longer-term.  Increasing security in Iraq and Sierra 
Leone was important to improving confidence of the population in the state.  
However, the way this was undertaken led to alienation, covering up longer-term 
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 Lt. Col. Tim Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier, Peace War and the Sandline Affair (London: 
Mainstream Publishing, 1999). 
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problems rather than forcing the state to address them.  In Sierra Leone the 
populations in the areas CMSPs operated were happy for the improvement in 
security.  However, there were large portions of the country which were ignored.  
As soon as CMSPs were withdrawn the military weakness exposed the 
underlying problems in the country.  The distribution of military power also 
affected societal relations by granting extra power to groups.  The use of CMSPs 
did privilege the Kamajors who formed part of the civil defence forces.  By 
increasing the authoritative power of the state the government was able to 
ignore the need for more fundamental reforms in the country.  In Iraq the 
presence of CMSPs was viewed as, if not more so, negatively than the presence 
of coalition troops.  The lack of control over the companies, both real and 
perceived, and their conduct towards the wider population contributed towards 
tensions.  In trying to build the legitimacy of the Iraqi state al-Maliki has been 
keen bring CMSPs under control, leading to their ultimate removal along with 
coalition forces. 
 The implications for the interaction between the sources of social power 
are mixed.  Some are strengthened in the short-term, though there is a threat of 
immediate alienation.  In the longer-term the state is at risk of damaging the 
relationship between the sources of power.  Particularly the relationship between 
the military-political elements of the state and wider society. 
7.6 CMSPs and the State 
The interaction between the sources of social power therefore has implications 
for the state, as understood in chapter three.  In this definition the state was 
understood as: 
 a differentiated set of institutions and personnel 
 embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and 
from a centre, to cover a 
 territorially demarcated area over which it exercises 
 some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some 
organised political force.3 
In both case studies the use of CMSPs had implications for the state as 
understood by this definition.  They protected state infrastructure, helped to 
improve control over territory and altered the way in which the institutions of the 
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 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 
1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.55. 
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government were able to execute political force.  There was a difference 
between the case studies.  Because the companies were working directly for the 
government in Sierra Leone, the state was strengthened in the short terms as 
military power improved the effectiveness of institutions.  Control of important 
infrastructural parts of the country was re-established or protected.  This 
lessoned the impact of other actors across the networks to influence the state.  
But, as the use of the companies persisted the long-term embeddness of the 
institutions in society was undermined, damaging the state.  
 In the Iraq case study the implications of CMSP activity were more 
complicated.  CMSPs provided some short-term control, with weak 
infrastructural control by the CPA.  As responsibility for running Iraq shifted to 
the Iraqi government the coalition CPA increased control over the companies, 
but the Iraqi government lacked control.  This was remedied over time as the 
contractors lost immunity from prosecution.  CMSPs, reinforced, undermined 
and then started to reinforce the state institutions.  In this case, although the 
power of some sub-state and transnational actors was reduced; power was lost 
to the coalition states. 
7.7 CMSPs and the Research Questions 
Having considered the implications of the use of CMSPs in the case studies, on 
the sources of social power and of the state, it is now possible to answer the 
research questions. 
 What is the impact of CMSP use on the relationship between the sources 
of social power in the different networks? 
When the state is in effective control of the CMSPs that are working within the 
state, the military power of the state is increased, particularly over sub-state and 
transnational actors.  This embodies the state with greater economic and 
political power, as control of resources is secured from other actors.  But, both 
Iraq and Sierra Leone show how militarily and politically weak states are still 
susceptible to the power of the strong states, militarily, politically and 
economically. 
 Do CMSPs undermine the power and/or the legitimacy of the institutions 
that comprise the state? 
In the short-term CMSPs increase the authoritative power of the state by 
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increasing military power, and strengthening institutions.  The short-term boost 
in security can help the legitimacy of the state.  But, in the longer-term the 
legitimacy of the state is undermined.  The use of CMSPs hampers the state by 
weakening the relationship between social-political-and military sources of 
power.  The overall effect is to reduce the embeddness of state in society and 
the legitimacy of the state, creating more opposition. 
 Does the existence of a body, possessing the quasi-legal ability to 
exercise force, compromise the relationship of the state with other actors 
within and outside the state? 
The presence of CMSPs could result in some isolation of military and social 
actors from within the state. In the short term there is a danger of alienating 
state military actors and in the long term of alienating social actors. 
 Therefore, how effective are CMSPs in building a sustainable security 
environment within the state? 
By improving the military power of the state the use of CMSPs in the case 
studies contributed towards a temporary increase in the security of the state.  
But their long-term use weakens the state by aggravating the relationship 
between state institutions, actors and the relationship between state and society 
7.8 Conclusion 
This thesis has argued that the impact of the use of CMSPs lies between those 
who condemn their use, and those who perceive them to be a panacea to the 
military weakness of the state.  CMSPs have a role in supporting weak states, 
particularly when other actors are either absent, or further destabilising the state.  
By taking a theoretical approach which has looked at the use of CMSPs in the 
context of power it is possible to take a nuanced approach.  Control over 
CMSPs is a particularly contentious issue, particularly in war zones.  The lack of 
oversight and regulation has led to the questioning of the effectiveness and 
value of the services provided.  There are of course good companies and bad 
companies, but this is an area of improvement.  Increasing control of CMSPs 
could improve the institutionalisation of their use, making it more sustainable. 
In terms of international security CMSPs are a comparatively weak actor, 
especially in relation to the state.  If weak states like Sierra Leone and Iraq can 
exercise control at a domestic level and remove the companies when required, 
 180 
 
there is little direct existential threat to the state.  In Iraq the problem with the 
companies was their backing by the US, which increased their power within the 
state.  The problems which do arise from the use of CMSPs are indirect, in 
propping up a state the balance between the sources of social power can be 
altered, potentially destabilising the state. 
Returning to the analogy for the use of CMSPs by the state with that of a 
drug on the human body.  When used carefully CMSPs can act as stimulant 
which temporarily rebalances the sources of power within the state and its 
relationship with other actors. The state then has the freedom to address the 
underlying problems.  There is a danger of immediately upsetting this balance, 
between military and political, with potentially dramatic results.  But this is a risk 
that the political elite of a state may be prepared to take to prevent the state 
succumbing to a greater existential threat. The greatest danger is of 
dependency, and the political elite relying on CMSPs to prop up the authoritarian 
power of the state.  This is a decision which lies with the political elite of the 
country - whether they prefer long-term stability over-medium term authoritative 
power.  Equally, ending the use of the companies early can be equally 
problematic for the state.  In Sierra Leone the outcome was the overthrow of the 
government, the fall of Freetown and the collapse of effective power.  Hence 
why the removal of Blackwater was so problematic to the U.S. in Iraq.  This 
thesis therefore argues that CMSPs are a short-term solution, that allow more 
fundamental problems to be addressed.  Careful consideration needs to be 
taken by political elites in balancing military weakness with effective building of 
institutions.  CMSPs are most effective when they support this process, not 
merely serve to patch up the state while political, military, economic and social 
institutions continue unreformed. 
Much reference is made to Machiavelli and his writing on mercenaries.  
His analysis of the use has rightly come under much criticism.4  However, he 
was right about the importance of national forces, though for the wrong reasons.  
In creating a state which has strong institutions which are embedded in society, 
an institutionalised military force is necessary.  Going back to the assertion by 
Mann that historically mercenaries functioned most effectively when they 
became institutionalised within the state.5  In regards to weak states CMSPs do 
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 See for example James Jay Carafano, Private Sector, Public Wars: Contractors in Combat - 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Future Conflicts (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp.14-19. 
5
 See chapter 4 
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not currently fulfil this role.  They can provide a stop gap and play a role in 
building these forces. 
7.9  Place in the Literature 
In the writing on CMSPs this thesis joins those studies which have sought to 
move beyond the descriptive reporting of much of the early writing on the 
subject.  In particular those who have sought to understand CMSPs activity 
using theoretical frameworks, such as Krahmann, Percy, Avant, Pattison and 
Ortiz.6  In doing so this thesis has built upon those studies which raised the 
possible implications of CMSPs on the state.  Taking the questions raised by 
writers like Peter Singer, who did not pursue the issue in depth.7 
 This thesis takes place alongside more recent writing on CMSPs which 
has focused on a number of complementary issues.  Regulation has been a 
fertile ground for research, with Percy, Singer and Krahmann all looking at the 
issue.8  There has been a move in the recent literature to consider 'lower end' 
security companies.9  Though this thesis chose to focus on the military side of 
the industry.  Others have looked at the home states of the companies, including 
the US, UK, and South Africa, and their role in regulation.10  Again, the focus 
here differs by considering the states in which the companies are used.   
 There is some overlap with the work of Bruneau who looked at civil-
military relations in the context of the US military.11 But, who looked at the use of 
contractors, balancing their military effectiveness with the implications for the 
democratic deficit of the state.  Stanger is another who has looked at the power 
of the state and the use of contractors, but with a focus on the US.12  Some 
elements of this thesis coincide with the work of Dunnigan who looks at the 
military effectiveness of CMSPs.   
 The conclusions of this thesis are situated alongside those writers who 
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have argued for the utility of the companies, particularly given their 
attractiveness for isolated governments.  Arguing that they have short-term 
utility.13  It disagrees with those who have taken a strong opposition to the use of 
CMSPs.14  However, it also joins those commentators who have concerns over 
the long-term use of security firms to prop up a state. 
 This thesis also contributes to wider literature on both international 
security and historical sociology.  The search for alternative approaches to 
security which account for changes in actors and the structure of the 
international system build on the work of Buzan and Lipschutz.15  The continued 
relevance of these questions can be seen in Krahmann's edited volume.16  It has 
also joined those who have used historical sociology in international relations.  
And those who have been influenced by the work of Michael Mann in pursuing 
this avenue of research.17 
7.10  Further Study 
The study of CMSPs remains a fascinating and relevant issue in the study of 
international security.  Particularly as the industry continues to increase in size 
despite the wind down of Iraq and Afghanistan.18  As such there are plenty of 
options available for further study.  The theoretical model used here could be 
expanded to other cases which occurred during this period, such as Papua New 
Guinea, Angola, Afghanistan, the Balkans and Columbia.  The modified IEMP 
model could be used to look at the role of commercial enterprises which are 
fulfilling services at the lower end of security spectrum where commercial 
security companies are prolific, such as in South Africa.  Several new cases 
have also arisen, and will continue to do so, such as Somalia.  There has also 
been a growth in the number of domestically produced firms.19 
 The modified IEMP model could also be used in theorising other issues.  
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Either to focus on non-state actors, transnational actors, or international 
organisations and their impact on state power.  Much writing on historical 
sociology, such as Mann, Tilley and Skocpol has focused on revolution and 
change.  The modified model could also be used more generally in considering 
the failure of weak states and their relationship with other non-state and state 
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